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Luciano MONZALI and Luca RICCARDI (eds.)**

**Italy and Tito's
Yugoslavia in the Age
of International Détente**

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The Italian Communist Party's Policy on Trieste as Viewed by Vittorio Vidali (1954-1975)

Patrick KARLSEN

1. That terrible 1955

On re-embracing Trieste in 1954, Italy celebrated the “final party of its Risorgimento”.¹ But the Italian Communist Party took only minor part in the historic event and with scant desire to enjoy itself. The reasons were certainly the long series of ambiguities and misunderstandings, fratricidal conflicts, and often irreconcilable loyalties that in the post-war period had condemned the Italian communists to a “fraught relationship”² with the “city dear to their hearts” and trapped them within an identity that was difficult to say the least.³ Furthermore, the London Memorandum came in a topical and once again “revolutionary” phase of Soviet-Yugoslav relations that caught the PCI in the midst of unforeseeable developments and forced it once again to manoeuvre in the dark.

The first attempts at rapprochement with Tito were made by Chruščëv in the summer of 1954 through correspondence which the Yugoslavs successfully demanded be kept secret so as not to upset the negotiations with the Western powers on Trieste.⁴ The post-Stalin leadership pursued various objectives through this extraordinary reconciliation. The main purpose of the new Soviet foreign policy was to repair a system that Stalin had left close to breakdown, and therefore to mitigate international

¹ Sergio Romano, *Guida alla politica estera italiana. Da Badoglio a Berlusconi* (Milano: Rizzoli, 2002), 94.

² Giampaolo Valdevit, “I comunisti italiani e Trieste fra guerra e dopoguerra. Un rapporto disturbato,” in *Id.*, *Il dilemma Trieste. Guerra e dopoguerra in uno scenario europeo* (Gorizia: Libreria Editrice Goriziana, 1999).

³ VV. AA., *Comunisti a Trieste: un'identità difficile* (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1983). For an examination of the PCI's policy towards Italy's eastern frontier during the war and the post-war period, see Patrick Karlsen, *Frontiera rossa. Il PCI, il confine orientale e il contesto internazionale 1941-1955* (Gorizia: Libreria Editrice Goriziana, 2010).

⁴ Svetozar Rajak, “The Tito-Khrushchev Correspondence, 1954,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, 12-13 (2001).

tensions.⁵ But besides extinguishing a hotbed of conflict in the socialist world, the peace with Tito was also intended to weaken the Atlantic alliance on its southern flank.⁶ By thwarting the project of the Balkan Pact, the Soviets simultaneously accelerated the process of assuring Austria's status as a neutral country. Thus created would be a buffer zone of states (Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Austria, Yugoslavia) extraneous to the two blocs and such to interrupt NATO's territorial contiguity with its southern and south-eastern allies.⁷ Finally, the USSR would acquire key influence in the Adriatic and be able to threaten the supply lines of the Anglo-American forces in the Mediterranean, including the Suez Canal.

In short, the resumption of dialogue with Yugoslavia was one of the components of Chruščëv's notion of peaceful coexistence. Excluding the possibility of armed conflict with the West would also serve to close ranks and reaffirm Soviet leadership in the socialist world, shifting economic-political balances in the global arena in favor of the USSR.⁸ These were the arguments on which, between 1954 and 1955, Chruščëv based his attack on Molotov as the symbol of the harmful aggressiveness of Stalin's foreign policies and blamed as mainly responsible for the hazards that had brought the world to the brink of nuclear war: from the Berlin blockade, through the Korean War, to the sabotaging of the EDC (European Defense Community).⁹ From the point of view of Chruščëv and the "collective leadership", this sequence of errors also included, unsurprisingly, the Soviet management of the Trieste question – at that time one of the causes of the strife between Stalin and Tito.¹⁰ Now that the latter had set about emitting messages of pacification and repentance, Chruščëv found it opportune to append to the second of the reparatory letters (July 1954)

⁵ Andrea. Graziosi, *L'URSS dal trionfo al degrado. Storia dell'Unione Sovietica. 1945-1991* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008), chapter IV; Federico Romero, *Storia della guerra fredda. L'ultimo conflitto per l'Europa* (Torino: Einaudi, 2009), 103 et sqq.

⁶ Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: The University of Carolina Press, 2009), 100-2.

⁷ Günter Bishof, *Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-1955: The Leverage of The Weak* (New York: Palgrave, 1999), 130-49; Mark Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. I (1999), No. 1-2-3.

⁸ Silvio Pons, *La rivoluzione globale. Storia del comunismo internazionale 1917-1991* (Torino: Einaudi, 2012), 266-9.

⁹ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 102 et sqq.

¹⁰ Ivo Banac, *With Stalin against Tito. Cominformist Split in Yugoslav Communism* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1988), 17; Raoul Pupo, *Trieste '45* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2010).

the hope expressed on behalf of the USSR that the Trieste question would be resolved “in conformity with the justified interests of Yugoslavia.”¹¹

What did this mean? Vibrations of this profound shift in the geopolitical terrain of the Cold War soon reached both the PCI and the leader of pro-Soviet communism in Trieste: namely Vittorio Vidali, who anchored his leadership to implacable hostility towards Tito's Yugoslavia.¹²

After 1948, the year of the excommunication that had first undermined the unity of the socialist front, the PCI's policy on Trieste remained firmly aligned with the USSR's demand for the Peace Treaty to be applied and the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT) be created. In its propaganda, the PCI adhered to the most aggressive cominformist anti-Titoism.¹³ For that matter, Togliatti saw the FTT as the solution closest to those that he himself had advocated since the end of war (internationalization in the form of an Italian-Yugoslav condominium being the one that he most preferred). It was because of his deep-rooted historicism that Togliatti was not averse to mantling the solution with a providentialist veil, depicting it as the most equitable outcome for those lands so tormented in the modern age.¹⁴ When the PCI had to take a position on the London Memorandum, therefore, it chose not to deny such a complex doctrine outright. Although the USSR, with a nod to the Yugoslavs, had notified its neutral stance, the accord that brought Trieste back to Italy was branded by the PCI the “worst” that Italian diplomacy could have obtained, yet another poisoned fruit of Italy's enslavement to Atlantic imperialism (Togliatti missed the debate in the Chamber due to an “indisposition”).¹⁵

The backstage turmoil of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and its possible repercussions were openly discussed at a meeting of the PCI executive at

¹¹ AJ, CK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I, – 49, Letter (Cable) from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to Tito and Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 24 July 1954, in Rajak, *The Tito-Khrushchev Correspondence* (translation of the author).

¹² Patrick Karlsen, “Vittorio Vidali: per una biografia del Novecento. Stato delle conoscenze e problemi metodologici,” *Annali, Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici*, a. XXV, 2011.

¹³ Karlsen, *Frontiera rossa*, chapter III. See also Maurizio Zuccari, *Il dito sulla piaga. Togliatti e il PCI nella rottura fra Stalin e Tito* (Milano: Mursia, 2008).

¹⁴ Palmiro Togliatti, “L'Italia e la guerra,” *Rinascita*, VII, 7 (1950); “Trieste atlantica,” *Rinascita*, X, 10 (1953); *Id.*, *Momenti della storia d'Italia* (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1973).

¹⁵ AP, Camera dei Deputati, session of 19 October 1954; “Il peggiore degli accordi,” Dichiarazione della Direzione del PCI, *l'Unità*, 6 October 1954; “Il governo sovietico prende atto dell'accordo per il Territorio Libero di Trieste,” *l'Unità*, 15 October 1954. Giampiero Valdevit, “Trieste, l'Unione Sovietica, la guerra fredda 1945-1954. Spunti per la messa a fuoco del problema,” *Qualestoria*, XXII, 3 (1994); Svetozar Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953-1957* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 85-6.

the end of October. Vidali was present at the meeting, and it was only the first of a series that saw a crescendo in his anger and frustration. Togliatti's announcement that he had given assent to Moscow's "consultation" on possible reconciliation was approved by a pragmatic unanimity disrupted only by the alarmed speeches of the old *Carlos*.¹⁶ He demonstrated a very clear idea of the meaning to attribute to the signals of agreement on Trieste emitted by the Soviets towards Belgrade. Bolstered by their support and aided by the withdrawal of the allied troops, the Yugoslavs would soon attempt "to do again what they did six to seven years ago": regain control of the party, not only liquidating Vidali first of all but also resuming the issue of Trieste's belonging to Italy.¹⁷ Consequently, Vidali admonished the meeting, the contents of the 1948 Cominform resolution should not be renounced for any reason, and the party in Trieste should be incorporated into the PCI as the first precautionary measure.¹⁸

But Vidali encountered the unyielding opposition of Togliatti, who had no desire to be once again embroiled in the insidious pitfalls of the eastern border. Vidali was therefore invited to consider "more calmly" the advantages of the new situation in regard to the movement's interests, and his proposal of a merger between the two parties was rejected: it was an "error", said the leader of the PCI, given the provisional nature of the Memorandum of London.¹⁹ The final resolution approved by the party executive went even further by stating that "recognition of the demarcation line as the state's frontier must in no way be acknowledged or envisaged."²⁰

Thereafter, in regard to the autonomy of the PCTT from Rome, one observes a curious dance in which the protagonists soon unexpectedly exchanged positions. It is possible to reconstruct these often tortuous movements from a variety of sources, Vidali's unpublished diaries, the papers of the PCI executive and secretariat; the reports of Italian intelligence on communist activity along the frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia; and the minutes of a meeting of the PCUS Plenum, which are significant for several reasons.²¹ The matter is important because it

¹⁶ "Carlos Contreras" was the name used by Vidali during his period of clandestinity in Mexico and Spain. After the Spanish Civil War, Commandant Carlos would become legendary (not only in a good sense) in the entire international left.

¹⁷ AFG, APC, f. M, Direzione, 28 October 1954, mf. 116.

¹⁸ "To have relations with us they must first deal with the PCI. We cannot return to 1947. Our PC must be the only one in Trieste": *ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ AFG, APC, f. M, Jugoslavia e Venezia Giulia, Risoluzione riservata su Trieste, 29 October 1954, b. 326, mf. 196.

²¹ This was the meeting of 9 July 1955, the first at which the members of the Presidium discussed foreign policies with the party leaders and the other state elites: Central Committee Plenum of the CPSU 9th Session, N. A. Bulganin Address, 9 July 1955,

involves others concerning the development of internal debate and the composition of balances and interdependences within the international communist movement, as well as the fact that the problem that, at least from 1943, the Communist Party's jurisdiction in Trieste was closely linked with the higher-level problem of the city's sovereignty.

The gist of the matter can be summarized as follows. To the extent that the concern was to withstand external pressures, Vidali found it entirely logical to seek protection in the party to which he was tied organizationally: the "older brother" with whom all policies had been agreed since the break with Tito, and with whom there was a strong (and for both parties vital) financial relationship.²² But what if those pressures became "internal", i.e. applied by the older brother in accord with yesterday's enemy? In that case, stout defense of small-scale but strategically precious autonomy might prove to be the most appropriate decision. According to the reports of the interior ministry's informants – who had infiltrated the Trieste party to its innermost circles²³ – this was exactly the kind of *revirement* to which Vidali resorted on his return from the quarrelsome executive meeting of late 1954.²⁴ As regards definition of the hierarchical relationships between the two communist parties, there followed a stalemate, or better a long trial of strength. The matter would be resolved only at the last congress of the PCTT in 1957, and in a manner intended to make what was in substance a victory for Vidali appear to be a draw.

It is difficult to say which of the two years that marked the beginning and end of the dispute was more tormented, which of them left the most scars on the skin of the jaguar.²⁵ What is certain is that in 1956, with the congress of patricide, a world disappeared. This was an event decisive in many respects because the cornerstones of the entire system of political and psychological values underpinning Vidali's life disintegrated, and thereafter a thick shadow of failure was cast on both the past and on what

History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD f. 2 op. 1 d. 173 ll. 76 ff. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111993>.

²² Valerio Riva (with the assistance of Francesco Bigazzi), *Oro da Mosca. I finanziamenti sovietici al PCI dalla Rivoluzione d'ottobre al crollo dell'URSS. Con 240 documenti inediti* (Milano: Mondadori, 1999); Karlsen, *Frontiera rossa*, Ch. III.

²³ ACS, MI, GAB, Partiti politici 1944-1966, bb. 23-24, f. 1608/85, PCTT/PCI 1955-1966, Prot. 04134/2 RIS, Organizzazioni clandestine del PCTT, 2/2/1956. The agents of the Trieste police headquarters had corrupted two party functionaries, as was the usual practice in these cases, unknown to each other, and one of whom was very close to Vidali.

²⁴ ACS, MI, GAB, Partiti politici, Prot. 200/9284, Situazione del Partito comunista del TT, 3/12/1954.

²⁵ Il Giaguaro was the last *nom de guerre* used by Vidali.

remained of the future, both Vidali's and that of the numerous others who shared the same illusion and the same lie.²⁶ But for Vidali the 20th Congress was a catastrophe in some way preannounced: the funeral ceremony of a crime committed the year before when Chruščëv had gone to Belgrade to welcome Tito back into the fold. For Vidali, Chruščëv's trip to Belgrade was a terrible blow not only because of his personal investment of energy and conviction in the battle against the rebellious neighbor and his awareness of having staked a large amount of his political fortunes on its outcome, but also because restoring Yugoslavia's status as a "genuinely socialist" country, after the schism of 1948, equated to admitting that Stalin had been wrong and therefore that it was permissible to question the USSR's hitherto undisputed authority to lead world communism. As also Molotov soon realized, there thus began the sunset of the Soviet monocacy and perhaps the end of communism in general.²⁷ Indeed, when Vidali entered the Kremlin to sit in the gallery of the foreign delegates to the 20th Congress, he had already been dressed in mourning for almost a year.

That the circle was tightening must have been very apparent on the occasion of Togliatti's visit to Trieste for the First of May 1955; a visit that had distressing, and with hindsight, fatal implications. Togliatti had rarely visited Trieste previously: three times in the 1920s before the "*fascistissime*" (the laws of 1926 that definitively transformed fascism into a dictatorship), plus a transit through the city by car, and almost incognito, in 1946 on his return from talks with Tito on the *infame baratto* (wicked bargain).²⁸ One can only conjecture as to the conflicting emotions evoked in Togliatti by the city that symbolized both irredentism and the Cold War. The anxieties of the PCI secretary caught between Stalin and Tito combined with the passion of a Turinese student fired by anti-Giolitti radicalism, and of a volunteer in the Alpine regiment in 1916 who had concluded the Great War as a senior corporal (the high official of the Third International had been this as well).²⁹

Under the already hot spring sunshine, in front of forty thousand people thronging the terraces of the Valmaura stadium, Togliatti made his appearance hidden behind a pair of dark glasses. Beside him stood Vidali, whom the news photographs showed to be tanned but with a grimace

²⁶ François Furet, *Il passato di un'illusione. L'idea comunista nel XX secolo* (Milano: Mondadori, 1995), 506-15; Pons, *La rivoluzione globale*, 269; Vittorio Vidali, *Diario del XX Congresso* (Milano: Vangelista), 1974.

²⁷ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 100.

²⁸ Claudio Tonel, *Rapporto con Trieste* (Trieste: Dedolibri), 1987.

²⁹ Aldo Agosti, *Togliatti: un uomo di frontiera* (Torino: Utet, 1996), 13-5; Giorgio Bocca, *Palmiro Togliatti* (Bari: Laterza, 1973), 25 *et sqq.*

of tension on his face.³⁰ The moment came for Togliatti to speak of the ongoing changes in the international scenario. "The policy of hostility towards the Yugoslav people pursued by the majority of the Italian parties and by the Italian government is wrong and absurd", Togliatti proclaimed. He then added: "We too, the Italian communists, have in the past clashed with the men who directed and still direct the Yugoslav state, but we have no intention of being exhausted by recriminations. We therefore greet with favour every step that distances Yugoslavia from the imperialists."³¹

Togliatti was then suddenly taken ill. Mario Spallone, his personal doctor, recalled that May the First as the date on which "Togliatti's physical well-being was brusquely interrupted."³² He was rushed to a mysterious villa in Opicina, a suburb of Trieste. The villa was the espionage center through which the Trieste PC kept the Soviet embassy in Rome informed.³³ Togliatti recovered in a few days, but the illness recurred in 1964 at Yalta and caused his death.³⁴

The Valmaura speech confirmed what Vidali had learned in Moscow in February, during a meeting with members of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and then again in April. The reunification was almost accomplished, they told him, and they sounded out his reactions to the eventuality that the Yugoslavs might resume their claims to Trieste: "We would support it. And you?" "Not us, absolutely not!"³⁵ The Titoists saw the Soviet reversal of position as sanctioning their victory, and moreover, as ratifying the rightness of their ideological and political stance since

³⁰ See the pictures in Vittorio Vidali, *Ritorno alla città senza pace. Il 1948 a Trieste* (Milano: Vangelista, 1982) and on the cover of Pietro Secchia, *In memoria di Togliatti. Discorso pronunciato nella commemorazione indetta dalla Federazione del P.C.I. a Trieste il 20 settembre 1964* (Trieste 1964).

³¹ "In una grande manifestazione a Trieste Togliatti rinnova l'appello a lottare per la pace," *l'Unità*, 3 May 1955; *Il Lavoratore*, 2 May 1955.

³² Mario Spallone, *Vent'anni con Togliatti* (Milano: Teti, 1976), 135-6.

³³ ACS, PCM, f. UZC, f. II, b. 83, Vol. I, 25/4, Centro di informazioni militari per l'Ambasciata sovietica, Prot. 4/2/23-28/56 GAB, 7/3/1956. Spallone, alerted by Nilde Iotti, arrived in the morning of 2 May on an aeroplane made available by the Italian government. He found Togliatti in bed, debilitated but conscious, engaged in discussion of Carducci's *Odi barbare* with Cesare Frugoni, his other personal doctor.

³⁴ When Togliatti briefly regained consciousness after the surgical operation, Nilde Iotti urged Spallone to reassure him: "Tell him that it's nothing, that it's like it was in Trieste. And then I said: 'Palmiro, courage, it's nothing, it's like it was in Trieste, remember?'. He seemed to understand. But then he groaned and two tears ran down his face [...] He had somehow realized that instead his end was near": Spallone, *Vent'anni con Togliatti*.

³⁵ AFG, APC, f. M, Segreteria, 7 June 1955, attachments: Note sulla discussione col PC di Trieste (riservato), author Luigi Amadesi, 5 June 1955, attachments, b. 324, mf. 194; AFG, AVV (Various Authors), Diari, 13 February 1956; Vidali, *Ritorno alla città senza pace*, 72-3.

1945 towards Moscow and Trieste. They now claimed the two trophies, which according to a shrewd PCI official sent to study the situation in Trieste at first hand, they agreed should include the head of Vidali.³⁶

They knew that they were backed by Chruščëv and by the USSR premier Bulganin. At the height of the polemic against Molotov, the two inveighed against the “erroneous” way in which the Trieste question had been handled “at the beginning and above all at the end.”³⁷ And they knew that Togliatti was seeking to extract the positive aspects of Chruščëvian destalinization and peaceful coexistence: in particular, an innovative conceptual framework – “polycentrism” – within which to propose the theme of “le vie nazionali” in grand style.³⁸ This was a process in which dialogue with the League of Yugoslav Communists (LYC), even though difficult, would assume strategic importance.³⁹

It is therefore clear that part of the PCI resented the man who reacted to Chruščëv's visit to Belgrade with a stridently vehement protest. “We are unable to solidarize with the declaration by comrade Chruščëv [...] as applied to our land [by way of the Yugoslavs] it was unbridled nationalism camouflaged as socialism, adventurism, sectarianism, political and physical terrorism [...] we are proud of the battles fought in recent years to reconstruct the party on the bases of Marxism-Leninism-*Stalinism*” (emphasis added): these were only some of the phrases – and not the most trenchant ones – published by Vidali after the act of contrition made by the CPSU general secretary to an elated Tito.⁴⁰ Vidali's vehemence was probably due to his sense of encirclement, but also to his intention to

³⁶ AFG, APC, f. M, Segreteria, 4 February 1955, attachments: Relazione sul lavoro in Jugoslavia, author Antonio Cicalini, 20 January 1955, b. 202, mf. 117. On Antonio Cicalini, one of the persons responsible for relations with Cominform and clandestine activities in Yugoslavia, see Alfredo Bonelli, *Fra Stalin e Tito. Cominformisti a Fiume 1948-1956* (Trieste: IRSMLFVG, 1994), 78.

³⁷ “God wants Tito to obtain two Triestes”: Central Committee Plenum of the CPSU Ninth Session, N. A. Bulganin Address, 9 July 1955.

³⁸ Jonathan Haslam, “I dilemmi della destalinizzazione. Togliatti, il XX Congresso del PCUS e le sue conseguenze,” in *Togliatti nel suo tempo*, ed. Roberto Gualtieri, Carlo Spagnolo, Ermanno Taviani (Roma: Carocci, 2007); Svetozar Rajak, “The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. I, *Origins*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler, Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Pons, *La rivoluzione globale*, 268-71.

³⁹ Marco Galeazzi, *Togliatti e Tito. Tra identità nazionale e internazionalismo* (Roma: Carocci, 2005); *Id.*, *Il PCI e il movimento dei Paesi non-allineati 1955-1975* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2011); Carlo Spagnolo, *Sul Memoriale di Yalta. Togliatti e la crisi del movimento comunista internazionale (1956-1964)* (Roma: Carocci, 2007).

⁴⁰ Vittorio Vidali, “La dichiarazione del comp. Kruscev ed i comunisti triestini,” *Il Lavoratore*, 30 May 1955; “Intensificare la lotta – Respingere la provocazione,” *ibid.* (emphasis added).

reaffirm his loyalties and the political strength that his political contacts in Moscow continued to ensure for him. The Soviet embassy's military information center at the villa in Opicina worked at full pace. The recent developments had not reduced its importance, and from its referents in Moscow it had received instructions "to defend itself with firmness".⁴¹ The PCI seized the opportunity provided by the *colpo di bora* – the expression used still today in Trieste to refer to Vidali's rebellion – to launch a ferocious attack on him. It mounted a sort of political trial and sought support in the Slovenian community to oust him from leadership of the party.⁴²

If the campaign against Vidali failed it was due, as at other times in his life, to factors beyond his control: in a word, luck. The Soviet invasion of Hungary, with which Chruščëv extinguished all the hopes of genuine renewal raised by destalinization, again altered the unstable order of relations between Moscow and Belgrade, inducing Tito to resume his equidistance between the blocs.⁴³ For his part, Togliatti abandoned polycentrism and fell back on the milder and vaguer idea of "unity in diversity."⁴⁴ For the time being, therefore, it was not possible to create a privileged axis with Yugoslavia to make the communist movement less dependent on Soviet monolithism.⁴⁵

With a delay of two years, therefore, the Trieste question came to an end also for the communists. The 6th national congress of the PCI held in December 1956 decreed the reintegration of the Triestine party

⁴¹ The center, named T1, gathered military information on the movements of both NATO troops and the Yugoslav armed forces: ACS, PCM, UZC, Prot. 4/2/23-28/56 GAB, 7/3/1956. On Vidali in Moscow in April 1955 see AFG, APC, f. M, Segreteria, 7 June 1955.

⁴² AFG, APC, f. M, Segreteria, 8 June 1955, b. 324, mf. 194. Togliatti was absent from the debate staged to crucify Vidali. The indecision on the Trieste party's autonomy and the exploratory contacts between PCI and the League of Yugoslav Communists continued until the eve of the Hungarian tragedy: AFG, APC, f. M, Direzione, 25 October 1956, mf. 127 APC, 1956, mf. 127, on the visit to Belgrade by a PCI delegation unbeknownst to Vidali and the relative protests. On the plotting with dissident Slovenes see ACS, MI, GAB, Partiti politici 1944-1966; Situazione del Partito comunista del TT, Prot. 4/2-10794/55 GAB, 10/10/1955; Situazione del Partito comunista del TT, Prot. 4/2-11389/55 GAB, 14/10/1955. But according to Vidali, the Titoists, with the backing of Chruščëv, also wanted the head of Togliatti. VV. AA., Diari, 6 June 1956.

⁴³ In February 1957 the tensions reached such a level that a recurrence of 1948 seemed likely: Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, 178-91; Rinna E. Kullaa, *Non-Alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Europe. Yugoslavia, Finland, and Soviet Challenge* (London-New York: I.B. Tauris), 2011.

⁴⁴ Pons, *La rivoluzione globale*, 290-92.

⁴⁵ Galeazzi, *Il PCI e il movimento dei Paesi non allineati*, 38; *Id.*, *Togliatti e Tito*, 160-78.

with the formula, urged by Vidali, of an autonomous federation.⁴⁶ The situation returned under control, and *comandante Carlos* gained election to Parliament.

2. Normalization

The 6th PCI Congress also served to lay the economic and political bases on which the communists, at both central and local level, intended to build their action in post-London Memorandum Trieste.

From Trieste's reunification with Italy onwards, the line taken by Vidali and others in a series of articles in *Rinascita* was to represent the event as a calamity: both for the city, increasingly decentralized from Danubian Europe, and for a country already afflicted by stagnation and unemployment.⁴⁷ Vidali put these arguments in more articulated form to the 5th PCTT Congress held in April 1956. A year and a half after the annexation, he declared, the economic crisis gripping Trieste, far from abating, had been aggravated by a series of factors, which he listed in order thus: the city's loss of its reference market; its peripheral position on Italian territory; and its lack of modern infrastructures.⁴⁸ To remedy these problems, Vidali, and the entire PCI with him, insisted on two provisions, one economic, the other institutional: the duty-free zone, and local government autonomy. As regards the duty-free zone, this was a considerable change of mind by the PCI if one considers that it had hitherto treated the project with open suspicion as one the benefits claimed by Yugoslavia during the pre-memorandum discussions.⁴⁹

It was Togliatti, in a speech of May 1955, who first proposed that Trieste be granted an economic-commercial instrument that would facilitate its integration into the national market.⁵⁰ Economic goals – stimulating Trieste's trade with the socialist countries in its traditional hinterland, attracting foreign investments in local industry – also drove the determination with which Vidali promoted the project of the free-trade zone, although in his case there was a strictly political consideration

⁴⁶ "Il Partito comunista di Trieste annuncia il suo ingresso nel nostro Partito," *l'Unità*, 13 December 1956.

⁴⁷ "Politica italiana," *Rinascita*, X, 10 (1953); Palmiro Togliatti, "Di Trieste e della pace," *Rinascita*, XI, 7 (1954); Vittorio Vidali, "L'odierna situazione economica e sociale di Trieste e le sue prospettive," *Rinascita*, XI, 10 (1954).

⁴⁸ AFG, APC, f. M, Direzione, 29 September 1955, mf. 136. See also: "Aperto il Congresso del PC di Trieste," *l'Unità*, 7 April 1956.

⁴⁹ See the reports in *l'Unità* devoted to Trieste in the editions of 5 May and 18 June 1954.

⁵⁰ "Noi comunisti riconosciamo giusta la rivendicazione che Trieste diventi, all'estremità del Mediterraneo, un porto franco," *Il Lavoratore*, 2 May 1955.

as well.⁵¹ Vidali was aware that the true, great, and still unresolved problem of the Communist Party in Trieste was that it was restricted – by its internal structure, social block of reference, and consensus base – to being a party of *cadres*, and had still not become the *mass* party that it had sought to be since 1947.⁵²

In 1950, Vidali had suggested that a break with the old (and in certain respects obsolete) Soviet line on the FTT, and its replacement with the claim that the entire territory (Zone B included) be Italy's, would have increased the communists' support among middle-class Italians. However, his proposal had been rejected out of hand by the PCI leadership.⁵³ He now maintained that the same function could be performed by the project for a free-trade zone. This he saw as the basis on which to build relations with the most dynamic sectors of Triestine society – business, crafts, commerce, and the professions – hitherto alienated by the Communist Party's anti-national prejudice.⁵⁴ Furthermore, the free-trade zone would realize all its potential if rapid implementation was given to article 116 of the Constitution for the creation of the autonomous region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, within which Trieste would be given even greater autonomy. This was the proposal approved with a specific motion by the 8th PCI congress.⁵⁵

Vidali's report also stressed the usefulness of the free-trade zone in enabling local firms to leave Confindustria.⁵⁶ This was indicative of a second significance that the communists attached to the proposal: that the free-trade zone would be a body interposed – so to speak – between Trieste and an Italy still seen as “something separate.”⁵⁷ For some years after the Memorandum, indeed, not a few militants refused to accept the new party cards because they were adorned with the tricolor.⁵⁸ It may be that it was precisely the association between autonomy and the free-trade zone that helped the Trieste communists to increase their percentage of votes in the 1956 administrative elections, despite the disaster caused

⁵¹ AFG, APC, f. M, Segreteria, 23 July 1956, attachments: Lettera di Vidali, 18 June 1956, mf. 125.

⁵² Karlsen, *Frontiera rossa*, ch. III.

⁵³ The episode is reconstructed in detail in *ibid.*

⁵⁴ APC, f. M, Segreteria, 31 May 1957, attachments: Lettera di Vidali, 23 May 1957, mf. 129. It was Pellegrini who exhorted the Trieste party to “rapidly supersede its current nature as a party of cadres”.

⁵⁵ Rapporto con Trieste, doc. 28.

⁵⁶ “Il Partito comunista di Trieste annuncia il suo ingresso nel nostro Partito,” *l'Unità*, 13 December 1956.

⁵⁷ Giampaolo Valdevit, *Trieste. Storia di una periferia insicura* (Milano: Bruno Mondadori, 2004), 104.

⁵⁸ *Comunisti a Trieste*, 144.

by the after-effects of the Twentieth Congress.⁵⁹ Vidali boasted that this success was his own achievement – especially to the party comrades who only recently had tried to eliminate him politically.⁶⁰

“National question”: this was the expression used at the last meeting of the PCTT (summer 1957) by Pietro Ingrao to define the magnitude of the political, economic and social emergency that Trieste represented for the rest of the country. Ingrao thus inaugurated an interpretative category which the PCI would never renounce thereafter;⁶¹ and which would also engender the parliamentary bill – entitled *Istituzione della Zona Franca nel Territorio di Trieste* – to which Vidali indissolubly tied his parliamentary activity (1958-1968).

On presenting the bill to the Chamber on 18 July 1958, Vidali emphasized that unemployment in Trieste far exceeded the national average, and that the level would have been even higher without the mass emigration that had taken place after 1954. All this was due to the inertia or inadequacy of the policies of the republican governments. For Vidali it was necessary to recognize as the basis for every remedy that “Trieste is the natural harbor firstly for Austria and Czechoslovakia, and then for Hungary, part of Yugoslavia and other parts of Europe”. If the government had been clearly aware of this matter of fact when Italy had joined the ECM, it would not have automatically agreed to the favourable measures requested by Federal Germany in regard to Hamburg, “conditions that have enabled that port to penetrate deeply into Trieste’s specific hinterland.”⁶² The existence of the EMC did not preclude the creation of free-trade zones in the member-countries, and contrary to the self-interested claims of the right, there was no danger to the national integrity of Trieste; indeed, the city’s history demonstrated that trade had long been the vital source of its Italian national identity. In conclusion, Vidali argued, the provision was intended to counter the crisis of the harbor and the area’s entire economy by redirecting to Trieste the investments made by the countries of its hinterland.⁶³

⁵⁹ See the data collected in *Quarant'anni di elezioni nel Friuli-Venezia Giulia* (Trieste: Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia, 1988), Vol. II.

⁶⁰ VV. AA., *Diari*, 5 June 1956: “I look at those who until a year ago wanted a resounding declaration of self-criticism [...] Beria would have been proud of the education administered”.

⁶¹ *Il Lavoratore*, 5 July 1957; “Vidali apre il Congresso del PC di Trieste e propone ufficialmente la fusione col PCI,” *l'Unità*, 29 June 1957.

⁶² Giulio Sapelli, *Trieste italiana. Mito e destino economico* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1990), 193.

⁶³ AP, Camera dei Deputati, III Legislatura, session of 18 July 1958.

Throughout the 1960s, the free-trade zone – embedded in the institutional structure of the autonomous province – continued to form the basis of the PCI's political and economic programme for Trieste. Although it was amended and augmented, its substance and purposes remained the same.⁶⁴

The same accusations that Italy had impoverished Trieste were brought against the national government principally its lack of a strategic vision of development and its reliance on mere welfarism to compensate for it – as Vidali never tired of repeating to the Chamber.⁶⁵ These were the lenses through which the PCI construed the protests that in 1966 filled Trieste's streets with thousands of demonstrators against the closure of the Cantieri San Marco and the Fabbrica Macchine as part of the general restructuring of Italy's naval engineering industry. With pure anti-Europeanist language, the communists described the closures as “a mistaken and submissive plan by the IRI, which sacrifices the interests of the nation to the decisions of the EMC.”⁶⁶ These protests anticipated the even more vociferous ones mounted against the Treaty of Osimo in the following decade. Both episodes expressed the resentment of a Trieste that felt itself downgraded by the decisions of the government parties – or worse betrayed by its country.⁶⁷

For the PCI the city was paying the price of a national policy that had produced nothing but empty rhetoric. Ingrao told Parliament: “Today in Trieste more than yesterday they say that this is Italy, this is where Italy is taking us [...] We could fill the Chamber with all the tears that have been shed for Trieste!”⁶⁸ And a few years later Vidali wrote thus in his diary:

Trieste has celebrated fifty years of life with Italy. The embrace has been so strong that the poor city has asthma, finding it more and more difficult to breathe. There have been ceremonies, speeches, illustrious visitors, luxury editions, promises, promises, and promises. Yet we are in the final light of a melancholy sunset.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ AP, Camera dei Deputati, III Legislatura, session 13 July 1959; “Intervento di Vidali per il porto di Trieste,” *L'Unità*, 14 July 1959. Vidali indicated as equally necessary the “reduction of ingoing and outgoing railway tariffs, an expansion of road linkages, an increase of shipping lines in the Adriatic through resumption of trade with the countries of Eastern Europe and Asia.

⁶⁵ AP, Camera dei Deputati, III Legislatura, session of 6 October 1960.

⁶⁶ Risoluzione dell'Ufficio politico del PCI, 8 October 1966, in *Rapporto con Trieste*; “Risoluzione della Direzione del PCI per l'avvenire di Trieste,” *L'Unità*, 24 September 1966.

⁶⁷ Valdevit, *Trieste. Storia di una periferia insicura*, 108-10; Marina Cattaruzza, *L'Italia e il confine orientale* (Bologna: il Mulino, 2007), 334.

⁶⁸ AP, Camera dei Deputati, IV Legislatura, session of 10 October 1966.

⁶⁹ VV. AA., *Diari*, 1 January 1969.

3. Twenty years later

Nevertheless, if there was anyone in Triestine communism able to express the discontent and rancor widespread in the city, it was not Vidali. He had long stubbornly adhered to view of Italy as equally parasitical and rapacious, the sponsor in Trieste of a colonial regime worse than the one wanted by the Anglo-Americans.⁷⁰ Moreover, in his old age he had drawn close – also for reasons of an affective nature – to the democratic-radical culture propounded by Slataper and Stuparich and imbued with a Voce-sque elitism bound to be disappointed. He was in love, not with Trieste itself, but with an idea of it, and with its more consolatory myths. In this regard, suffice it to quote the following passage from his diary:

The Triestine bourgeoisie, cosmopolitan because it is bereft of a homeland, filled with that ‘patriotism’ which is often the refuge of scoundrels, has always been narrow-minded, selfish, and uncultivated. Poets, writers, journalists, and graduates must flee from Trieste if they want to have some satisfaction, to be someone. It has always been thus here. And it is for this reason that sons of Trieste like Slataper, Stuparich, Saba, and so many others have always scorned this wretched middle class: uncivil, parasitical, devoted to speculation, aged and senile, and are now leaving the void and the stench. This is the result of the Rome bureaucracy’s work as a rodent and a wrecker. A stupendous city, with a hard-working population, is allowed to die, with its unprincipled, clientelistic and venal bourgeois parties, with its polluted and deserted bay.⁷¹

Woven into this tangle of disillusionment was also Vidali’s frustration with the progress of relations with Yugoslavia at both government and party level. From the end of the 1950s to Osimo, apart from some rare and short-lived tensions, diplomatic relations between the two Adriatic countries had maintained “their cordial regularity.”⁷² This was terrain that nourished the endeavor within the PCI, begun by Togliatti and substantially continued by his successors, to use dialogue with the Yugoslavs to strengthen the multipolar tendencies in the communist movement. The insistence on the plurality of possible transitions to the socialism, together with the dream of a united but less hierarchical, more flexible and integrated communist movement, had been the legacies entrusted to Togliatti’s *Yalta*

⁷⁰ “Here fascism and the state merge together. It has been so since when the Italian state arrived in November 1918. We are a military region, a frontier zone, infested by military serfs and by cheap patriotism. Judges, police officers, generals and colonels, bureaucrats: all selected on the right make their careers as they once did in Libya”: *ibid.*, 28 January 1975.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 18 February 1975.

⁷² Cattaruzza, *L'Italia e il confine orientale*, 336. Massimo Bucarelli, *La “questione jugoslava” nella politica estera repubblicana (1945-1999)* (Roma: Aracne, 2008).

Memoriale.⁷³ During the 1960s, as Sino-Soviet tensions mounted, it had become customary to see the names of Tito and Togliatti side by side in the broadsides that the Chinese launched – on behalf of all the extremists of post-Stalin reducism, including Vidali – against the revisionists with peaceful and national policies.⁷⁴ Instead, the first meeting between the Autonomous Federation of Trieste and the Ljubljana League of Communists took place only in 1962. Vidali on the one hand and Boris Krajgher on the other did the best they could with gestures of reconciliation with the former enemy, while postponing self-criticisms to an unspecified later date.⁷⁵

But the furrow ploughed by Togliatti would become deeper. The imposition of a conservative and authoritarian version of *détente à la Brežnev*, perceived by Yugoslavia as a threat to its autonomy, only reinforced harmony between the PCI and the CLY (Communist League of Yugoslavia) especially after the Czechoslovakia crisis.⁷⁶ In 1969 it was Giorgio Napolitano who conveyed cordial greetings to the Congress of the Yugoslav Communists during which the Cominform resolution of 1948 was labeled that “wretched decision”.⁷⁷ This was Vidali’s reaction in his diary:

It seems that the Italians knew nothing about it and that Togliatti had to accept the resolution for reasons of discipline. Instead: 1) the Italians were the most enthusiastic; 2) Togliatti collaborated on formulating and writing a fine letter to Judin⁷⁸ extolling the position of the Triestine communists; 3) the PCI executive directed the illegal work in Yugoslavia with one of its offices; 4) I gave lectures on Titoism in the schools of Rome and Bologna; 5) in Rome, Mitko⁷⁹ wrote a highly-praised thesis on Titofascism, for which he was elected to the CC; 6) in Italy the Titoists organized a party, the USI,⁸⁰

⁷³ Spagnolo, *Sul Memoriale di Yalta*; Galeazzi, *Togliatti e Tito*, 246; Pons, *La rivoluzione globale*, 308-09.

⁷⁴ Pons, *La rivoluzione globale*, 295-306.

⁷⁵ Claudio Tonel, *Da Vidali in qua* (Trieste: Italo Svevo, 2004), 24.

⁷⁶ Both Longo and Tito expressed their support for Dubček a few days from each other: *The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader*, ed. J. Navrátil (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), docs. 29-32; Mark Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine,” in *1968: the World Transformed*, ed. Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, Detlef Junker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 111-72; Maud Bracke, *Quale socialismo, quale distensione? Il comunismo europeo e la crisi cecoslovacca del '68* (Roma: Carocci, 2009).

⁷⁷ “Napolitano a colloquio con Tito e Kardelj,” *l’Unità*, 15 March 1969.

⁷⁸ Pavel F. Judin, USSR permanent representative at the Cominform.

⁷⁹ Karel Šiškovič [Mitko], *La lotta contro il titofascismo: relazione tenuta al III Congresso del Partito comunista del Territorio di Trieste* (Trieste 1951).

⁸⁰ Unione Socialista Indipendente. See Giorgio Boccolari, Luciano Casali, *I Magnacucchi. Valdo Magnani e la ricerca di una sinistra autonoma e democratica* (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1991).

which took more than 300,000 votes away from the PCI in the elections; this USI received money from Yugoslavia and from the Italian Department of the Interior [...]. Napolitano should therefore have been more careful. Perhaps he had drunk too much, or perhaps he had been drugged.⁸¹

The multipolarism vs. state-leader alternative had always divided Vidali and Togliatti;⁸² and it continued to do so under Berlinguer. Even more deeply, the distances were marked by a different conception of the stance that the communists should take towards the Italian state: convinced loyalty to the institutions of the Republic or their radical delegitimation. Throughout his lifetime, Vidali adhered to latter position, which also heavily influenced his reaction to the Treaty of Osimo, given that it had been signed by the state which had humiliated and impoverished Trieste ever since its first “redemption”. He never shifted, either in private or in public, from a highly ambiguous position: he accepted only with reluctance the values of pacification and détente expressed in the accord; conversely, he was ready to express sympathy with the thousands of Triestines who protested against the Treaty – decided “without them, against them” – and its economic provisions.⁸³ From national periodicals he did not hesitate to flaunt such opinions:

I understand the frustration felt. Among the fifty thousand people who signed for the duty-free zone, against the Treaty of Osimo, there will have been some in bad faith, but there were very many honest, worried people. I can understand. [...] Trieste has become the bazaar of Yugoslavia. There is a discouragement everywhere. In twenty years the governments have sent at least six hundred billion lire here, but not even we communists know how it has been spent. [...] This sea before us would become, they told us, a sea of giants. It has become a sea of shit, perhaps the most polluted in the world. The shipyards have been dismantled, there is not even a dry dock for repairs. Although the seventh wharf for containers is efficient, it is blocked by the fact that there are no links with the railway, with the roads around the city. [...] So many good people signed, Triestines and Italians. I cannot say that Cecovini, Giuricin, Fonda-Savio, Gruber-Bencos are fascists.⁸⁴ They are honest, democratic, combatants.⁸⁵

⁸¹ VV. AA., *Diari*, 14 March 1969.

⁸² Valdevit, *Trieste. Storia di una periferia insicura*, 93.

⁸³ VV. AA., *Diari*, 30 September and 1 October 1975.

⁸⁴ The leaders of the popular mobilization: see Diego D'Amelio, “‘Peace in the Security’ and ‘Bridge Border’. The Italian Centre-Left and Yugoslavia Overcoming the Question of Trieste,” *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino*⁸⁷, 2015/1.

⁸⁵ Giancarlo Graziosi, “Dovete ascoltarci: qui a Trieste abbiamo paura,” *La Domenica del Corriere*, 9 December 1976.

Vidali evinced embarrassment only at the justifications which he had been obliged to proffer when rejecting the proposal for the free-trade zone. The project had been let drop at the end of the 1960s by the communists and had now been exhumed by a heterogeneous front – neofascists, radicals, autonomists of the List for Trieste – in opposition to the tax-exempt industrial installation on the Karst plateau envisaged by the Treaty.⁸⁶ Without much conviction, Vidali called it a “mystifying proposal” in accordance with the rather superficial arguments put forward by the rest of the PCI.⁸⁷

The debates within the PCI executive at the beginning of the 1970s were between two opposing points of view on the value to be given to the agreement with the Yugoslavs. One side was careful not to lose sight of the USSR's attitudes and moods, with Pajetta as its proponent; the other was identified with Berlinguer, according to whom the privileged axis with the leader of the non-aligned countries was essential if the two-bloc system was to be superseded.⁸⁸ The radicalization imposed by the communists in Portugal after the Carnation Revolution (1974) united Berlinguer and Tito in harsh condemnation of the Portuguese secretary Álvaro Cunhal. Thereafter, the fear that the anachronism of a popular democracy in Western Europe would irremediably jeopardize détente induced the two leaders to tie their parties together in an “authentic strategic alliance.”⁸⁹ The collaboration should have helped the League of Yugoslav Communists to foster contacts between the group of non-aligned countries and the PCI, while the latter would express Belgrade's worries concerning Brežnev's autocratic efforts within the communist movement.⁹⁰ These issues were addressed at the meeting between Berlinguer and Tito in March 1975, during which the PCI secretary passed what seemed definitive sentence on what still remained of the unity of international communism: “Continuing to affirm the existence of a communist movement united by a shared ideology and separate from

⁸⁶ Cattaruzza, *L'Italia e il confine orientale*, 338-40.

⁸⁷ In the Chamber, Pajetta merely said: “The proposal being advanced today by the other side, which we oppose, was once also made by the communists [...] at a time when the situation seemed tense, fraught, when relations between the two peoples seemed impossible, or almost [...] Then this proposal of the duty-free zone seemed a possibility, a hypothesis”: AP, Camera dei Deputati, VI Legislatura, session of 17 December 1976. See also “Trieste: votata mozione unitaria in favore del trattato di Osimo,” *l'Unità*, 21 November 1976; M. Passi, “Campagna contro il trattato di Osimo. A colloquio con il compagno Vittorio Vidali,” *l'Unità*, 1 December 1976.

⁸⁸ AFG, APC, Direzione, 2 February 1972, mf. 32.

⁸⁹ Silvio Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo* (Torino: Einaudi, 2006), 62.

⁹⁰ AFG, APC, Estero, Jugoslavia, Nota per Berlinguer Pajetta segreteria, 1974, mf. 84; Estero, Dibattiti tra PC, Nota sul viaggio di Segre e Oliva a Belgrado e sulla riunione del sottogruppo a Berlino (12-13 maggio), 1975, mf. 206.

the rest responds to a narrow view of the possibilities.”⁹¹ On the eve of signature of the Treaty of Osimo, therefore, understanding between the two communist parties could not have been closer.

Seen in this light, one understands all the nuances of the declarations with which Berlinguer commented on the results of the negotiations. After mentioning the “great national significance” of the agreement, he emphasized that Italy had a “profound interest in developing relations of friendship and cooperation with socialist and non-aligned Yugoslavia”; Osimo was described as the “realization in practice” of the principles recently affirmed at the Helsinki Conference.⁹² At a superficial level, insofar as the accord ratified the location of the frontiers between the two countries, this was true. Nevertheless, implicit in Berlinguer’s statement was the intent to have the Treaty read as a hand extended by Italy to the non-aligned countries and as a step towards superseding the blocs: which was what Pajetta instead expressed overtly during the discussion in Parliament on ratification.⁹³ This concerned the “profound interest” – the core of Berlinguer’s political design – which clashed with the conservative paradigm of the “Brežnev doctrine”: that is, with the prospect of freezing the internal equilibria of the countries on either side of the Iron Curtain by interpreting Helsinki in inflexibly bipolar terms.⁹⁴

Amid this fruitful dialogue, in 1974 Vidali decided to publish his diaries compiled at the time of the Twentieth Congress.⁹⁵ One reads anguished pages infested by ghosts, from which, however, there transpires an irrepressible desire to save everything possible of Stalin’s memory by reiterating the reasons for Tito’s excommunication. How else can one judge it if not as a brazenly disruptive manoeuvre? What can one think of a book that at the apogee of the honeymoon between the PCI and the

⁹¹ AFG, APC, Estero, Incontro del compagno Berlinguer con Tito (presenti Dolanc, Grličkov, Obradović e Segre) 29 marzo 1975, 1975, mf. 204; Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*.

⁹² “Sull’accordo fra Italia e Jugoslavia,” *Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst*, 3 October 1975.

⁹³ Yugoslavia was the state “that has adopted [...] the non-alignment policy that represents one of the hopes that the blocs of the great opposed powers will be superseded [...] the policy that we pursue in Europe and in the world”: AP, Camera dei Deputati, VI Legislatura, session of 17 December 1976.

⁹⁴ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 227-46; Pons, *La rivoluzione globale*, 352-3.

⁹⁵ Vidali, *Diario del XX Congresso*.

LCY loudly proclaimed the right to call what the Yugoslavs had done in Trieste in May 1945 “occupation”, and not liberation? All possible evil obviously – came the answer almost in unison from the opposite shores of the Adriatic.⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Emanuele Macaluso wrote that “the more Vidali realizes the tragic misdeeds of Stalin, the more he feels rancour towards Krusciov, with the consequence that he is unable to pass critical judgement” (*Rinascita*, 5, 31 January 1975). *Komunist*, the LCI party organ, after declaring that in Vidali’s book “one seeks in vain for a logical connection,” recalled that already in 1955 Vidali had sought, with a “stab in the back” to block rapprochement between Italian and Yugoslav communists; and that publication of the *Diario* was “a further attempt to halt this process [...] and to salvage the remnants of an outmoded policy” (“Sarebbe questa la critica senza paura?,” December 1974).