

# ADDITIONS, INTEGRATIONS, CORRECTIONS AND SUPPLEMENTS TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ARNOLD JOSEPH TOYNBEE\*

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Integration to Part I,  
Works by Arnold J. Toynbee

## 1915-1916

Arnold J. Toynbee, *Nationality and the Future* and *Nationality and Sovereignty*, in *Towards an Enduring Peace. A Symposium of Peace Proposals and Programs, 1914-1916*, compiled by Randolph Silliman Bourne, with an Introduction by Franklin H. Giddins, New York, American Associations for International Conciliation, Part I, *Principles of the Settlement: Political*, pp. 43-56, 57-69.

Excerpts from Item 909, A.J. Toynbee, *Nationality and the War*, London, Dent, 1915 (reprinted, New York, Dutton, 1915), Chapter I, *The Future*, pp. 1-20, Chapter XII, *Nationality and Sovereignty*, pp. 478-498.

## NOTE

As stated in the *Preface* (p. XV), the aim of *Towards an Enduring Peace* was «to present a discussion of some of the most hopeful and constructive suggestions for the settlement of the war on terms that would make for a lasting peace. The selections are taken from books, magazines, manifestoes, programs, etc., that have appeared since the beginning of the war. Part I contains a discussion of the general principles of a settlement, economic and political. Part II contains the more concrete suggestions for the constitution of a definite League of Peace. Part III presents some of the reconstructive ideals – «Towards the Future» – as voiced by writers in the different countries. In the Appendix are collected definite programs for peace put forward by associations and individuals, international organizations, etc., in this country, Great Britain, Germany, France, Holland, Denmark and Sweden, and Switzerland».

Toynbee's *Nationality and the War* was described as part of «an indispensable library for the understanding of international questions» (*ibid.*), and its twenty-six years old author as «the son-in-law of Prof. Gilbert Murray, and (...) one of the most brilliant students of problems of nationality» (*Concerning the Authors quoted, ibid.*, p. XIII).

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\* *A Bibliography of Arnold J. Toynbee*, compiled by S. Fiona Morton, with a Foreword by Veronica M. Toynbee, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980.

## NATIONALITY AND THE FUTURE\*

<sup>MH</sup>For the first time in our lives, we find ourselves in complete uncertainty as to the future. To uncivilised people the situation is commonplace; but in twentieth-century Europe we are accustomed to look ahead, to forecast accurately what lies before us, and then to choose our path and follow it steadily to its end; and we rightly consider that this is the characteristic of civilised men. The same ideal appears in every side of our life: in the individual's morality as a desire for "Independence" strong enough to control most human passions: in our Economics as Estimates and Insurances: in our Politics as a great sustained concentration of all our surplus energies, in which parties are becoming increasingly at one in aim and effort, while their differences are shrinking to alternatives of method, to raise the material, moral, and intellectual standard of life throughout the nation. From all this fruitful, constructive, exacting work, which demands the best from us and makes us the better for giving it, we have been violently wrenched away and plunged into a struggle for existence with people very much like ourselves, with whom we have no quarrel.

We must face the fact that this is pure evil, and that we cannot escape it. We must fight with all our strength: every particle of our energy must be absorbed in the war: and meanwhile our social construction must stand still indefinitely, or even be in part undone, and every class and individual in the country must suffer in their degree, according to the quite arbitrary chance of war, in lives horribly destroyed and work ruined. [*We have to carry this war to a successful issue, because on that depends our freedom to govern our own life after the war is over, and the preservation of this freedom itself is more important for us than the whole sum of concrete gains its possession has so far brought us.*

*Thus we are sacrificing our present to our future, and, therein, obeying the civilised man's ideal to the uttermost. But we shall only be justified in our most momentous decision, by*

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\* The passages in square brackets and italics were omitted in the excerpts. The compiler added some marginal headings at the very beginning of each page of the excerpts, which here I have momentarily reproduced in capital letters and inserted as notes in correspondence to the beginning of the first new paragraph of each page in the original with the initials MH.

<sup>MH</sup> WAR HAS SHATTERED OUR CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORT.

*which we have put to the touch the whole of our fortunes at once, if the path we choose and follow is worthy of the sacrifice and the danger we are incurring for the sake of it.*

*At present we are all working, according to our individual capacities, for success in the war, but we have little influence, even collectively, upon the result. We have unreservedly put the control of it into the hands of experts whom we trust, and rightly done so, because it is the essence of this evil, war, whether the veiled war of Diplomacy or the naked war of military force, that its conduct must be secret and autocratic. Naturally our thoughts are with the fleets and armies, for we know that if they are beaten, we lose the thing they are fighting for, freedom of choice; but we are in danger of forgetting that, if we win, our object is not automatically attained. If we read in the newspaper one day that the powers with which we are at war had submitted unconditionally to the Allies, we should only be at the beginning of our real task. The reconstruction of Europe would be in our hands; but we should be exposed to the one thing worse than defeat in the field, to the misuse of the immense power of decision, for good or evil, given us by victory.*

*This is an issue incomparably graver than the military struggle that lies immediately before us. Firstly, we are more personally responsible for it as individuals. The war itself is not only being managed by experts: it was brought upon us (the White Paper leaves no doubt in our minds) by factors outside England altogether. But our policy after hostilities cease will be decided by our own government relying for its authority upon the country behind it, that is, it will be decided ultimately by public opinion. Secondly, the state of war will have shaken our judgment when we are most in need of judging wisely.]*

<sup>MH</sup>The psychological devastation of war is even more terrible than the material. War brings the savage substratum of human character to the surface, after it has swept away the strong habits that generations of civilised effort have built up. We saw how the breath of war in Ireland demoralised all parties alike. We have met the present more ghastly reality with admirable calmness; but we must be on our guard. Time wears out nerves, and War inevitably brings with it the suggestion of certain obsolete points of view, which in our real, normal life, have long been buried and forgotten.

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<sup>MH</sup> IT HAS ROUSED THE INSTINCT OF REVENGE.

It rouses the instinct of revenge. «If Germany has hurt us, we will hurt her more – to teach her not to do it again». The wish is the savage's automatic reaction, the reason his perfunctory justification of it: but the civilised man knows that the impulse is hopelessly unreasonable. The «hurt» is being at war, and the evil we wish to bann is the possibility of being at war again, because war prevents us working out our own lives as we choose. If we beat Germany and then humiliate her, she will never rest till she has "redeemed her honour", by humiliating us more cruelly in turn. Instead of being free to return to our own pressing business, we shall have to be constantly on the watch against her. Two great nations will sit idle, weapon in hand, like two Afghans in their loopholed towers when the blood feud is between them; and we shall have sacrificed deliberately and to an ever-increasing extent, for the blood feud grows by geometrical progression, the very freedom for which we are now giving our lives.

<sup>MH</sup>Another war instinct is plunder. War is often the savage's profession: «"With my sword, spear and shield I plough, I sow, I reap, I gather in the vintage"[1]. If we beat Germany our own mills and factories will have been at a standstill, our horses requisitioned and our crops unharvested, our merchant steamers stranded in dock if not sunk on the high seas, and our 'blood and treasure' lavished on the war: but in the end Germany's wealth will be in our grasp, her colonies, her markets, and such floating riches as we can distraint upon by means of an indemnity. If we have had to beat our ploughshares into swords, we can at least draw some profit from the new tool, and recoup ourselves partially for the inconvenience. It is no longer a question of irrational, impulsive revenge, perhaps not even of sweetening our sorrow by a little gain. To draw on the life-blood of German wealth may be the only way to replenish the veins of our exhausted Industry and Commerce». So the plunder instinct might be clothed in civilised garb: «War», we might express it, «is an investment that must bring in its return».

The first argument against this point of view is that it has clearly been the inspiring idea of Germany's policy, and history already shows that armaments are as unbusinesslike a speculation for civilised countries as war is an abnormal occupation for civilised men. We

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<sup>MH</sup> AND OF PLUNDER.

[<sup>1</sup> *The song of Hybrias the Kretan.*]

saw the effect of the Morocco tension upon German finance in 1911, and the first phase of the present war has been enough to show how much Germany's commerce will inevitably suffer, whether she wins or loses.

It is only when all the armaments are on one side and all the wealth is on the other, that war pays; when, in fact, an armed savage attacks a civilised man possessed of no arms for the protection of his wealth. Our Afghans in their towers are sharp enough not to steal each other's cows (supposing they possess any of their own) for cows do not multiply by being exchanged, and both Afghans would starve in the end after wasting all their bullets in the skirmish. They save their bullets to steal cows from the plainsman who cannot make reprisals.

<sup>MH</sup>If Germany were really nothing but a "nation in arms", successful war might be as lucrative for her as an Afghan's raid on the plain, but she is normally a great industrial community like ourselves. In the last generation she has achieved a national growth of which she is justly proud. Like our own, it has been entirely social and economic. Her goods have been peacefully conquering the world's markets. Now her workers have been diverted *en masse* from their prospering industry to conquer the same markets by military force, and the whole work of forty years is jeopardised by the change of method.

Fighting for trade and industry is not like fighting for cattle. Cattle are driven from one fastness to another, and if no better, are at least no worse for the transit. Civilised wealth perishes on the way. Our economic organisation owes its power and range to the marvellous forethought and cooperation that has built it up; but the most delicate organisms are the most easily dislocated, and the conqueror, whether England or Germany, will have to realise that, though he may seem to have got the wealth of the conquered into his grip, the total wealth of both parties will have been vastly diminished by the process of the struggle.

The characteristic feature of modern wealth is that it is international. Economic gain and loss is shared by the whole world, and the shifting of the economic balance does not correspond to the moves in the game of diplomatists and armies. Germany's economic growth has been a phenomenon quite independent of her political ambitions, and Germany's economic ruin would compromise something far greater than Germany's political

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<sup>MH</sup> BUT TO FIGHT FOR TRADE NO LONGER PAYS.

future – the whole world’s prosperity. British wealth, among the rest, would be dealt a deadly wound by Germany’s economic death, and it would be idle to pump Germany’s last life-blood into our veins, if we were automatically draining them of our own blood in the process.

<sup>MH</sup>But issues greater than the economic are involved. The modern “Nation” is for good or ill an organism one and indivisible, and all the diverse branches of national activity flourish or wither with the whole national wellbeing. You cannot destroy German wealth without paralysing German intellect and art, and European civilisation, if it is to go on growing, cannot do without them. Every doctor and musician, every scientist, engineer, political economist and historian, knows well his debt to the spiritual energy of the German nation. In the moments when one realises the full horror of what is happening, the worst thought is the aimless hurling to destruction of the world’s only true wealth, the skill and nobility and genius of human beings, and it is probably in the German casualties that the intellectual world is suffering its most irreparable human losses.

With these facts in our minds, we can look into the future more dearly, and choose our policy (supposing that we win the war, and, thereby, the power to choose) with greater confidence. We have accepted the fact that war itself is the evil, and will in any event bring pure loss to both parties: that no good can come from the war itself, but only from our policy when the war is over: and that the one good our policy can achieve, without which every gain is delusive, is the banishing of this evil from the realities of the future. This is our one supreme “British interest”, and it is a German interest just as much, and an interest of the whole world.

<sup>MH</sup>This war, and the cloud of war that has weighed upon us so many years before the bursting of the storm, has brought to bankruptcy the “National State”. Till 1870 it was the ultimate ideal of European politics, as it is still in the Balkans, where the Turk has broken Time’s wings. It was such a fruitful ideal that it has rapidly carried us beyond itself, and in the last generation the life of the world has been steadily finding new and wider channels. In the crisis of change from nationalism to internationalism we were still exposed to the plague of war. The crisis might have been passed without it, and war banished for ever between the

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<sup>MH</sup> GERMANY’S ECONOMIC RUIN WOULD COMPROMISE WORLD-PROSPERITY.

<sup>MH</sup> THE BASES OF TRUE NATIONALITY MUST BE LAID.

nations of civilised Europe. Now that the catastrophe has happened (it is childish to waste energy in incriminations against its promoters) we must carry through the change completely and at once: we cannot possibly afford to be exposed to the danger again.

No tool, machine, or idea made by men has an immortal career. Sooner or later they all run amuck, and begin to do evil instead of good. At that stage savage or unskilful men destroy them by force and replace them by their opposite: civilised men get them under control, and build them into something new and greater. Nationality will sink from being the pinnacle of politics only to become their foundation, and till the foundations are laid true, further building is impossible. But the bases of nationality have never yet been laid true in Europe. When we say that «nationality was the political ideal of the nineteenth century», and that 1870 left the populations of Europe organised in national groups, we are taking far too complacent a view of historical facts. The same century that produced a united Italy and Germany, saw out the whole tragedy of Poland, from the first partition in 1772 to the last revolt in 1863. Human ideas do not spring into the world full-grown and shining, like Athena: they trail the infection of evil things from the past.

<sup>MH</sup>In the Dark Ages Europe's most pressing need and only practicable ideal was strong government<sup>[1]</sup>. Strong government came with its blessings, but it brought the evil of territorial ambitions. The Duke of Burgundy spent the wealth of his Netherland subjects in trying to conquer the Swiss mountaineers. Burgundy succumbed to the king of France. But the very factor that made the French kings survive in the struggle for existence between governments, the force of compact nationality which the French kingdom happened to contain, delivered the inheritance of the kings to the Nation.

The French Nation in the Revolution burst the chrysalis of irresponsible government beneath which it had grown to organic life, but like a true heir it took over the Royal Government's ideal: «Peace within and piracy without». France had already begun aggression abroad before she had accomplished self-government at home, and in delivering

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<sup>MH</sup> NATIONALISM HAS PERPETUATED VIOLENCE.

[<sup>1</sup> *The expression "Strong Government" is used throughout this book in the quasi-technical sense of "Government in which the governed have no share". "Absolutism" and "Autocracy" are terms more usually employed, but both have acquired a sinister connotation, and it is better to use some neutral word that implies no judgement on what denotes.*]

herself to Napoleon she sacrificed her liberty to her ambition. Napoleon's only enduring achievements outside France were the things he set himself to prevent, the realisation, by a forceful reaction against force, of German and Italian nationality. Nationalism was converted to violence from the outset, and the struggle for existence between absolute governments has merely been replaced by a struggle between nationalities, equally blind, haphazard, and non-moral, but far more terrific, just because the virtue of self-government is to focus and utilise human energy so much more effectively than the irresponsible government it has superseded.

<sup>MH</sup>Naturally the result of this planless strife has been no grouping of Europe on a just and reasonable national basis. France and England, achieving racial frontiers and national self-government early, inherited the Earth before Germany and Italy struggled up beside them, to take their leavings of markets and colonial areas. But the government that united Germany had founded its power on the partition of Poland, and in the second Balkan War of 1913 we saw a striking example of the endless chain of evil forged by an act of national injustice.

The Hungarians used the liberty they won in 1867 to subject the Slavonic population between themselves and the sea, and prevent its union with the free principality of Serbia of the same Slavonic nationality. This drove Serbia in 1912 to follow Hungary's example by seizing the coast of the non-Slavonic Albanians; and when Austria-Hungary prevented this (a right act prompted by most unrighteous motives), Serbia fought an unjust war with Bulgaria and subjected a large Bulgarian population, in order to gain access to the only seaboard left her, the friendly Greek port of Salonika.

Hungary and Serbia are nominally national states: but more than half the population in Hungary, and perhaps nearly a quarter in Serbia, is alien, only held within the state by force against its will. The energy of both states is perverted to the futile and demoralising work of "Magyarising" and "Serbising" subject foreign populations, and they have not even been successful. The resistance of Southern Slav nationalism on the defensive to the aggression of Hungarian nationalism has given the occasion for the present catastrophe.

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<sup>MH</sup> INTRA-NATIONAL OPPRESSION HAS BEEN A CHIEF CAUSE OF WAR.



The evil element in nationalism under its many names, "Chauvinism", "Jingoism", "Prussianism", is the one thing in our present European civilisation that can and does produce the calamity of war. If our object is to prevent war, then, the way to do so is to purge Nationality of this evil. This we cannot do by any mechanical means, but only by a change of heart, by converting public opinion throughout Europe from "National Competition" to "National Co-operation". Public opinion will never be converted so long as the present system of injustice remains in force, so long as one nation has less and another more than its due. The first step towards internationalism is not to flout the problems of nationality, but to solve them.

<sup>MH</sup>The most important practical business, then, of the conference that meets when war is over, will be the revision of the map of Europe. [*Merely to suggest such a thing is a complete reversal of our policy during the last generation. We in England have been steadily shutting our eyes to nationality, and minimising its importance. Our English national question was settled long ago. Our geographical situation as an island of manageable size gave our mediaeval Norman and Angevin kings an exceptional opportunity for establishing at an early date a strong well-knit government. The nation became self-conscious when it expanded under the Tudors, and self-governing by the political revolutions of the seventeenth century, a full hundred years ahead of France. While France was realising her nationality, we were passing through the Industrial Revolution, and during the last century we have been working, with rapidly increasing success during latter years, to adapt ourselves to our new economic conditions.*]

If we do not think about nationality, it is simply because we have long taken it for granted, and our mind is focussed on posterior developments; but it is increasingly hard to keep ourselves out of touch with other countries, and though our blindness has been partly distraction, it has also been in part deliberate policy. We saw well enough that the present phase of the national problem in Europe carried in it the seeds of war. We rightly thought that war itself was the evil, an evil incomparably greater than the national injustices that might become the cause of it. We knew that, if these questions were opened, war would

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<sup>MH</sup> THE MAP OF EUROPE MUST BE JUSTLY REVISED.

follow. We accordingly adopted the only possible course. We built our policy on the chance that national feeling could be damped down till it had been superseded in the public opinion of Europe by other interests, not because Nationalism was unjustified, but because it endangered so much more than it was worth. Knowing that we had passed out of the nationalist phase ourselves, and that from our present political point of view war was purely evil, we hoped that it was merely a question of time for the Continental populations to reach the same standpoint. Notably in Germany, the focus of danger, we saw social interests coming more and more to the front at the expense of militarism. We threw ourselves into the negative task of staving off the catastrophe in the interim, by a strenuous policy of compromise and conciliation, which has been successful on at least two critical occasions. Now that the evil has been too powerful and the catastrophe has happened, the reasons for this policy are dead. Nationalism has been strong enough to produce war in spite of us. It has terribly proved itself to be no outworn creed, but a vital force to be reckoned with. It is stronger on the Continent than social politics. It is the raw material that litters the whole ground. We must build it into our foundations, or give up the task, not only of constructive social advance beyond the limits we have already reached, but even of any fundamental reconstruction of what the war will have destroyed.

<sup>MH</sup>Perhaps we might have foretold this from the case of Ireland immediately under our eyes. Failure to solve her national problem has arrested Ireland's development since the seventeenth century, and imprisoned her in a world of ideas almost unintelligible to an Englishman till he has travelled in the Balkans. This has been England's fault, and we are now at last in a fair way to remedy it. The moment we have succeeded in arranging that the different national groups in Ireland govern themselves in the way they really wish, the national question will pass from the Irish consciousness; they will put two centuries behind them at one leap, and come into line with ourselves. The Dublin strike, contemporary with the arming of the Volunteers, shows how the modern problems are jostling at the heels of the old. Although "Unionist" and "Nationalist" politicians could still declare that their attitude

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<sup>MH</sup> OTHERWISE NO PERMANENT SETTLEMENT IS POSSIBLE.

towards the strike was neutral, the parliament of the new Irish state will discuss the social problem and nothing else.

<sup>MH</sup>Ireland, then, has forced us to think about the problem of nationalism; and our Irish experience will be invaluable to us when peace is made, and we take in hand, in concert with our allies, the national questions of the rest of Europe. To begin with, we already have a notion of what Nationality is. Like all great forces in human life, it is nothing material or mechanical, but a subjective psychological feeling in living people. This feeling can be kindled by the presence of one or several of a series of factors: a common country, especially if it is a well defined physical region, like an island, a river basin, or a mountain mass; a common language, especially if it has given birth to a literature; a common religion; and that much more impalpable force, a common tradition or sense of memories shared from the past.

But it is impossible to argue a priori from the presence of one or even several of these factors to the existence of a nationality: they may have been there for ages and kindled no response. And it is impossible to argue from one case to another: precisely the same group of factors may produce nationality here, and there have no effect. Great Britain is a nation by geography and tradition, though important Keltic-speaking sections of the population in Wales and the Highlands do not understand the predominant English language. Ireland is an island smaller still and more compact, and is further unified by the almost complete predominance of the same English language, for the Keltic speech is incomparably less vigorous here than in Wales; yet the absence of common tradition combines with religious differences to divide the country into two nationalities, at present sharply distinct from one another and none the less hostile because their national psychology is strikingly the same. Germany is divided by religion in precisely the same way as Ireland, her common tradition is hardly stronger, and her geographical boundaries quite vague: yet she has built up her present concentrated national feeling in three generations. Italy has geography, language and tradition to bind her together; and yet a more vivid tradition is able to separate the Ticinese from his neighbours, and bind him to people of alien speech and religion beyond a

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<sup>MH</sup> NATIONALITY IS SUBJECTIVE, NOT MATERIAL.

great mountain range. The Armenian nationality does not occupy a continuous territory, but lives by language and religion. The Jews speak the language of the country where they sojourn, but religion and tradition hold them together. The agnostic Jew accepts not only the language but all the other customs of his adopted countrymen, but tradition by itself is too strong for him: he remains a Jew and cannot be assimilated.

<sup>MH</sup>These instances taken at random show that each case must be judged on its own merits, and that no argument holds good except the ascertained wish of the living population actually concerned. Above all we must be on our guard against "historical sentiment", that is, against arguments taken from conditions which once existed or were supposed to exist, but which are no longer real at the present moment. They are most easily illustrated by extreme examples. Italian newspapers have described the annexation of Tripoli as «recovering the soil of the Fatherland» because it was once a province of the Roman Empire; and the entire region of Macedonia is claimed by Greek chauvinists on the one hand, because it contains the site of Pella, the cradle of Alexander the Great in the fourth century B. C., and by Bulgarians on the other, because Ohrida, in the opposite corner, was the capital of the Bulgarian Tzardom in the tenth century A. D., though the drift of time has buried the tradition of the latter almost as deep as the achievements of the "Emathian Conqueror", on which the modern Greek nationalist insists so strongly.

<sup>MH</sup>The national problems of Europe are numerous, and each one is beset by arguments good, bad, and indifferent, some no more specious than the above, some so elaborately staged that it requires the greatest discernment to expose them. Vast bodies of people, with brains and money at their disposal, have been interested in obscuring the truth, and have used every instrument in their power to do so. It is therefore essential for us in England to take up these hitherto remote and uninteresting national problems in earnest, to get as near to the truth as we possibly can, both as to what the respective wishes of the different populations are, and as to how far it is possible to reconcile them with each other and with Geography; and to come to the conference which will follow the war, and is so much more

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<sup>MH</sup> "HISTORICAL SENTIMENT" IS LARGELY FACTITIOUS.

<sup>MH</sup> WE MUST UNDERSTAND NATIONALISTIC AIMS AND DIVERSITIES.

important than the war itself, with a clear idea of the alternative solutions and a mature judgment upon their relative merits.

To accomplish this we need a co-ordination of knowledge on a large scale, knowledge of history, geography, religion, national psychology and public opinion. *[It is a case for the collaboration of experts, but meanwhile an attempt to review the whole question, even if there is no deep knowledge behind it, may, if honestly made, serve at least as a plea for more detailed and authoritative contributions.]*

*The remainder of this book is an attempt to make such a beginning. We will take a series of actual political groups, some of them states with no national basis, some in which state and nation roughly coincide, some that are true nationalities at present prevented from realising themselves in concrete form, and we will start in each case by trying to understand the group's own point of view. We shall find that it nearly always has some justification, and is hardly ever justifiable in its entirety. This need not make us pessimistic: it is one of the commonest traits of human nature. Right and Wrong are always a question of degree, and our next step will be to criticise the case of the group under discussion, and estimate how far it is just and reasonable to give it what it asks. In reaching our conclusions we shall find ourselves evolving a scheme for the reconstruction of that particular corner of Europe.*

*Such a reconstruction must be guided by certain obvious principles.*

*(1) It must be done with the minimum of territorial or administrative change. There is always a presumption in favour of the existing machinery, so long as it works, varying in proportion to the civilisation of the people concerned. In a civilised country the plant of self-government is elaborately installed, not only in the material sense of public services and administration, business concerns with capital invested in them, which must in great measure be wasted if they are broken up and reconstituted on quite different lines, but in the more important psychological sphere of political habit. There is a certain political value, for instance, in the esprit de corps of the motley Austrian army, or even in the still callow constitutional tradition of the Austrian Crown-lands' parliament. It is very hard to make people work together, very easy to pull them apart again. If they work together so badly that they bring the whole organism to a deadlock, there is no course left but to part them, and regroup them on other lines which will enable the various elements to function more*

*smoothly. But we must never forget that the negative work of demolishing what other men have spent their labour in building up, even if it be a Bastille, is at best a regrettable necessity.*

*(II) In the last resort there must always be minorities that suffer. This must be so if men are not to let difference of opinion prevent them working together, and co-operation in spite of disagreement is the foundation of politics. We can only secure that the minorities are as small and the suffering as mild as possible. This again is a question of degree. In Macedonia, until the year before last, one Turk with one rifle caused a "minority" of a hundred Christians with no rifles to suffer robbery, rape, and murder. Every one agrees that this was an abomination. In Great Britain at the present moment the numerically small Welsh-speaking minority of school children have to learn English as well as their mother tongue, but the English majority do not learn Welsh. Here we have "suffering" or disadvantage to one party, without injustice: the Welsh child does not learn English because it is the English-speaking majority's interest that he should do so, but because it is his own. His only quarrel is with the fact that the English population is much larger than his, and its language much more widely spoken, and it is as useless to quarrel with facts as it is to beat the sea and bind it in chains.*

*The Irish question has produced a rich crop of misguided arguments on both sides. First came the skirmishes of "historical sentiment". The Unionists wished to keep everything as it was «because Ireland has been conquered by England, and united thereby to the English Kingdom». They were silenced by the outstanding fact that the Catholic Irish are a separate nationality, but not content with this, the Nationalists declared that the whole island was the heritage of the "Irish nation", with the deplorable result that the Ulster Protestants made good their objection by threats of force. Now the Protestants in turn are trying to grab more than their share by maintaining that Ulster is "one and indivisible", in defiance of the fact that the territory "Ulster" as such has no organic life, or in other words no nationality, of its own. This is mere encouragement to Nationalists to claim all Ulster counties complete where there are Catholic majorities, though one corner of them may be entirely Protestant in population.*

*The only way out is for both parties to face the fact that there are two nationalities in Ireland, English-speaking Protestants and English-speaking Catholics, which in the greater part of the island form uniform populations covering continuous territories; but that there is*

*an irreducible zone, especially in County Tyrone, where the two nations are inextricably mingled, not only Catholic village interspersed with Protestant, but Catholic and Protestant householders occupying alternate premises in the same town. Even here the territories justly belonging to each nation could be plotted out to a nicety on a big-scale map, but it would be quite impossible to draw a frontier of equal delicacy for the practical purposes of public service and self-government.]*

With the growth of civilisation the human and the territorial unit become less and less identical. In a primitive community the members are indifferenced from one another: the true human unit is the total group, and not the individual, and the territory this group occupies is a unit too, self-sufficing and cut off from intercourse with the next valley. In modern Europe every sub-group and every individual has developed a "character" or "individuality" of its own which must have free play; while the growth of communications, elaboration of organisation, and economic interdependence of the whole world have broken down the barriers between region and region. The minimum territorial block that can be organised efficiently as a separate political unit according to modern standards is constantly growing in size: the maximum human group which can hold together without serious internal divergence is as steadily diminishing.

<sup>MH</sup>This would look like an *impasse*, were it not corrected by the virtues of civilisation itself. We started with the fact that the essence of civilisation was "Forethought" and its ideal the "power of free choice": the complementary side of this ideal, on the principle «Do as you would be done by», is to allow free choice to others when they are in your power. It is a virtue with as many names as there are spheres of human life: "Forbearance", "Toleration", "Constitutionalism". [*When we have drawn our frontier through Tyrone with all the ingenuity that Geography allows us, there will inevitably be a minority left on either side, a minority no map-making can further reduce. Savages wipe out minorities: civilised men take testimonials from them. The drawing of the frontier is only the first step towards the solution of the Irish question. It will truly be settled if the minorities find that the disadvantage to which Geography puts them is more than made up by the good-fellowship of the population with*

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<sup>MH</sup> INDIVIDUALITY AND TOLERANCE MUST BE OUR INTERNATIONAL IDEALS.

*which it yokes them. Then they will become as strong a link between Catholic Ireland and Ulster, as the "colonies" of businessmen, that voluntarily take up their residence in Liverpool and Hamburg, are between Germany and England.*

*Having stated these principles, which once more draw our attention to psychological facts as being the really important forces to which all concrete, mechanical manipulations of frontiers and institutions must be referred in the end, we may now more safely plunge into the great sea of European controversy. Let us begin with the nation whose action has drawn us into the vortex, Germany.]*



## NATIONALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY

*[We have completed our survey of national problems in the area affected by the war.*

*We entered upon it with an ideal before our minds – the sovereign national state of the West. How far have we found this ideal applicable to the rest of Europe and to the Nearer East?*

*As we proceeded Eastwards, the national atom proved less and less capable of adoption as the political unit. In Central Europe, we discovered, the Tchechs will be unable to work out their national salvation as an independent state: the economic factor necessitates their political incorporation in the German Empire<sup>1</sup>. In the Balkans the political disentanglement of one nationality from another is only possible if all alike consent to economic federation in a general zollverein<sup>2</sup>. In the North-East, geographical conditions decree that national individuality shall express itself by devolution within the bond of the Russian Empire<sup>3</sup>.*

*In all these cases the political unit reveals itself not as a single nation but as a group of nationalities; yet even these groups cannot be entirely sovereign or self-contained. Like the chemist's molecules, they are woven out of relations between atoms, and are bound in their turn to enter into relation with one another.*

*The nationalities of the South-East coalesce in a Balkan Zollverein; the Zollverein as a whole is involved by mutual economic interests with its neighbour molecule, the Russian Empire<sup>4</sup>; similar necessity produces similar contact between the Russian Empire and Norway or Persia. The simple uninational molecules of the West and the complex multinational molecules of the East and Centre all dispose themselves as parts of a wider organism – the European system.*

*Every organism needs a special mechanism to execute its functions. Each of its members may be instinct with its own vitality, yet there must be a vitality external to them all to co-*

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[<sup>1</sup> Ch. VI.]

[<sup>2</sup> Ch. IV. Section C.]

[<sup>3</sup> Ch. VIII.]

[<sup>4</sup> Ch. VIII. Section C.]

*ordinate them severally with one another. The provision of a Russian railway to the Atlantic sets up a complicated interaction between Norway and the Russian Empire beyond the individual control of either unit. Norwegian sovereignty cannot secure Norway's independence against Russia: Russian sovereignty cannot secure Russia's right-of-way through Norway. If these two molecules are to interact harmoniously, their functioning must be regulated by some force superior to them both.*

*In the course of our survey we have often had to postulate such a force, but so far we have left its scope and character quite indefinite. We have glibly summoned "Europe", the "Concert of Europe" or a "European Guarantee" to our aid, and passed on our way rejoicing.*

*We can no longer screen ourselves behind such formulas. They were invented at the Congress of Vienna just a hundred years ago, to embody the same vision of an international organism which still floats unsubstantiated before our minds. This century is the measure of their failure: they have not maintained the organism in being – they never brought it into being at all – and successively they have been cast upon the scrap-heap. One generation passed, and the "Concert" was shattered by the convulsion of 1848; a second, and Europe was divided into two camps by the "Triple Alliance"; now the third has passed and "Guaranteed Neutrality", the most solid of all the international links our great-grandfathers forged, has snapped at the first shock of battle between the marshalled hosts.*

*Guarantee! The formula coined in 1814 rings ironical to-day. Belgium was guaranteed in order to secure the stability of Europe, yet on account of that guarantee Great Britain and Germany, two of the greatest sovereign units in the European complexus, are at this moment engaged in a life-and-death struggle. Germany violated the Belgian guarantee deliberately in her attempt to destroy the European system by war. The effect of the guarantee may still prove momentous: it has drawn us into the war, and our intervention may turn the scale. Yet even if the Allies are victorious, and the new Europe is fashioned by them after their own hearts and not by Germany after hers, this will not save the credit of the guarantee itself. Germany may be punished for her work, but the work cannot be undone. Europe must drink the cup of war to the dregs – the pain, the hate, the waste, the pure evil that is not diminished*

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<sup>1</sup> [Italy joined Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1882, three years after they had joined each other.]

*one drop by cause or consequence. The guarantee was invented to avert that catastrophe from Europe. The catastrophe has happened and the invention is bankrupt.]*

<sup>MH</sup>The old Europe is dead, the old vision vanished, and we are wrestling in agony for new inspiration. [*That has been the motive of this book. «And yet», the reader will say, «you return to the discredited fetish once more? With the crash of the Belgian guarantee about our ears, you propose to regulate by guarantee the future relation of Norway and the Russian Empire, and replace the snapped link by a hundred others more brittle than itself?».* The objection is just, and we must meet it].

We must beware of putting our new wine into old bottles. While guarantees hold, they conserve their charge: when they break, the destruction is worse than if they had never existed. Unless we can ensure that the sovereign states of Europe respect European guarantees hereafter in other fashion than Germany at the present crisis, we must modify the formula or else discard it altogether.

Can the mechanism of the European system be safeguarded against its individual members? [*Several means have been mooted to this end.*

*(I) One means is "Disarmament". We discussed it in connection with the Russo-German frontier in Poland<sup>1</sup> and with the military control of the Kiel Canal<sup>2</sup>, but in both cases we found it Utopian. A war may be just or unjust, defensive or aggressive, yet when once a nation is at war, its existence is at stake: Germany is fighting for her life no less than the powers she has attacked. Armament is self-preservation, and self-preservation is the last sovereign right that a sovereign state will surrender.*

*(II) "Disarmament by Compulsion" thus presupposes the complete suppression of individual sovereignty, and no one seriously proposes it as a means of "breaking in" the untamed sovereign state: "Voluntary Disarmament" is the catchword, yet the difficulty involved is just the same. Nations may promise to disarm, but war is a question of life-and-death: at the whisper of war they will break their word, and who is to call them to account?*

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<sup>MH</sup> WE MUST HAVE NEW FORMS OF GUARANTEES.

<sup>1</sup> [Ch. II. Section D.]

<sup>2</sup> [Ch. IX. Section A.]

*(III) "Limitation of Armaments" would prove even more ineffectual. It would save men's pockets in peace time, but it would not save Peace itself. The essence of the idea is to make the reduction proportional: ex hypothesi there would still be the same balance of forces, and therefore the same calculations on the part of sovereign governments, upon which the possibility of war depends.*

*Armament is self-preservation, and living creatures, whether individual men or individual states, will safeguard their existence with all their soul and all their strength. There is no other limit than their capacity, and limitation of armaments in peace time would mean at most that each nation would arm to the uttermost after war had broken out, as Great Britain is doing now, instead of arming to the uttermost before its outbreak, as Germany and most other European powers have done hitherto.*

*In practice it would not even mean that. Artificial limitation would set a premium upon dishonesty. One extra submarine concealed in a canal, one extra howitzer in a cellar, and the stipulated balance would be upset, the calculations invalidated, and the offending state ensured against defeat. «After all», the offenders would say to themselves, «what is to determine our rightful proportion except our own willingness to spend our strength? Our neighbours wrote themselves off at nine guns, we at ten: if we can make the effort to build an eleventh, that alters the real proportion between our own and our neighbours' capacity, and entitles us to the extended licence».*

*When the cross-bow was invented, the Pope called a conference, and limited the employment of this lethal weapon to warfare against the infidel: a few years passed, and the people of Christendom were destroying one another not only with cross-bows but with gun-powder.*

*(IV) "International Armament" is propounded either as a supplement or an alternative to the three means we have dealt with already. This also we discussed when we threshed out the problem of the Black Sea Straits<sup>1</sup>, and we found it as impracticable as the rest. There is a spiritual force – "group-feeling", "public spirit", "patriotism", or however we name it – without which no human organisation can live, but upon which military organisation is particularly*

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<sup>1</sup> [Ch. IX. Section B.]

*dependent. In the contemporary world the national state<sup>2</sup> alone generates this spirit with an intensity sufficient to organise armies: that is why the national state is the most magnificent and the most dangerous social achievement in existence. The creation of an international army equal to its task would be proof that the task was no longer necessary: it would mean that the national unit had forfeited its moral sovereignty, and that its members had sunk their narrower citizenship in the citizenship of the world.*

*The four solutions thus assume one and all the very conditions they are intended to bring about, and we can neither force the individual state to abandon its sovereignty nor threaten it with the competition of a sovereignty superior to its own. If we are to maintain the mechanism of European society by compulsion, we must swear in as special constables the individual members themselves.*

*This policy may answer under very favourable circumstances: Denmark may take charge of the Baltic Straits and faithfully execute her commission<sup>3</sup>, yet as soon as we pass to the Black Sea Straits the method breaks down. We foresaw<sup>1</sup> that here our chosen candidates would fail us, and that we should have to consign the task to Russia. To instal Russia at the Bosphorus and Dardanelles or to leave Great Britain in control of the Persian Gulf or Suez Canal is much like posting a brigand to guard his professional haunts. «Set a thief to catch a thief»: apply it to guarantees and we are driven back upon the old system, neither more nor less – the system that one of the wolves in sheep's clothing has just discredited by violating the guaranteed independence of Belgium.]*

We have asked our question and must accept the answer. It is useless to fortify our new European organism by guarantees of the old order, because we cannot fortify such guarantees themselves against the sovereign national state. Whenever it chooses, the sovereign unit can shatter the international mechanism by war. We are powerless to prevent it: all we can do is to abandon our direct attack, and look for the causes which impel states to a choice as terrible for themselves as for their victims.

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<sup>2</sup> [Including under the term complex molecules of several complete national units.]

<sup>3</sup> [Ch. IX. Section A.]

<sup>1</sup> [Ch. IX. Section B.]

«You ask», the Germans say, «why we broke our contract towards Belgium? It would be more pertinent to ask how we were ever committed to such a contract at all.

<sup>MH</sup>The heart of modern Germany is the industrial world of the Rhineland and Westphalia. The Belgian frontier and the Belgian tariff-wall rob this region of its natural outlet at Antwerp, yet the contract expressly forbids us to right this economic and geographical wrong by uniting the sea-port to its hinterland.

The chief need of modern Germany is a source of raw produce and a market for her finished products in the tropical zone. Belgium has staked out for herself the one important region in Africa which was not already occupied by France or Great Britain. She can do nothing with it, while we – but this contract expressly forbids us to kick the Belgian dog out of the manger.

Because of this Belgian guarantee we must go in want of almost everything we need, yet meanwhile our great neighbours on either flank have conspired to take from us even the little we possess already. The struggle with France and Russia on which we are now engaged has been impending for years, and on our part it is a struggle for existence, but even here the same remorseless contract operates to paralyse our efforts. On the scale of modern warfare the Western battlefront must extend from Switzerland to the North Sea, yet the greater part of this immense zone is neutralised by natural and artificial obstacles on either side. From Switzerland to the Ardennes there will be stalemate: the decision will be reached in the open country between the Ardennes and the coast. Here, as soon as war broke out, France and our own fatherland had to concentrate the terrific energy of their armaments, yet we had contracted away our initiative in this vital area, for it lies within the frontiers of the Belgian state. The government we had guaranteed might prepare the ground for France and ruin it for ourselves, yet because of the guarantee we must look on passively at the digging of our grave.

<sup>MH</sup>Why, then, had we suffered ourselves to be bound hand and foot? We had not: our grandfathers had entailed the bonds upon us. When they signed the contract in 1839, they knew not what they did. At that time Germany had no industry, Belgium had no colonies,

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<sup>MH</sup> THE GERMAN POSITION.

<sup>MH</sup> WE MUST PROVIDE FOR NATIONAL GROWTH.

and the Franco-German frontier between the Ardennes and the Jura was not closed to field operations by two continuous lines of opposing fortifications. Had their signature been demanded in 1914, they would have refused it as indignantly as we should have refused it ourselves. To us no choice was offered, and if we have asserted for ourselves the right to choose, who dares in his heart to condemn us? Who will impose a changeless law upon a changing world?».

This is Germany's argument about Belgium. Her facts may be true or false, the arguments she builds on them valid or fallacious [1] That is not the point. Behind arguments and facts there looms an idea that can inspire an individual nation to make war on Europe. We must do justice to this idea, if it is not to play the same havoc again.

Humanity has an instinctive craving for something eternal, absolute, petrified. This seems to be a fundamental factor in our psychology: it has obtruded itself equally in spheres as diverse as religion and politics, but it has been especially dominant in diplomacy.

Whenever the European organism proves its instability by breaking down, we start in quest of a perfect mechanism, a "permanent settlement". We are invariably disappointed, but invariably we return to the quest again. The Congress of statesmen at Vienna followed this will-of-the-wisp in 1814: in 1915 the belligerent democracies are preparing to lead themselves the same dance. «Europe is in a mess», we are all saying: «Let us tidy her up "once for all", and then we can live comfortably ever after».

<sup>MH</sup>We might as well expect a baby to «live comfortably ever after» in its swaddling clothes [*or say to a snake, as we watch it slough off its old skin and wriggle out radiant on a Spring day: «Now that you have got through that tiresome business, you won't need to do it over again when next Spring comes round». We are always mistaking the dead clothes for the living creature. A year hence, and it will be the new skin's turn to shrivel, but year in and year out the same snake will be living his life under each skin in turn. In treating one of these*

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[<sup>1</sup> For instance, the argument does not justify in the least the procedure by which Germany actually asserted her freedom. If the situation had altered so vastly that she felt herself no longer bound by the guarantee, she ought to have denounced it formally in time of peace. By professing observance of it up to the last moment and only breaking it by the declaration of war, she obtained a grave military advantage. That was downright dishonesty.]

<sup>MH</sup> THE EUROPEAN ORGANISM IS FULL OF DYNAMIC LIFE.

*annual skins with preservatives, we are not doing our snake a service. When the season arrives, he will have either to burst it by an exhausting effort or die inside it conquered and stifled. The one thing he cannot do is to live in it another year.]*

So it is with the European organism. It is as full of life, as perpetually in transformation, as the individual national molecules of which it is woven, yet we confuse it in turn with each of its transitory garments. If we are to find a satisfactory issue out of the present crisis, we must begin by correcting our standpoint.

The impending settlement will not be permanent, and the better it fits the situation, the less permanent will it be. *[As soon as the war is over, we have to devote all our energy of thought and will to the racial and economic problems of Europe: we have to solve each one of them, and solve it to a nicety, yet when the work seems done and its result stands embodied in map and treaty, we must confess that we are unprofitable servants, and recognise that we are only at the beginning of our task.]*

Our real work will be to regulate this immediate settlement so that it varies in harmony with the subsequent growth of Europe and modifies its structure and mechanism to meet the organism's changing needs.

We have now discovered the flaw in guarantees of the old order. They were framed for rigidity, and therefore were doomed to crack. Our new guarantees must be elastic: they must be forged of steel not cast in iron.

How can we frame guarantees of this malleable character? *[We may shed light on the problem by analysing into classes the actual guarantees we have proposed in our survey.]*

(I) Firstly, we have proposed guarantees of political independence and integrity in the case of the three Scandinavian states [<sup>1</sup>], the Slovene Unit [<sup>2</sup>], the Greek islands off Anatolia [<sup>3</sup>],

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[<sup>1</sup> Ch. IX. Section A.]

[<sup>2</sup> Ch. V.]

[<sup>3</sup> Ch. X. Section D. Strictly speaking, we proposed to guarantee the Kingdom of Greece to the extent of this portion of its territory.]



Persia [4], and the Sultanate of Oman [5]. The autonomy guaranteed to Poland within the Russian Empire [6] comes under the same head.

(II) Secondly, we have proposed to guarantee economic rights-of-way to one state across the political territory of another. Instances of this type are the Russian railway through Norway to the Atlantic [7] and through Persia to the Indian Ocean [2]; Poland's title to free trade down the Vistula, and to the enjoyment of a free port at Danzig [3]; and Germany's similar claim to an unhampered outlet at Trieste [4].

<sup>MH</sup>Both these classes of guarantee are adapted from the international machinery invented during the Nineteenth Century. The first class is an extension of the political guarantee given to Belgium in 1839, the second of the economic right-of-way secured to her through Dutch waters, in order to furnish the commerce of Antwerp with a free passage down the estuary of the Scheldt to the open sea.

Our standpoint towards these two classes is inevitably prejudiced by their associations. We envisage them as embodied "once for all", like their nineteenth-century precedents, in a contract, and like nineteenth-century diplomacy we tend to regard such contracts as so many girders in a "permanent settlement".

(III) There is a third class, however, which has no precedent in the past, and which will react upon our standpoint in the very opposite direction: our proposed guarantee of alien minorities within the national state.

*[We have resorted to this formula more often than to either of the others.]* The German populations transferred with Schleswig to Denmark and with the Eastern frontier-zone to Autonomous Poland [5]; the Poles abandoned to Germany in West Prussia [6]; the Germans

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[4 Ch. XI.]

[5 Ch. VIII. Section A.]

[6 Ch. IX. Section A.]

[1 Ch. IX. Section A.]

[2 Ch. XI.]

[3 Ch. II. Section D.]

[4 Ch. V.]

<sup>MH</sup> NO SETTLEMENT CAN BE PERMANENT.

[5 Ch. II. Section C.]

[6 Ch. II. Section D.]

and Slovaks who cannot be disentangled from Hungary [<sup>7</sup>]; the Christian elements in Anatolia [<sup>8</sup>] and Arabia [<sup>9</sup>] – these are a few out of many instances, and each one of them is a refutation of “finality”.

The fact that such minorities must inevitably be left on our hands compels us to recognise that beyond a certain degree the economic and the national factor are not commensurable. Here is an essential imperfection in the best settlement we can possibly devise.

<sup>MH</sup>The fact that these minorities require a guarantee reveals a deficiency still more grave than the other, inasmuch as it is not environmental but psychological. It means that hardly a single national society in Europe has yet become capable of national toleration. Just as people were persecuted for their religious belief in the sixteenth century and for their political opinions in the nineteenth, so they are still in the twentieth century almost universally exposed to persecution for their national individuality. In this sphere the social evolution of Europe is exceptionally backward, and the problem of nationality will never be solved till this psychological incongruity is removed.

This at once reduces to their proper proportion both the immediate geographical settlement of the problem which we have elaborated in this book and that guarantee of alien minorities which we have found to be its necessary supplement. In this light, the contracts in which such guarantees are enshrined appear as the transitory scaffolding they are. Weakened by the morbid hypertrophy of nationalism which has been preying upon her for years, exhausted by the convulsion of war in which the malady has culminated, Europe must walk on crutches now or else collapse; yet she will not be a cripple for ever. Relieved by these guarantees from the immediate strain of unmitigated national friction, she will be able to concentrate all her energy upon her spiritual convalescence. As soon as she has trained herself to national toleration, she will discard the guarantees and walk unaided.

So far from constituting a “permanent settlement”, our third type of guarantee is an intimation that the problem still remains unsettled. The work will not be complete until we

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[<sup>7</sup> *Ch. IV. Section A.*]

[<sup>8</sup> *Ch. X. Section D.*]

[<sup>9</sup> *Ch. X. Section E.*]

<sup>MH</sup> BUT ELASTIC GUARANTEES WILL FURTHER RACIAL TOLERATION.

can dispense with the instrument, but the instrument will not accomplish the work unless it is wielded by a craftsman's hand. Not only are guarantees of our third type merely the means to an end beyond themselves: the contract in which it is embodied is in this case the least important part of the guarantee.

<sup>MH</sup>When we guarantee a national minority we have of course to define certain liberties which it is to enjoy – liberties, for instance, of religion, education, local self-government [<sup>1</sup>] – and all the parties to the Conference must contract responsibility for the observance of such stipulations; yet when we have done this, we cannot simply deposit our document in some international “Ark of the Covenant” and go our ways. The essence of the guarantee is its subsequent interpretation.

The relation between the different elements in a country is continually changing. One church dwindles while another makes converts; one race advances in culture while another degenerates; Man's indefatigable struggle to dominate his physical environment alters the natural boundaries between localities: a barrier that once seemed insurmountable is pierced, and leaves one formerly insignificant in relative prominence [<sup>2</sup>]. Each of these modifications demands an adjustment of the guarantee, and since they are an infinite series, the guarantee itself requires ceaseless manipulation if it is to perform its function aright.

This need cannot be satisfied by the original *fiat* of the International Conference: it can only be met by the appointment of a standing international committee with executive powers, empowered, that is, to administer and interpret the contracts to which the members of the Conference have originally subscribed [<sup>3</sup>]. Our third type of guarantee has thus presented us with the clue we sought. The letter of international law has proved ineffective

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<sup>MH</sup> THE CHANGING ORGANISM NEEDS A NEW FORM OF INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE.

[<sup>1</sup> See the programme for the re-organisation of Hungary in Ch. IV. Section A.]

[<sup>2</sup> An obvious example of this is the tunnelling of the Alps.]

[<sup>3</sup> It would be premature to discuss constitutional relation between this representative international organ and the individual national states from which its delegate authority would be derived. We cannot yet conjecture how much discretion its sovereign constituents would be willing to grant it. Its reference would probably include a free hand to “interpret” in the widest sense, but on the question of emending the actual letter of the contract, our executive organ would almost certainly be required to refer back to its principle.]

hitherto because it has lacked the inspiration of a living spirit, and this spirit can only be breathed into it by a human organ of international authority.

<sup>MH</sup>Supposing that such an organ were called into existence, what kind of international relations would naturally fall within its scope? We can analyse its probable sphere of activity into several departments.

(I) The first branch would of course be those guarantees of national minorities which have just taught us the necessity for its existence.

(II) The second branch would include the two subjects of guarantee we dealt with first, namely "Political Independence" and "Rights of Way". We can see now that their administration by a representative international executive would eliminate that defect of rigidity which has always proved fatal to them heretofore.

Between them these two branches would cover all the machinery we have suggested for our regenerated European organism. Are there any further spheres of national interaction over which our international organ might properly assume control? It would be logical to assign to it, if possible, all relations between sovereign national states which are peculiarly subject to change.

Change is a harmonisation of two rhythms – Growth and Decay. Some sovereign units are continually waxing in population, material wealth and spiritual energy: such are Great Britain and Germany, France and the Russian Empire. Others, like the Ottoman Empire or Spain, are as continually waning in respect of the same factors.

This ebb and flow in the current of life causes, and must cause, a perpetual readjustment of the relations between units in the two complementary phases. Units in the positive phase inevitably absorb the fibres and trespass upon the environment of those which have passed over into the negative rhythm. We cannot arrest this process any more than we can abolish change itself: what we can do is to regulate it on the lines of civilisation, instead of letting it run riot in a blind struggle for existence.

<sup>MH</sup>The current radiates in an almost infinite variety of interactions. Great Britain, Germany, and India are discharging surplus population into the empty lands of the New World; Great

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<sup>MH</sup> THE EXECUTIVE AND THE GUARANTEES.

<sup>MH</sup> HOW THIS INTERNATIONAL ORGAN WOULD FUNCTION.

Britain and France are applying surplus wealth to evoke the latent resources of countries with no surplus of their own; Great Britain and Russia are putting forth spiritual energy to inspire primitive peoples with the vitality of civilisation.

Our international organ can handle no more than a fraction of this world-wide interchange.

(I) We may exclude at once from its competence every interaction that is confined within the limits of a single sovereign unit. Within the British Empire, for example, it is patently impracticable to "internationalise" the problems of Indian emigration to Vancouver or the Transvaal, of the closure of the Australian labour-market against labour from the British Isles, of commercial exploitation in Nigeria or Rhodesia, of autonomy in Ireland or the Asiatic Dependencies. The Empire may handle its own problems well or ill, but it will never consent to waive its sovereignty in respect of them. We should regard the proposition of international intervention as a menace to the Empire's existence. We should undoubtedly fight rather than submit to it, and every other sovereign state would do the same under similar circumstances. In purely internal affairs international authority will never obtain a footing at the expense of the individual unit.

(II) We may likewise exclude interactions between two or more sovereign states in spheres that fall entirely within their respective sovereignty. The Dominion of Canada or the U. S. A. would never submit to international regulation the question of Japanese immigration along their Pacific seaboard. If Russia wished to float a loan, she would never allow our international organ to decide where and in what proportions it should be placed: she would insist on keeping her hands free, and making the best bargain for herself both from the financial and the political point of view. Italy and the Argentine would never relinquish their respective sovereign rights over the Italian labourers who cross the Atlantic every year to reap the South American harvests. International authority would be flouted as uncompromisingly in these instances as in the former.

<sup>MH</sup>(III) There are some units, however, so raw in their growth or so deeply sunk in their decay as to lack the attribute of sovereignty altogether – units which through want of

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<sup>MH</sup> CONTROL OF WEAK STATES AND OF IMMIGRATION.

population, wealth, spiritual energy, or all three together are unable to keep the spark of vitality aglow. Such dead units are the worst danger that threatens the peace of the world: each one of them is an arena enticing the living units around to dash in conflict, a vacuum into which the current of life swirls like a mälström. In these “no-man’s- lands” where no sovereignty exists, our international organ can and must assert its own sovereignty against the sovereign states outside.

(a) In every such area the standing international executive should regulate immigration from overpopulated sovereign units – German colonisation, for instance, in Anatolia [<sup>1</sup>], or Indian settlement on the alluvium of Irak [<sup>2</sup>].

(b) It should likewise regulate the inflow of capital. [*We have discussed this question at some length in connection with the economic exploitation of Anatolia<sup>3</sup> and Arabia<sup>4</sup>].*

(c) In areas where the pressure of spiritual energy is so low that the population cannot save itself by its own efforts from political anarchy, the international executive should be prepared to step in and organise “strong government”.

*[The problems of Persia<sup>5</sup> and the Black Sea Straits<sup>6</sup> will here occur to our minds, and we shall recognise that this is at once the most indispensable and the most formidable task that our international executive has to take in hand. We shall frankly repeat our confession that active political construction of this kind will be beyond the capacity of any international organ which the immediate settlement may bring to birth after the present war. Europe will not be reborn in the fulness of her strength like Athena: she will strengthen herself in pain and sorrow, advancing laboriously from small things to great. The assertion of international sovereignty in Persia and at Constantinople will not be the first step in international organisation: it is the goal of our hopes, the extreme horizon that our vision can wrest from Utopia.*

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[<sup>1</sup> Ch. X. Section C.]

[<sup>2</sup> Ch. X. Section E.]

[<sup>3</sup> Ch. X. Section D.]

[<sup>4</sup> Ch. X. Section E.]

[<sup>5</sup> Ch. XI.]

[<sup>6</sup> Ch. IX. Section B.]

*We have now established the nature of that international force which is to regulate the relation between sovereign national molecules, and we can abstract our conclusion in two formulas.*

*(I) There is no virtue in lifeless contracts, unless they are administered by a living organ with executive, or in other words with sovereign, authority.*

*(II) On the other hand this international sovereignty must scrupulously confine itself to the adjustment of the equilibrium between individual units, and to the apportionment among them of untenanted areas.*

*It cannot encroach upon individual sovereignty in any way that effects, or is deemed to affect, the sovereign right of self-preservation: in particular, it cannot aspire to the regulation of War, and it is waste of ingenuity to propound any international machinery for this purpose. The best-conceived arbitration or conciliation is bound to break down, when once a sovereign state has made up its mind that the surrender of its will on a particular issue is equivalent to annihilation. No international authority could ever prevent parleys like those of last July from resolving themselves into a conflict of arms<sup>1</sup>.*

*The reader may feel this distinction of spheres casuistical. «I admit», he may say, «that each combatant has staked his existence on the result of the struggle, but surely he has staked it for a cause? The issues of the war are certain concrete problems – Morocco, the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire – all of which conspicuously fall within the sphere you propose to internationalise. Have you not been making a distinction without a difference? If you cannot regulate war itself, how can you regulate the relations that precipitate it? In July 1914 your “international organ” would have proved just as ineffective in the sphere you reserve to it as in any other».*

*Yes, we must answer, if it had only been called into existence that very month: no, if it had already been in commission during the Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911, or had been there to take in hand the Balkan problem in 1875, the moment when the revolt of Bosnia against the Ottoman Government opened that chain of events which has culminated actually in the present catastrophe.]*

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*[<sup>1</sup> All the belligerents maintain that they took up arms for self-preservation, and they all speak truth – it is a truism.]*

<sup>MH</sup>Morocco, the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire – the present war is not really being waged to settle these problems: it is being waged because they have been settled already, and settled on such unjust and injudicious lines that all parties concerned have found it worth while to stake their existence for the reversal of the settlement. No one need have been involved by such problems in a struggle for life. They were all problems of expansion, and their solution ought at worst to have disappointed the expectation of immoderate gains: it ought never, as it has done, to have threatened the parties with the loss of what they possessed already before the problems were probed.

Why has the contrary occurred? Because, just for lack of that international executive with the sovereign authority we postulate, these issues that were not vital have been fought out, like issues of life and death, by war – not by the war of arms which has descended upon us now like some recurrent plague, into which we relapse at rarer and rarer intervals as we advance in civilisation, but by the unobtrusive, unremitting war of diplomacy which is being waged year in and year out between the sovereign states of Europe, and which has increased appallingly in violence during the last generation.

In this disastrous diplomatic warfare our opponents in the present war of arms have been uniformly the aggressors. If Austria. Hungary is now struggling for existence, it is because she deliberately embarked nearly forty years ago upon a diplomatic campaign of aggrandisement against South-Slavonic nationality<sup>[1]</sup>. If Germany is fighting back to back with her in the same ghastly struggle, it is because Germany has wielded diplomatic weapons still more ruthlessly against her other European neighbours.

<sup>MH</sup>For the terrible embitterment of the diplomatic contest Germany herself is entirely responsible, but she has inevitably exposed herself to reprisals as severe as her own provocative blows. She opened the battle over Morocco by forcibly intruding upon a sphere where she had no shadow of claim to expansion: thereby she drew France and Great Britain into diplomatic alliance against her, and laid herself open to the humiliation of 1911, when Franco-British diplomacy mobilised its financial forces and drove her to retreat by cutting

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<sup>MH</sup> SUCH AN EXECUTIVE COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE WAR OF DIPLOMACY AND OF ARMS.

<sup>[1]</sup> *In Ch. IV. Section B we have traced the history of this campaign at wearisome length.*

<sup>MH</sup> THE WAR OF DIPLOMACY.



off her supplies. In Turkey she might easily have satisfied her needs without any battle at all. The untenanted area was vast, the claims staked out on it were singularly narrow: when German enterprise circumvented the enterprise of Great Britain and France, and secured all the railway-concessions in the virgin hinterland of Anatolia, French and British diplomacy grumbled but did not attempt to open hostilities. Yet instead of reaping her harvest in peace, Germany again precipitated a diplomatic conflict by extending her ambitions to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf [²]. The moment she aspired to absorb the whole Ottoman Empire, Great Britain and Russia entered into diplomatic co-operation, and opposed her purpose with all their might. Germany's Arabian venture has jeopardised her Anatolian gains, and if she is defeated in the present struggle, she will probably be excluded from the Ottoman area altogether.

The diplomatic warfare over three secondary issues, which ought never to have been settled by fighting at all, has thus left none of the combatants unscathed. On the contrary, the wounds inflicted then have festered till their poison has threatened each combatant with the pains of dissolution, and made that quack-physician the diplomat call out in panic for the knife of that quack-surgeon the war lord.

This diplomatic warfare is the objective of our new international organisation. Upon diplomacy we can and must make a direct attack. If we can draw this monster's teeth, we shall no longer be troubled by its still more monstrous offspring – War.

*[«Attack diplomacy!», the reader will exclaim: «Stated in these terms, your scheme takes on a more revolutionary aspect. You are really demanding that the sovereign national state shall delegate to your international executive its entire sovereignty in the diplomatic sphere. When it grasps your intention, will it not shrink from the sacrifice after all?».*

*Our answer can be no more than a prophecy, and we shall frame it best on the analogy of that association among individuals of which every sovereign state consists.*

*In the philosophy of the individual society it is a common-place that liberty and political organisation increase in a direct ratio to one another. Mankind has never lived in the "State of Nature", for if our progenitors had not evolved the Herd already, they would never have*

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[² Ch. X. Section D.]

*been able to evolve the Soul. The life of Ishmael, which sovereign states are leading still, is a discredited myth in the individual's history: nevertheless, when first he comes within our ken, he has not committed himself entirely to the "Social Contract".*

*The most primitive individual societies we know are still in the phase of transition. In almost every sphere of life their members have already discovered the value of political co-operation, but there is one anarchic tradition they have not yet brought themselves to abandon – the "Blood-feud". Yet the Blood-feud too is doomed, and we watch it die out as the individual's political sense develops. The increasing political regulation of all other relations between man and man eliminates occasions for the shedding of blood, and instead of being an everyday necessity, murder becomes a last resort. The individual begins to think of it as a dreadful exception to the normal reign of Law: he misses here the liberty which Law has elsewhere given him, and longs here also to abandon unlimited rights in order to cast off the burden of unlimited duties. Then the Blood-feud dies out, and Law wins undisputed sovereignty within the state.*

*Why should not the State itself repeat the history of the Individual? If the evolution of individual societies was compatible with the survival of the Blood-feud, surely we need not despair of organising sovereign states into a still greater political association merely because they are unwilling to abandon the sovereign right of War; and if once this international organisation is accomplished, surely we can look forward with hope to the eventual disappearance of War also. States like individuals must eventually discover that the Blood-feud is a burden, and that the sovereign right to wage it is not Liberty but a mockery of it: we shall be past teaching indeed, if the present catastrophe is not a sufficient object-lesson for us. If sovereignty means freedom of choice, when were the nations of Europe ever less free to exercise their will than in the summer of 1914? No choice was open to them. One and all they were compelled to turn aside from the pressing task of social reconstruction upon which their heart is set, and take up in self-defence – poor sovereign puppets – that task of mutual destruction for which they have no heart at all.*

*The political philosophy of Modern Germany vehemently repudiates this analogy of ours. It refuses to regard the State and the Individual as homologous organisms. «The Individual*

*– his function is to merge himself in the society to which he belongs: the State – that is the political Absolute. For the State there is no law, no vision of a wider society».*

*This dogma may be true or false: that the future will show, yet this much we can proclaim at once: If it is true, then European Civilisation is a failure.*

*«The function of Society», says Aristotle, «is not to make life possible, but to make it worth living». This saying, at least, applies not only to individuals but to states. Hitherto the national states of Europe have been absorbed in the preliminary struggle to secure their existence. If they can profit by the present crisis to liberate their energy for higher ends, then the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand: if inspiration fails them in this hour, then we are witnessing «the beginning of great evils for Hellas», and the Sovereign Nations of Europe are doomed to the same destruction as the Sovereign Cities of Greece.]*