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## **Divided and Contested Cities in Modern European History. The Example of Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina**

November 9, 1989 was marked by the fall of the Berlin wall: the most famous divided city of 1920<sup>th</sup> century Europe was finally on its way to reunification.<sup>1</sup> Four years later, on the same day, the Old Bridge of Mostar was destroyed. For the old inhabitants this event marked the death of their pluralist city; for spectators around the world, horrified that war once again raged in the heart of the European continent, Mostar staked a claim of its own to the title of Europe's most renowned divided city. It contended for this dubious distinction with Nicosia and Belfast, though no European city could compete with Jerusalem in this regard.

The story of divided Berlin has very little in common with the stories of Mostar, Belfast, Nicosia and Jerusalem. The German city was divided in the aftermath of a world war and during the Cold War confrontation. Berlin was not divided as a result of civil war or internal strife for hegemony or domination within the city or in its wider area. Nor were outside powers present to contain a local conflict or to *divide and quit*, the way Britain did as it left its former colonial possessions. There had been no ethnonational rivalry over Berlin. Instead, these are all elements of the division of the other mentioned cities and their deep-rooted political and cultural contentions. While it is quite easy to see Berlin as a German city, it is not as easy to classify the other cities nationally. Belfast is a northern Irish town belonging to the United Kingdom and is contested locally by Irish Nationalists and British Loyalists. Jerusalem is both an Israeli and a Palestinian city and at the centre of open and exclusive claims by rival national ideologies and movements. Nicosia is both Greek and Turkish, divided by a police-controlled state border, and is the capital of both Cypriot states, though Greek Cypriots claim the whole city and do not recognize the Turkish

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<sup>1</sup> This article is based on a research carried out partly independently, partly with the help of Eric Gobetti and for the production of the ethnographic film *Around Mostar, the Bridge and Bruce Lee* (authors: Vanni D'Alessio and Sanja Puljar D'Alessio), which has not yet been formally released but was presented at the conference "Revisiting Southeastern Europe. Comparative Social History of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries" (Institut für soziale Bewegungen, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 2007), in the documentary section of the 2008 ASN World Convention (Columbia University, New York City) and at several other conferences and scientific institutions in Italy, Germany and Croatia.

Northern Cypriot Republic (along with all of the international community, except Turkey).

Exclusive nationalist claims on these cities refer to unresolved questions of sovereignty in the respective countries. Mostar is a Bosnian-Herzegovinian town, but Bosnia-Herzegovina's status as a state and the means by which it will resist internal separatist drives are questions of some concern. Trends towards both integration and disintegration are present in Mostar as they are throughout Bosnian-Herzegovinian society, politics and public opinion. There is a direct relation between Bosnia-Herzegovina's uncertain status as a state and Mostar's lasting crisis as a divided city. Nonetheless, the elements of Mostar's division are built on the city's historical experience.

During the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Mostar was claimed by all the belligerents. When the Dayton agreement was signed in November 1995, the Bosnian Serbs managed to retain a *quasi*-state, the *Republika Srpska*, one of the two entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>2</sup> They did not regain Mostar, however. The initial coalition of Croatian and Bosniak (Muslim) forces, which fought together against the Serb-dominated Yugoslav Army, had forced the Bosnian Serbs to leave the city in 1992. After the break-up of that initial coalition in 1993, the Croatian Territorial Defense (*Hrvatsko vijeće obrane*, HVO) fought for the Croatian Republic of *Herceg-Bosna*, with Mostar as its main city, but in vain. In 1994 the Bosnian Croats agreed to join a Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ever since the war ended, however, the main Croatian parties have been pushing for a revision of the Dayton agreement and the recognition of a third, separate entity in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian state.<sup>3</sup> During the war, Croatian forces ethnically "cleansed" the western part of the town. They pushed the majority of the Bosniak population to the older, eastern part of Mostar, though some elderly Muslims managed to remain in their apartments. The old town of Mostar, situated along the river Neretva and particularly to its east, was already inhabited by a majority of people with Muslim identity or origins. This group's preponderance in the east was further reinforced by the constant flow of refugees from the surrounding areas. In the western area of the town, only individuals who identified themselves or were identified by others as Croats were allowed to take shelter and settle.<sup>4</sup> After being divided by the war's

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<sup>2</sup> The other entity being the Croatian/Bosniak (Muslim) Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

<sup>3</sup> On Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Dayton Peace Agreement see Florian BIEBER, *Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance*, London 2005; Xavier BOUGAREL / Elissa HELMS / Ger DUIJZINGS (eds.), *The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society*, Aldershot 2007; Sumantra BOSE, *Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*, London 2002. On Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s war see (among others) Xavier BOUGAREL, *Bosnie: anatomie d'une conflict*, Paris 1996. For further literature on Bosnia-Herzegovina see the following notes in this article.

<sup>4</sup> "It was estimated that post-war east Mostar contained over 30,000 displaced persons, coming from eastern Herzegovina, Stolac, and the Capljina region in addition to west Mostar. In west

front line, the city was further segregated in the immediate postwar period. The international powers, with their extensive authority in post-Dayton Bosnia, created a system of consociational local rule that reinforced the division of Mostar and strengthened the leaders of the war parties.<sup>5</sup> When the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina formally unified the town in 2004, it maintained two separate voting units, each of which had three districts and a clear ethnonational majority.

Mostar is still divided in most, if not all, aspects of social and cultural life, and the main Croatian and Bosniak parties still carry on irreconcilable ethnic policies. Croats, who now comprise the relative majority of the city's population, have held the mayorship since the city was reunified in 2004. They are eager to eliminate the power sharing mechanisms governing local elections, which allow Bosniak nationalist parties to exert their hegemony over local electoral districts where Muslims are in the majority. At the same time as they are fighting for a further division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three entities, Croatian nationalists are therefore deploying a strategy and a discourse of unification within Mostar. Bosniak nationalists, on the other hand, use a discourse of further unification and centralization of the country as a whole. At the same time, they exert their absolute majority in Sarajevo and in the Croatian-Bosniak Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, they refuse to accept the majority rule voting system and the unification of Mostar's electoral districts, thus opposing the end of the consociational modus of power sharing in this town.

Differently from postwar Berlin, postwar Mostar belongs to a category of divided *and* contested cities in which sovereignty problems are combined with issues of ethnicity and nationalism. The sovereignty issue refers to the weakness and insecurity of the states to which these towns belong, which are undermined by nationalist claims raised by conflicting local political factions. Such cities are contested, Anthony Hepburn explains, because in their urban centres "two or more ethnically conscious groups – divided by religion, language and/or culture and perceived history – co-exist in a situation where neither group is willing to concede supremacy to the other".<sup>6</sup> Ethnicity is a crucial aspect of this situation,

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Mostar, about 17,000 displaced persons resided there after the war, coming mainly from Central Bosnia, Sarajevo, Jablanica, and Konjic." Scott A. BOLLENS, *Cities, Nationalism, and Democratization*, London / New York 2007, 171.

5 On consociational democracy see Arend LIJPHART, *Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration*, New Haven / London 1977; Id., *The Power-Sharing Approach*, in: Joseph V. MONTVILLE (ed.), *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, New York 1991. On consociational democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina see the already mentioned books of Bieber and Bose and the recent article, based on research on Mostar, by Azra HROMADŽIĆ, "Once We Had a House". *Invisible Citizens and Consociational Democracy in Post-War Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina*, in: *Social Analysis* 56 (2012), no. 3, 30-48.

6 Anthony C. HEPBURN, *Contested Cities in the Modern West*, Basingstoke 2004, 2.

because it is entrenched with territorial bonds and nationalist claims. This is not to say that in present day Berlin the ethnic question is not relevant for the mechanisms producing and enhancing divisions in its urban sphere. In fact, Berlin is experiencing the problems of a *late* or *post-modern* divided city, particularly the association of urban residential divisions with ethnic belonging. This association, however, does not stem from a German interethnic division, say, between east and west German Berliners, manifesting a new ethnonational differentiation within the city and consequently new issues of control and sovereignty.

Other European *late modern* metropolises, like London and Paris, are also considered divided.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, their divisions are either of social nature or linked with the relatively new global waves of immigration, which do not imply significant problems of nationalism and statehood. In the last few years, several works have appeared on divided modern metropolises and on how the forces of globalization and economic restructuring have affected the public sphere, producing socio-spatial partitions in the urban fabric that divide the rich and the poor, the private and the public, the old settlers and the newcomers, and also different immigrant ethnic communities.<sup>8</sup> These works mainly address issues of inequality and pluralism in the new multicultural globalized cities of the *west*, although the dramatic effects of privatization are producing new inequalities also in central and eastern Europe, and enhancing the marginalization of some segments of society.<sup>9</sup> Though ethnicity plays an important role in debates on the fragmentation of urban spaces, it is depicted more as an element of concealed social identities.<sup>10</sup> Nationalist forms of contestation of state power and of inter-ethnic contention, deployed in the city's public spaces in the name of a specific nationality, are not generally featured in these discussions. Following a different set of literature on divided cities, I focus on cities divided and contended by rival nationalist communities. Rather than addressing the problems of globalization and their impact on the residential ethnic segmentation of late modern me-

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7 Susan S. FAINSTEIN / Ian GORDON / Michael HARLOE, *Divided Cities: New York and London in the Contemporary World*, Oxford 2002; Yuri KAZEPOV (ed.), *Cities of Europe: Changing Context, Local Arrangements, and the Challenge to Urban Cohesion*, Oxford 2005.

8 Peter MARCUSE / Ronald VAN KAMPEN (eds.), *Of States and Cities: The Partitioning of Urban Space*, Oxford 2002; Id. (eds.), *Globalizing Cities. A New Spatial Order?*, Oxford 2000; Richard SCHOLAR (ed.), *Divided Cities: the Oxford Amnesty Lectures 2003*, Oxford 2006.

9 Zorica NEDOVIĆ BUDIĆ / Sasha TSENKOVA (eds.), *The Urban Mosaic of Post-Socialist Europe*, Heidelberg 2006; Ian F. E. HAMILTON / Kaliopa DIMITROVSKA ANDREWS / Nataša PICHLER-MILANOVIĆ (eds.), *Transformation of Cities in Central and Eastern Europe: Towards Globalization*, Tokyo 2005; Gregory D. ANDRUSZ / Michael HARLOE / Iván SZELÉNYI (eds.), *Cities after Socialism: Urban and Regional Change and Conflict in Post-Socialist Societies*, Oxford 1996; György ENYEDI, *Social Change and Urban Restructuring in Central Europe*, Budapest 2009.

10 Zygmund BAUMAN, *Community. Seeking Safety in an Insecure World*, London 2000.

tropolises, I study cities where ethnic differentiation is linked to nationalist claims that endanger the sovereignty of the state.<sup>11</sup>

In the divided cities I discuss in this article, therefore, the rivalry between different ethnic groups is of a nationalist nature. It occurs within a nationalist ideological framework and deploys discourses and practices used in disputes about hegemony in the political and public space. These claims are also related to issues of state legitimation and the contestation of statehood. Aspects of inter-ethnic contention are no less relevant here than statehood problems, since the mechanisms of ethnonational contrast and polarization are not necessarily interwoven with contestations and claims involving the fundamentals and stability of the state. A divided society may be the result of local political contentions that both express and are expressed by cultural fault lines, even when there are no discourses questioning the sovereignty of the state. Apart from situations of coincidence or proximity to state borders, a contended city showing patterns of division does not necessarily raise questions of state sovereignty. Yet the type, peculiarity and equilibrium of the state are fundamental elements of divided cities, as these characteristics provide the framework in which local political contention can develop.

The Swiss Fribourg/Freiburg and the Italian Bolzano/Bozen show elements of division, but presently not of statehood contestation. In the Swiss town, ethnic issues do not seem to play a significant role in political competition, but they do play a role in the spatial organization of socialization. Nowadays in Bolzano, where ethnic conflict had jeopardized Italian sovereignty until the 1960s, the town's belonging to the Italian state is no longer controversial. Nevertheless, this stabilization has not lessened the impact of ethnicity in local political competition and socialization. In both cases a settlement and a stable equilibrium have been reached at the state level. Conversely, in Brussels, Montreal and Belfast, the polarization of public opinion along the line of the politicization of ethnicities produces discourses that undermine the stability of the state, the very existence of which is often problematized in its institutional present. The same could be said for Mostar after the Dayton peace process, and for Nicosia before it became a *double city*. In Nicosia under the late British Empire

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<sup>11</sup> For a comparison between divided and contested cities see the above mentioned books by HEPBURN (*Contested Cities in the Modern West*) and BOLLENS (*Cities, Nationalism, and Democratization*), as well as James ANDERSON, *From Empires to Ethno-National Conflicts: A Framework for Studying "Divided Cities" in "Contested States"*, Part I, Belfast 2008 (*Divided Cities/Contested States Working Paper Series*, 1); Jon CALAME / Ester CHARLESWORTH, *Divided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia*, Philadelphia 2009; Hilary SILVER, *Divided Cities in the Middle East*, in: *City & Community* 9 (2010), no. 4, 345-357; William NEILL, *Urban Planning and Cultural Identity*, London 2003; Dominique BRYAN, *Belfast: Urban Space, "Policing", and Sectarian Polarization*, in: Jane SCHNEIDER / Ida SUSSE (eds.), *Wounded Cities: Destruction and Reconstruction in a Globalized World*, Oxford 2003, 251-270.

and from independence in 1960 until the 1974 Turkish invasion, interethnic Greek-Turkish tensions and violence were interwoven with Greek-Cypriot demands for incorporation into Greece (*enosis*) and Turkish-Cypriot demands for partition of the island (*taksis*).<sup>12</sup> This does not mean that these cities had not previously exhibited some characteristics of divided societies or that they had been free of ethnic divisions and contentions. Yet, the relatively low degree of politicization of ethnicities in Mostar both during the Yugoslav socialist period and under Ottoman rule, as in Ottoman Nicosia, inhibited the production of nationalist discourses and claims on the common mixed territory in which the different groups were living. As a result, such discourses could not endanger the stability of the state. In part, this was a result of the different constraints that were imposed by the Yugoslav and Ottoman regimes. It also resulted, however, from dissimilar sorts of public ethnic bonds, perceptions and behaviour.

Cities can be considered laboratories for the study of intersections between the economic, social, demographic and cultural aspects of modernization. One of the most prominent elements of European modernization has been the *creation of national peoples*, or nationalization. Clearly, cities serve as sites for the exploration of such phenomena on a smaller scale. Yet, they are also places where we can observe the ambiguities and consequences of nationalization in spaces that are, by definition, heterogeneous. The presence of a variety of ethnic groups in the same urban space raises sociopolitical and historical questions of cooperation, integration, exclusion, and of the balance of power. The problems related to this issue are deep-seated and have often emerged along with the politicization and socialization of ethnic identities in plural communities. As has already been pointed out, the state framework proves crucial in this regard. Historically, many European towns have found themselves at the centre of ethnonational contentions and disputes. When typical urban heterogeneity was first challenged by hegemonic nationalist discourses and practices, state authorities responded by allowing, legitimizing, reinforcing, containing or repressing such discourses and practices. During the processes of industrialization and urbanization, when the juxtaposition of different ethnicities derived from short and long distance immigration and the expansion of urban areas into the rural ones, national states pursued a policy of cultural and national assimilation and homogenization. Conversely, in multinational states and empires, a certain degree of multiethnicity and pluralism was better maintained. This was the case in many of the mixed towns of east central Europe during the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, which were of course not “gently simmering melting pots”,<sup>13</sup> since they

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12 Andrew BOROWIEC, *Cyprus. A Troubled Island*, Westport 2000; Yiannis PAPADAKIS, *Echoes from the Dead Zone: Across the Cyprus Divide*, New York 2005; Id., *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, and an Island in Conflict*, Bloomington 2006.

13 This expression is used by Janusz Bugajski when he observes how Bosnia was “far from being an interethnic utopia or even a gently simmering melting pot”, which in reality is a

were not immune to social strains and because political cleavages in many of them developed along nationalist lines.

The crisis and eventual collapse of the continental European empires, coupled with the spread of nationalization processes, reduced the number of ethnically mixed cities. Until World War Two, most central and eastern European towns could be defined as ethnonationally mixed, although they featured various patterns of division and contention. These towns were still inhabited by groups that had been anchored to specific urban areas for generations, but were also involved in – although sometimes excluded from – processes of democratization usually characterized by nationally oriented political parties and nationalist agendas. This was the case of the Habsburg Empire in its constitutional phase for instance, when the process of democratization as well as of the politicization and nationalization of ethnic identities fuelled local political conflicts alongside the polarization of social and cultural interactions. The Habsburg state worked to reach some compromises – quite successfully in Moravia, for example – but also permitted the development of nationalist confrontations at the local level. These endangered state loyalty and set the scene for ethnonational conflicts. Certainly, all multinational states, be they empires or federations, seek to ameliorate ethnic and/or national differences in order to inhibit these from jeopardizing state stability. James Anderson noticed how *ethnonationally* contested and divided cities appeared on the fringes of empires that had “often created and hierarchized politicised ethnicities which then became hard for them to manage as their grip weakened with the spread of competing nationalisms”.<sup>14</sup>

The nationalization process and the integration of urban and rural masses did not evolve peacefully in western Europe, either. Though religious and linguistic amalgamation had a long history in this part of the continent, the development of more homogenous national states brought great discontent in the countryside and within industrializing urban areas, which radicalized political confrontations and social relations. As a matter of fact, social problems fuelled conflicts both in national states and in multiethnic and multinational empires. Class struggle was a peculiar trait of the industrialized regions which, though less affected, were not exempt from ethnic and nationalist strains. Meanwhile, in less-industrialized or non-industrialized areas, the latent or open conflict between socially dominant and non-dominant groups was expressed also in ethnic and national terms along with harsh urban/rural oppositions.

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condition hard to find in any given society, no matter the time or the type. The quote was taken from James SADKOVICH, *Reconsidering Bosnia-Herzegovina*, in: *Spaces of Identity* 5 (2005), no. 1, 25-53, 29, available at <[http://www.yorku.ca/soi/\\_Vol\\_5\\_1/\\_PDF/Sadkovich.pdf](http://www.yorku.ca/soi/_Vol_5_1/_PDF/Sadkovich.pdf)>. All internet sources were accessed on 30 April, 2013.

<sup>14</sup> ANDERSON, *From Empires to Ethno-National Conflicts*, 4 and 16.

The decline and collapse of multiethnic and multinational continental empires early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and the later collapse of multinational states such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have been destabilizing events. The collapse of the Ottoman State in the Balkan Peninsula began in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, resulting in a rapid and radical decrease in the area's Muslim population.<sup>15</sup> Around World War One, however, a strong increase in the use of violence occurred all over Europe and also in everyday political life, followed by a renewed radicalization during and after World War Two. The collapse of the European continental empires fostered harsh conflicts amongst their successor states over cities and territories. These strains were generally not eased by the Versailles settlement, and were actually enhanced by open irredentist claims, which reached new heights during World War Two. Finally, after 1945, border agreements and the new postwar order brought the multiethnic peculiarity of east central Europe to an end. Disputed border cities like Teschen / Cieszyn / Těšín, Danzig / Gdansk, Pilsen/Plzeň, Klausenburg / Kolozsvár / Cluj, Trieste / Trst, Rijeka/Fiume and many others suffered through the world wars, postwar crises and violent transitions. The "massive simplification of ethnic demography and creation of relatively homogenous populations where previously great heterogeneity had been the norm" took place in most of the towns of east central Europe, resulting in a radical *unmixing of peoples*.<sup>16</sup>

In spite of various moments and periods of warfare and massive violence, such a radical unmixing of peoples was not accomplished in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the wars, the postwar periods or the revolutions of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The religiously mixed cities of Banja Luka, Sarajevo and Mostar enjoyed a relatively peaceful period of political and economic modernization during the Austro-Hungarian condominium, and the end of Ottoman rule did not provoke the mass departure of the local Muslim community as it did in the coeval new Balkan national states. Robin Okey states that the overall Muslim emigration from Bosnia under the Austrian occupation "no doubt exceeded the official figure of 61,114 and contributed to a further fall in the Muslim proportion of the population to just under a third in the 1910 cen-

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15 Cf. Justin McCARTHY, *Death and Exile: the Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*, Princeton/N.J. 1995.

16 Rogers BRUBAKER / Margit FEISCHMIDT / Jon FOX / Liana GRANCEA, *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town*, Princeton 2006, 52. On the process of unmixing of peoples see Rogers BRUBAKER, *Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, in: *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 18 (1995), no. 2, 189-218; and Id., *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge 1996. On this process see also Philipp THER / Ana SILJAK, *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe*, Lanham 2001; and the two classics Eugene M. KULISCHER, *Europe on the Move. War and Population Changes, 1917-1947*, New York 1948; and Joseph B. SCHECHTMANN, *European Population Transfers, 1939-1945*, New York 1946.



sus".<sup>17</sup> The Muslim elite, however, continued to be the dominant political and social group.<sup>18</sup> Muslims remained by far the strongest landowners, both among those possessing *kmets*<sup>19</sup> (91%) and among those without *kmets* (70%). They were also the largest group employed in industry and crafts (45%) and comprised the majority of the population in the towns,<sup>20</sup> even though the Habsburg authorities did set the conditions for the increased immigration of Christians, who were favored in the administrative and public sectors.<sup>21</sup> The number of central European Catholics and Croats grew most quickly, but the number of Serbs also grew. To a lesser extent, the numbers of Muslims and Jews grew as well.<sup>22</sup> The number of Muslims decreased in Banja Luka (by 3.4%), but grew in Sarajevo (by 18.4%). Sarajevo experienced enormous growth, going from about twenty thousand to more than fifty thousand people. The populations of both Mostar and Banja Luka increased from circa ten to fifteen thousand people.<sup>23</sup> Proportionately, Mostar's Muslim population fell from 59.1% to 43.9%, but their absolute number increased from 6,421 to 7,212. The Orthodox population in Mostar remained stable at around 28% (with an increase of circa 1,500 people), and the Catholic population experienced huge growth, from 1,366 (12.5%) to 4,307 people (26.7%).<sup>24</sup>

In the Habsburg period, a new Mostar came to life west of the river, with new infrastructure as well as new buildings for public services and offices, for the army, for occasional workers and for guests.<sup>25</sup> In comparison, the following period of royal Yugoslavia was a time of demographic decline and stagnation for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The only new arrivals to Bosnian-Herzegovinian towns came from the nearby countryside, while the Muslim population, after suffering losses due to the arrival of Serb troops, underwent a progressive downfall in economic property and social status. Mostar had the smallest growth rate in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but Sarajevo also suffered under the eco-

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17 Robin OKEY, *Taming Balkan Nationalism. The Habsburg "Civilizing Mission" in Bosnia, 1878-1914*, Oxford 1997, 239.

18 Dalibor ČEPULO, *Continuities and Discontinuities: The Constitutional and Political Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina to 1990*, in: *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 36 (2004), no. 1, 377.

19 *Kmets* were not properly serfs but "customary tenants", and in 1910 most of them were Christian Orthodox (73.92%) or Catholics (21.49%), cf. Ivo BANAC, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*, Ithaca 1988, 367; and Mitja VELIKONJA, *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, College Station 2003, 124.

20 OKEY, *Taming Balkan Nationalism*, 239; VELIKONJA, *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance*, 124.

21 Dževad JUZBAŠIĆ, *Nacionalno-politički odnosi u Bosanskohercegovačkom saboru i jezičko pitanje (1910-1914)*, Sarajevo 1999, 33-38.

22 Robert J. DONIA, *Sarajevo: a Biography*, Ann Arbor 2006, 64.

23 *Ibid.*, 64.

24 *Ibid.*, 64; VELIKONJA, *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance*, 122. See also Dervo VAJZOVIĆ, *Stanovništvo Mostara 1879.-1991.*, Mostar 2005.

25 VAJZOVIĆ, *Stanovništvo Mostara*, 160.

conomic and autocratic political centralism of the new state. In 1938, Sarajevo's annual budget per inhabitant was approximately one third of what was spent per capita in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana.<sup>26</sup>

The First World War was a difficult time, with "severe privations" for Bosnia-Herzegovina and more than 300,000 dead, and further violence against Muslim landlords ensued in the war's immediate aftermath.<sup>27</sup> Nevertheless, World War One and the postwar violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina ought not to be compared with what was experienced by people elsewhere in the Balkans or east central Europe – like the Serb/Albanian or Ukranian/Polish border areas, for example. Nor should this period be compared to the Second World War and its aftermath in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself. The country's experience during the Second World War was dramatic and brutal; it was characterized by extermination policies against political and ethnic opponents, beginning with the anti-communist, anti-Serb and anti-Jewish policies carried out by the Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*, NDH). This violence initiated a three-sided civil war between Serb Monarchists, Croatian NDH troops and communist-led partisans, which further exacerbated interethnic relations and left many open wounds. Bosnia-Herzegovina emerged with an unpredicted Yugoslav political solution and moral recomposition. The new situation did not exclude *a priori* – on the grounds of ethnicity – any local individual or cultural group from joining the anti-fascist fight and participating politically in the new socialist society. Military and political opponents, however, whether from the war or the postwar period, were repressed with murderous violence. The affirmation of the socialist revolution after World War Two was prone with violence and authoritarianism, as strong anti-religious and centralist policies were put in place, and there was vast political repression following the Tito-Stalin split of 1948. Still, the situation did slowly improve. In both world wars, political transitions and the subsequent affirmation of two different kinds of multiethnic national states – the first (royal) and the second (socialist) Yugoslavia – diminished the multiethnic character of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian towns. Despite the loss of several thousand non-Slavic Muslims, Germans and Jews, however, these towns remained multicultural. The socialist state in particular eventually integrated the different Slavic religious/national communities into its Yugoslav project.

Even though Bosnia-Herzegovina had the lowest rate of economic growth in the Yugoslavia of the 1950s and 1960s, some towns did enjoy a certain degree of industrialization.<sup>28</sup> In Mostar, metal-working factories, cotton textile mills and an aluminium plant became sources of new jobs and of new flows of immigration from other Yugoslav republics, particularly from Serbia and Croatia, and to

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26 DONIA, Sarajevo, 154.

27 Noel MALCOLM, *Bosnia. A Short History*, New York 21996, 163.

28 *Ibid.*, 201.

a lesser extent from Montenegro: by 1961, half of Mostar's thirty-five thousand inhabitants had been born elsewhere.<sup>29</sup> Interestingly enough, this period of economic prosperity and development is often idealized because of its presumed demographic stability. In comparison to the present-day city, the demographic composition of which was deeply altered by the 1990s war, socialist Mostar is perceived as the good old days of the "born" *Mostarians* (*rođeni mostarci*), that is when the city was inhabited by "true" Mostarians (the so-called *Mostarska raja*).<sup>30</sup> Many *true Mostarians* were interviewed for the previously mentioned ethnographic film *Around Mostar, the Bridge and Bruce Lee*.<sup>31</sup> In their attempts to explain the town's currently fragmented society, they cited the divisions created by the war, but they also referred to the incomplete assimilation of the huge number of *non Mostarians* who settled in town during and after the 1990s conflict.<sup>32</sup> According to the Mostarians who remember the prewar transnational socialization with nostalgia, the newcomers have enhanced the logic and reality of polarization, while the Yugoslav time is remembered as a period when social cohesion was high across all segments of the local population.

This view may, in part, be a myth. Still, it is based on people's memory of authentic, wide open transethnic interactions and socialization in Mostar be-

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<sup>29</sup> VAJZOVIĆ, Stanovništvo Mostara, 194-195.

<sup>30</sup> "True" and "born" Mostarian are considered synonyms. During the second Yugoslavia the only local soccer team was Velež and its anthem (almost an anthem of the town itself) was "Rođeni" ("Born" Mostarians). The following sentence is also illuminating on the relevance of being a "born Mostarian". It is taken from a review of the novel *Mostarenje* by Mišo Marić (Sarajevo 2006), in which the reviewer (Mugdim Karabeg) paradoxically notes that a convinced *Mostarian* like the author was ironically not born in Mostar. This however is generally considered of fundamental importance, "since he who did not drink from the urban small river Radobolja from the first day is not considered a true Mostarian": "*Budimo dokraja pravedni pa kažimo kako su Mostarci ipak lokalpatriote. Čak ako je neko rođen u selu pored Mostara i odmah sutradan stigao sa roditeljima u grad da bi tu proživio svoj vijek, ipak će za njega reći da nije 'pravi Mostarac'. Jer, nije od prvog dana "pio Radobolje"*". Mugdim KARABEG, Nizanje rasutih dragulja, *Barikada*, 16 July, 2009, available at <[http://www.barikada.com/vremeplov/mostarenje/2009-07-16\\_mostarenje.php](http://www.barikada.com/vremeplov/mostarenje/2009-07-16_mostarenje.php)>.

<sup>31</sup> During the production of the film, we took various photographs of private and public buildings, monuments and street signs, posters and other indicators of the division of the public space and collected a large number of interviews. Some of these interviews appear in the film. The main characters interviewed were the Mostarians Veselin Gatalo, a poet and novelist (see later in the text), and Nino Raspudić, a Zagreb-based university professor (both main activists of the *Urbani pokret Mostar / Mostar Urban Movement* which had the original idea for the monument to Bruce Lee). We also interviewed the well-known Mostar-born writer Predrag Matvejević and a bar tender from a coffee bar near the Old Bridge. Alongside the film production many other people were interviewed, the majority of whom were chosen because of their public role in Mostar, from radio and press journalists to school teachers and university professors, to members of cultural, political and economic associations.

<sup>32</sup> Mili Tiro, Manager of the Pavarotti Music Center and organizer of the Mostar Blues Festival, a particular proponent of this idea (Mostar, 2 December, 2009), and Amela Bećirović, founder of the Entrepreneurship and Business Association Link (Mostar, 1 April, 2009).

tween the 1960s and the 1980s. Moreover, this view is shared by many inhabitants of Bosnian-Herzegovinian towns. It is also reflected statistically in the increase of self-identified Yugoslavs in the censuses until 1981. This increase occurred despite the fact that beginning in 1971, citizens could declare themselves Muslims “in a national sense”. By 1981, more than 300,000 Bosnian-Herzegovinians declared themselves Yugoslavs (7.8%).<sup>33</sup> In the second half of the 1980s Wolfgang Höpken called the constantly increasing number of Yugoslavs a testament to “social change”. He noted this trend’s urban peculiarity and its presumable link to mixed marriages, since “in the cities social values change and religiously connotated national definitions tend to lose ground faster than in rural areas”.<sup>34</sup>

In 1981, Yugoslavs comprised 22.4% of the 63,427 inhabitants of the city of Mostar.<sup>35</sup> The 1991 census then indicated a decrease; at that time, 11,555 (or 15.23%) of the 75,865 people in the city (*grad*), and 12,768 (or 10.08%) of the 126,628 people in the whole municipality (*općina*) declared themselves Yugoslavs. These figures were higher than in the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of the 4,377,033 inhabitants of the Republic, 242,682 (or 5.54%) declared themselves Yugoslavs.<sup>36</sup>

A strong, shared sense of distinction and uniqueness is considered a characteristic aspect of Mostarian identity. This is especially true of the many inhabitants who were raised in the former Yugoslavia. Others, among them also born Mostarians, see things differently and consider division to be a *normal* aspect of Mostar. These different attitudes towards the Mostar of the past and of the present can also be found among external observers and scholars. Fragmentation and cohesion, integration and disunion are competing forces in the history of this city. Indeed, the picture and discourse of cohesion and tolerance associated with the socialist period and applied particularly vigorously to Mostar, but also to Sarajevo and even to Bosnia-Herzegovina more generally, had both advocates and sceptics inside and outside the country. According to the sceptics, *tolerance*, *hate*, *coexistence* and *fear* could all be used to describe Bosnian society, in the present and past times, in urban and rural settings.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Andreas KAPPELER / Gerhard SIMON / Georg BRUNNER / Edward ALLWORTH (eds.), *Muslim Communities Reemerge. Historical Perspectives on Nationality Politics and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia*, Durham 1994, 351-352.

<sup>34</sup> Wolfgang HÖPKEN, *Yugoslavia’s Communists and the Bosnian Muslims*, in: KAPPELER et al. (eds.), *Muslim Communities Reemerge*, 214-247, 236-237.

<sup>35</sup> Serbs comprised 11,353 (17.89%), Croats 17,621 (27.78%) and “Muslims” 18,414 (29.03%). Compared to the 1971 census, the biggest number of Yugoslavs came from the Muslim side. VAJZOVIC, *Stanovništvo Mostara*, 269.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* See also Agencija za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine: *Demografija*, Sarajevo 2007 (Tematski bilten 02/2007).

<sup>37</sup> BOUGAREL, *Bosnie: anatomie d’un conflit*, 26.

Ethnic segmentation along religious lines is a historical peculiarity of Bosnian society. It is also an often celebrated characteristic of Ottoman rule, which is considered to have been simultaneously tolerant and repressive. In fact, the politicization of ethnic differences began during the Ottoman period, in concomitance with the establishment of a local Muslim-oriented press, along with the Croat Catholic and Serb Orthodox presses, which were both strongly influenced by Croat and Serb cultural and political movements outside Bosnia-Herzegovina. This segmentation was then expressed in the separate national movements of Serbs, Muslims and Croats. Each of these groups had separate political goals and tendencies while the region was under Habsburg rule at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>38</sup>

Along with the dynamics of party politics in the late Habsburg and early Yugoslav times, divisions along national and religious lines were accepted and supported by a consistent and influential portion of the population. “Confessional loyalty” remained the main reason for Bosnian Muslims supporting Muslim parties in the 1910 and post-World War One elections.<sup>39</sup> The elected Muslim delegates, especially those in the new south Slavic state, tended to identify nationally with either the Serbs or the Croats.<sup>40</sup> This was not the sign of a weak propensity towards a separate political identity. Instead, it exemplifies Muslims’ ability to negotiate identity according to their agenda and the available discourses and political resources of the time. Muslim intellectuals were able to participate politically and nationally identify with Croats or Serbs. They could also insist on their Muslim peculiarity. Some of them went through more than one *national conversion*.<sup>41</sup> Accordingly, the Muslim delegates accepted and promoted variable alliances and coalitions, in both the late Habsburg diet and the Yugoslav *Skupština*.

Yugoslavism started to play a role, especially among the younger generations, before and after World War One, and Social Democrats – who were to become communists in the new state – started to gather workers’ support. In both respects Bosnian-Herzegovinian voters expressed their preference for parties with which they could easily identify on national or religious grounds. Not even one social democrat was elected to the provincial Diet in 1910, due to the

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<sup>38</sup> Marko Attila HOARE, *The History of Bosnia. From the Middle Ages to the Present Day*, London 2007, 76-79; VELIKONJA, *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance*, 122-124. See also Mark PINSON, *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian Rule*, in: Id. (ed.), *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia*, Cambridge/Ma. 1996.

<sup>39</sup> Sabrina P. RAMET, *Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism: The Case of Yugoslavia’s Muslims Reconsidered*, in: KAPPELER et al. (eds.), *Muslim Communities Reemerge*, 111-138, 127.

<sup>40</sup> Ante ČUVALO, *The A to Z of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Lanham / Plymouth 2007, 193.

<sup>41</sup> RAMET, *Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism*, 125; Xavier BOUGAREL, *Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav Idea*, in: Dejan DJOKIĆ (ed.), *Yugoslavism. Histories of a Failed Idea 1918-1992*, Madison 2003, 101-103.

limited franchise of the voting system.<sup>42</sup> The electorate's will to reward parties according to their political-religious identity was equally important, however. Four parties served in the Diet: one Muslim, one Serb, and two Croatian. Of the two Croatian parties, one emphasized its secular and supra-confessional orientation, while the other promoted a strong Catholic-centered program.<sup>43</sup> This resulted in different kinds of alliances among the four parties.

In the first Yugoslavia, more parties stood for election, and more potential political alliances emerged. Muslims still moved between the national identity options existing at the time (Croat and Serb). The idea of the nation was still perceived as a secular concept far from Islamic logic. Nevertheless, the process of national identification was clearly related to denominational differences. As such, it was also at stake for the Muslim population. Ethnic/religious identity was clearly orienting people's votes and the stances of political leaders. The same process took place at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, as part of the shift to political pluralism and the first free elections. This was remarkable because all the Bosnian-Herzegovinian components had successfully integrated into the Yugoslav state, and pre-election surveys showed a strong endorsement for Yugoslavia and a transnational, transreligious Bosnia-Herzegovina. These same surveys also found solid support for the transnational options offered by parties like Federal Prime Minister Ante Marković's Union of Yugoslav Reform Forces and the League of Communists. Nevertheless, the 1990 Bosnian-Herzegovinian elections were won by nationally oriented parties, which together garnered 84% of the votes.<sup>44</sup>

The national radicalization of electoral choices was clearly rooted in the period before the Yugoslav crisis. The timing of the elections, according to Burg and Shoup, "contributed to increasing the dominance of ethnic identities in defining the pattern of voting, and to pushing the three nationalist parties toward conflict".<sup>45</sup> They add that the victory of the nationalist parties was "based on fear rather than on popular support for the views of the nationalists themselves".<sup>46</sup> Ethnoreligious orientation as an electoral choice cohered with what was going on in the rest of Yugoslavia and reflected people's preoccupations, and, therefore, the propensity to seek shelter with *imagined siblings*. This choice drew on the traditional cultural attitudes of the population in a time of

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<sup>42</sup> The Habsburg curial system of votes was adopted in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It rewarded stronger taxpayers who could gain a higher number of delegates.

<sup>43</sup> The two Croat parties were the Croatian Catholic Union (*Hrvatska katolička udruga*) and the Croatian People's Organization (*Hrvatska narodna zajednica*). ČUVALO, *The A to Z of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 191; DONIA, Sarajevo, 104-105.

<sup>44</sup> Ivica (Ivo) LUČIĆ, *Uzroci rata. Bosna i Hercegovina od 1980. do 1992. godine*, Zagreb 2013, 286; Steven L. BURG / Paul S. SHOUP, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, Armonk/N.Y. 2000, 46-56.

<sup>45</sup> BURG / SHOUP, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 56.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

crisis, in a situation where many established truths were being shaken. At the same time, it was a political choice, and one very much connected with the political juncture. It did not come from ethnic imperatives, since many people's preferences could have switched to more viable political options in favor of Yugoslav and/or integral Bosnian-Herzegovinian options. At the time, the Serb side was still internally politically fragmented.<sup>47</sup> The leaders and founders of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine*, HDZ BiH) and the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (*Stranka Demokratske Akcije*, SDA) were people of diverse attitudes. Their ranks included nationalists as well as moderates open to dialogue and to alternatives. In 1990, the President of the HDZ BiH was the former communist dissident and moderate Stjepan Kljuić. He had received the most votes from Croats in that year's election and had fought for the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is why he was dismissed at the beginning of 1992.<sup>48</sup> Among the founders of the SDA were pro-Yugoslavists like the former communist dissident Adil Zulfikarpašić, who founded a more liberal and secularly oriented Muslim Bosniak Organization (*Muslimanska bošnjačka organizacija*) right before the elections, and the renowned former communist and businessman Fikret Abdić. The latter got more votes than the SDA President Alija Izetbegović in 1990, but failed to represent the party at the Bosnian Presidency.

Multiethnic societies carry various degrees of "conflict potential". As recently suggested by the political analyst Bojana Blagojević, however, "ethnic conflict occurs when a particular set of factors and conditions converge".<sup>49</sup> Among these factors, which other authors have also deployed in order to explain the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s, are "a major structural crisis; presence of historical memories of interethnic grievances; institutional factors that promote ethnic intolerance; manipulation of historical memories by political entrepreneurs to evoke emotions such as fear, resentment, and hate toward the 'other'".<sup>50</sup> This and other similar interpretations of the Bosnian conflict explain the propensity of being involved and mobilized in ethnic conflict, but miss one basic factor: in Bosnia-Herzegovina, war knocked at most people's door before they made any ethnic choice. Electoral segmentation and polarization was definitely a sign that people were anchored to their ethnic identity. As in World War Two, however, when villages were attacked by Ustaša and Četnik formations, the situation changed dramatically in 1992 when the war from Croatia penetrated into Bosnia-Herzegovina. People needed protection and resources. It is

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<sup>47</sup> BURG / SHOUP, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 47.

<sup>48</sup> Victor MEIER, *Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise*, New York 1999, 201; Sabrina P. RAMET, *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building And Legitimation, 1918-2005*, Bloomington 2006, 389 and 434.

<sup>49</sup> Bojana BLAGOJEVIĆ, *Causes of Ethnic Conflict: A Conceptual Framework*, in: *Journal of Global Change and Governance* 3 (2009), no. 1, 1-25, 3.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-3.

not my intention to enter such a huge debate, and doing so is certainly beyond the scope of this article, but both in 1941 and in 1992 most people suddenly found themselves in a widespread ethnic conflict before they had chosen to mobilize. The way people then did mobilize and choose sides reflected, in turn, the ongoing polarization and the efficacy of nationalist political entrepreneurs who spread “ethnic intolerance, fear, resentment, and hate”. Influential political leaders fuelled the conflict, in Croatia first and subsequently in Bosnia-Herzegovina, eliminating both individuals who had stood up against the war and possibilities for a political solution or compromise.

The elements of a shared identity would not spare Mostar from the politicization and polarization of ethnic/religious identities during the war and the subsequent period of transition. A higher degree of political and social segmentation would have occurred in any case, though many attitudes of intercultural relationships and feelings of sharing a common city would also have played a role in the game of politicization and socialization. Nevertheless, elements of shared identity certainly did not and could not spare Mostar from the war or the consequent *thick* spatial division. Mostar featured some elements of ethnonational contention before the war, too. In a situation of high political crisis where ethnic differences were being politicized, these elements would turn against the city’s pluralism, but not necessarily lead to violent conflict. Had war never occurred, the spatial division would not have taken place.

Socialist Yugoslav times were not only a period of low intensity ethnonational consciousness, but also a time of propensity towards Yugoslav identification and of interethnic relationships and socialization. In the urban spaces, socialist Yugoslav housing policies also reduced the traditional linkages of old inhabitants with their urban ethnic niches, thinning the possibility of territorially based specific identities and of related political claims. Urban planners and administrators were moved more by other ideological drives and by practical preoccupations than by the imperative to build ethnically segregated areas in the constantly growing urban areas. In the 1990s, the combination of democratic pluralism, ethnonational strains, and the commencement and spread of war represented intertwining drives that influenced the political and identity orientations of the people as well as the policies and practices of leaders and administrators. A certain degree of division within Mostar’s society and the development of political and cultural polarization along religious/ethnic lines has been under way from the very beginning of multiparty democracy. The 1990s war in Mostar, therefore, was not the source of the ethnopolitical competition. Rather it caused the physical division and the *unmixing of peoples*.

In the areas on the west side of Mostar that were controlled by the Croatian Defense Council (*Hrvatsko vijeće obrane*, HVO), armed men asked apartment dwellers “*Šta si?*” (“What are you?”). In one case, a woman named Amina was



asked precisely “*Šta si?*” “*Šta je tvoj otac?*” (“What are you?” “What is your father?”) by soldiers who were apparently from outside of town (supposedly from Dalmatia).<sup>51</sup> “My father works at *Aluminium*”, she answered. “No!”, yelled the soldier with impatience and a machine gun in his hands: “*I asked what are you?! Are you ours (naš)?? ... Are you Croat or Muslim?!?*”. Visits like this one occurred in many apartments in west Mostar. Along with shootings and shelling targeting Amina’s and other houses supposedly inhabited by Bosniaks, these visits convinced her and many others to move to the older, eastern part of town. While expulsions were carried out, thousands of Bosniak soldiers and civilians were captured and imprisoned in concentration camps such as the infamous *Heliodrom*.<sup>52</sup>

The *Bulevar*, which runs across the town one hundred meters west of the river Neretva, became the front line between east and west Mostar and the centre of constant artillery fire from both sides. The 1994 Washington Agreement, which was signed by the political rulers of the internationally recognized Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Republic of Croatia – acting on behalf of the Croatian Republic of *Herceg-Bosna* –, resulted in a ceasefire between the Croatian and Bosniak forces. It did not end, however, the tensions, especially in the mixed cantons of the Croatian-Bosniak joint Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mostar remained completely divided until the end of the 1990s, with two administrations, two infrastructures and a bipolar ethnic structure. The Serbs had left town during the first phase of the local war, and few have returned since the end of the 1990s. At the time of the 1991 census, Serbs accounted for around 18-19% of the population, both in the overall municipality and within Mostar’s inner city (*grad*).<sup>53</sup> In the following decade, Serbs and Yugoslavs were replaced by ethnic Croats and Bosniaks, who had already been the two largest communities in prewar Mostar. There were now 0.3% more Muslims in the municipality and a greater number of Muslims in the immediate urban space (*grad*): 34.1% vs. 28.7%.<sup>54</sup>

The wartime and postwar departures, as well as the contemporaneous arrivals from the countryside, deeply modified the demographic composition of the town and substantially transformed its social and cultural structure. According

51 Amina is the fictional name of a Mostarian displaced person, now living in Mostar once again (interview December 2009).

52 International Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), IT-01-48-T, Prosecutor vs. Mladen Naletilić Tuta and Vinko Martinović Štela, Judgement, 31 March, 2003, available at <[http://www.icty.org/x/cases/naletilic\\_martinovic/tjug/en/nal-tj030331-e.pdf](http://www.icty.org/x/cases/naletilic_martinovic/tjug/en/nal-tj030331-e.pdf)>, 14-19; ICTY, IT-04-74, Prlić et al., Prosecutor vs. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić & Berislav Pušić, n. d., available at <[www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/cis/en/cis\\_prlic\\_al\\_en.pdf](http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/cis/en/cis_prlic_al_en.pdf)>.

53 VAJZOVIĆ, *Stanovništvo Mostara*, 92, 269.

54 In 1991, 34% of Croats lived in the Mostar municipality and 28.7% in the urban area. There were 34.6% Bosniaks in the municipality and 34.1% in the urban area of Mostar. Other nationalities numbered 2.5% in the municipal and 3.2% in the urban area. Cf. *ibid*.

to United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) statistics, the municipality of Mostar had lost around one sixth of its population. At the beginning of the new millennium, it had only 105,408 permanent residents. Of these, about 50,000 (or 47%) were thought to be Bosniaks and 51,000 (or 48%) Croats.<sup>55</sup> Inquiries about the number of registered voters, conducted by the local parties and by the International Crisis Group in 2003, estimated Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs to be 58%, 40% and 1.5% respectively, while a newer analysis conducted in 2008 suggested figures of 53%, 44% and 3% respectively.<sup>56</sup>

All in all, the approximately 40,000 residents who fled the town during the war were replaced by about the same number of refugees. There were around 30,000 refugees in the eastern part of town and approximately 10,000 in the western part of the town by the end of the 1990s.<sup>57</sup> In the Bosnian-Herzegovinian war, “ninety percent of the prewar Bosnian-Serb population left the area now called the Federation, and over ninety-five percent of prewar Bosnian-Croat and Bosniak (Bosnian-Muslim) inhabitants left what is now Republika Srpska”.<sup>58</sup> The cultural composition of all the towns involved in the wars was deeply altered. Substantial demographic changes have been legitimized and enhanced by the postwar peace process, and very limited, partial results have been obtained by the internationally sponsored returnee programs. What appears to be irredeemably lost is the social cohesion and mutual trust among the different groups across the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the transition from socialism to a new political configuration, the contention over Mostar by political parties structured along ethno(-religious) national lines was probably unavoidable. Spatial division and segregation, however, were a direct result of the war.

The Croatian-Bosniak war and the 1990s postwar, despite international intervention, produced a stiff demarcation line and a political, economic and administrative division between two ethnically and religiously reinforced national communities. Freedom of movement has been restored, and some people have returned to their prewar apartments. Yet, the thick division between Bosniak-dominated east Mostar and Croat-dominated west Mostar did not vanish. On the contrary, the postwar period enhanced the partition, extending it further into the realm of social interactions. Meanwhile, the media, the reconstruction of urban

55 According to this estimate, the number of Serbs fell to 3.5% and the number of “others” to 0.8% (“Yugoslavs” have vanished). International Crisis Group (ICG), *Building Bridges in Mostar*, Sarajevo / Brussels, 20 November, 2003 (Europe Report N° 150), 6.

56 *Ibid.*; and International Crisis Group, *Bosnia: A Test of Political Maturity in Mostar*, Sarajevo / Brussels, 27 July, 2009 (Europe Briefing N° 54).

57 Nenad DIMITRIJEVIĆ, *Civil Initiatives in Integration and Confidence-Building in Mostar*, in: *Id.*, *Managing Multiethnic Local Communities in the Countries of the Former Yugoslavia*, Budapest 2000, 271-280, 273-274.

58 Huma HAIDER, *Initiative and Obstacles to Reintegration in Divided Communities: UNHCR's Imagine Coexistence Project in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, January 2012 (Divided Cities/Contested States Working Paper Series, 24), available at <[http://www.conflictincities.org/PDFs/Huma%20Haider-CinC%20WP-January%202012\\_v2.pdf](http://www.conflictincities.org/PDFs/Huma%20Haider-CinC%20WP-January%202012_v2.pdf)>, 5.

infrastructure and the policy of religious, cultural and political institutions stimulated polarization and national homogeneity on both sides. Public space in Mostar became a symbolic battlefield. It was a continuation of the war by other means.

Mostar is not the only well-known town that remains disputed along the fault lines of wartime divisions. Mitrovica, in Kosovo, is another paradigmatic example of what is perceived as *unfinished business*. It features a contested border between two well defined urban areas divided by the river Ibar. War was also a crucial element in the physical division of Mitrovica, though interethnic tensions and clashes commenced in Kosovo before they did in Bosnia-Herzegovina. War is not the only cause of such situations of instability, but it is often a point of no return. Issues of interethnic contention among culturally differentiated groups may explain or even cause, the beginning of violence. Such violence does not always develop into uncontrolled clashes or lead to war, however. Partition has been used to control situations of ethnic conflict. Although, it has been noted, partition has very often worsened the situation. Thus, "in Cyprus, India, Palestine and Ireland rather than separating irreconcilable ethnic groups", partitioning cities and regions "had fomented more violence and forced mass migration".<sup>59</sup> Partition is not always feasible, and although it might seem to be a solution to violence, it does not necessarily bring peace. On the contrary, it can lead to higher levels of conflict.<sup>60</sup>

Presently, statehood issues and interethnic nationalist contention are causing instability and division in other towns of the former Yugoslavia. In southern Serbia and Macedonia, for example, partition does not presently seem to be a viable solution. In Skopje, ethnonational tensions have the potential to erupt into a state of uncontrollable violence. Any serious political crisis that combines the city's endemic socio-economic instability with the concerns of its sizeable Albanian minority, still searching for more political recognition and autonomous space, could trigger violence. Skopje's huge new monuments to Alexander the Great, along with its statue of the *Slavic Macedonian* king Samuel of Bulgaria, and its statue of Skanderbeg in the Albanian district, make the city a paradigmatic example of new national mythopoeic projects that have transformed the cityscape and its political balance. These statues and the ongoing competition over the symbolic core of the new nation in public space imply a problem of sovereignty in the new Macedonian state, a state that is still incapable of resolving the dispute over its official name in the international arena.

In the former Yugoslavia in particular, and throughout central-eastern Europe more generally, the dismissal of the old socialist presence has left an ideological

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<sup>59</sup> Radha KUMAR, The Troubled History of Partition, in: *Foreign Affairs* 76 (1997), no. 1, 22-34, 24.

<sup>60</sup> Ghislaine GLASSON DESCHAUMES / Rada IVEKOVIĆ (eds.), *Divided Countries, Separated Cities. The Modern Legacy of Partition*, Oxford 2003.

vacuum and thus created an empty space for new nation building projects and policies. These have been led by the new states and by organized groups seeking political and symbolic recognition in their territories. A source of instability lies in the combination of the pressures and requests for legitimisation by organized ethnic minorities and the actions and reactions of states eager to reestablish and reinforce the ideological basis of their authority with new radical policies of nation building. This is very definitely the case in Skopje, but also in Mostar. Both are contested and mixed cities in which confrontation for and in public space is a particularly visible and noticeable embodiment of political competition. This confrontation takes place among culturally polarized groups and among their elected representatives or self-appointed leaders. The state also takes part in the use and symbolic occupation of urban spaces in everyday political confrontation.

In ethnationally mixed and disputed towns, urban public space is an arena in which different ethnic or national groups legitimate themselves, socialize, and organize divergent political discourses. In these cities, which reveal themselves as both divided *and* contested, rival groups engage in a competition for public space, “bound up with *sovereignty* disputes” that supersede the problematic issues of a *pluralist* and multicultural society.<sup>61</sup> Globalization and economic transition may be relevant variables but not crucial aspects of this category of divided cities, which are most significantly embedded in ethnonational conflicts over statehood and sometimes marked with violence. In some of these towns, intercommunal rivalry embedded in wider conflicts over state sovereignty have produced or “seemed inevitably to recommend” a partition.<sup>62</sup> Jerusalem and Nicosia are striking examples of this situation. State borders may run along partition lines, but sometimes physical barriers segregate different parts and inhabitants of a city that lies at the border of two states or of two *quasi-states* in construction. Such was the position of Mostar during the Croatian-Bosniak war; it was controlled by competing forces that intended to establish different states in the same area. These were the HVO, which was fighting for the state of *Hercegovina*, and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (*Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine*, ArBiH), which was fighting for an integral Bosnia Herzegovina.

In Nicosia and throughout the rest of Cyprus, a fence along the rigid *Green Line* separates two different territorial and political entities, one of which is a state not recognized by the international community. The Turkish-Greek separation line was first marked in the capital approximately fifteen years before the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus and the formal establishment of the present

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61 Mike MORRISSEY / Frank GAFFIKIN, Planning for Peace in Contested Space, in: *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 30 (2006), no. 4, 873-893, 874.

62 CALAME / CHARLESWORTH, *Divided Cities*, x (Introduction).

division.<sup>63</sup> In Nicosia, the Green Line was meant to keep the contending sides apart. The only place where Turks and Greeks continued to live side by side was the tiny village of Pyla/Pile.<sup>64</sup> In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the city of Sarajevo has seen similar divisions. The district of *Istočno Sarajevo* (East Sarajevo), which belonged to the city before the wars of the 1990s, is no longer part of it. Instead, it is now part of the other entity that comprises the same country, the *Republika Srpska*. In this latter case there is no longer a physical barrier, but the administrative border between the two areas of the prewar city, and also between the two entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, coincides with an ethnonational differentiation produced by the war and reinforced in the postwar, despite the return of formerly displaced people.

In Mostar, non-physical barriers still divide the town. The wartime front line, however, disappeared after the war when the town was integrated into the Croatian-Bosniak Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite the formal unification of the local administration in 2004, most public services are still administered separately in practice and Mostar remains a dual city. The only unitary municipal service that functions over the entire urban area is the fire department. There is a unified public transport system, but only one bus line goes around the whole town. People tend to remain in their own side of town, although shopping trips sometimes cause people to venture out. Very recently, the public park at the eastern edge of the Croat side of town has been restored by the municipality. It is unclear how many people from east Mostar take their small children there, however. Some open concerts on the main square of the old front line bring people to the same place at the same time. Nevertheless, almost twenty years after the end of the war, nearly a decade after the formal unification of the city administration, and despite the establishment of freedom of movement, few exchanges take place across the former front line, especially among the younger generations.<sup>65</sup>

The old Mostarians' ("*Mostarska raja*") dismay about this new situation is strong. They perceive of themselves as a hopeless minority in the city's new demographic and cultural panorama. Many regret the division and despise it as artificial, even though they are conscious of its strength. On the other hand, there are other *pravi Mostarci* who see the partition as an unconvertible reality or even a necessity for reestablishing "normal" conditions. The problem of Mo-

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63 Yiannis PAPADAKIS, Nicosia after 1960: A River, a Bridge, and a Dead Zone, in: *Global Media Journal: Mediterranean Edition* 1 (2006), no. 1, 1-16, 2. The study was originally published in German in Gisela WELZ / Petra ILYES (eds.), *Zypern. Gesellschaftliche Öffnung, europäische Integration, Globalisierung. Kulturanthropologie Notizen*, Frankfurt/M. 2001, 201-224.

64 PAPADAKIS, *Echoes from the Dead Zone*, 207-238.

65 For a survey on young people's positions on this issue see Šime PILIĆ / Mateja BOŠNJAK, *Hoće li Mostar ostati komunikacijski podijeljen grad?*, in: *Informatologija* 44 (2011), no. 2, 101-114.

star is the “unsolved national question”, says the Mostar writer Veselin Gatalo, who was interviewed for our film.

“Unfinished business” is the title of a well-known BBC documentary on the war in Mostar, which might well be applied to the situation of the whole country, whose destiny remains unclear. Partition along national lines seems a likely outcome. Reestablishing a formal border and two autonomous communities is the suggestion of some Mostarians who are primarily interested in living in a “normal” town. A town is not normal, many of these people pointed out to me, when it is incapable of electing a mayor. In Mostar, this inability has been due to the incapacity or irresponsibility of the local political parties as well as the rules imposed by the Dayton Agreement and the international community. After the October 2008 elections, it took more than four hundred days before the council representatives finally managed to elect a mayor. Even then, the election only happened due to the intervention of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In contested cities like Mostar, which are characterized by non-consensual citizenship, and where ethnonationalist confrontations diminish “the legitimacy of the state itself”<sup>66</sup>, the “logic of identity politics” has begun to characterize and dominate political competition.<sup>67</sup> In such situations sectarian political entrepreneurs have found legitimisation and resources from above and supporters and legitimisation from below by triggering a political confrontation, based on cultural differences and influencing everyday life and socialization. It is within this framework that we can compare the local competition, the ethnonational mobilization and the urban display of ethnonational symbols in contemporary towns like Mostar to those deployed in other contested frameworks, like 19<sup>th</sup> century Bohemia.<sup>68</sup>

Even in contested cities, there are patterns of communication, interaction and cooperation across ethnonational boundaries. Bohemian Czechs and Germans did more than just fight each other during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, although the conflicts between them are remembered best because they were singled out by coeval media and narrated in history books. Even in nineteenth and 20<sup>th</sup> century Nicosia (at least until the upheaval of the late 1960s), interactions took place

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<sup>66</sup> MORRISSEY / GAFFIKIN, *Planning for Peace in Contested Space*, 874.

<sup>67</sup> Beverly CRAWFORD, *The Causes of Cultural Conflict: an Institutional Approach*, in: Ead. / Ronnie D. LIPSCHUTZ (eds.), *The Myth of “Ethnic Conflict”: Politics, Economics, and “Cultural” Violence*, Berkeley 1998, 3-43, 5.

<sup>68</sup> On Prague see Gary B. COHEN, *The Politics of Ethnic Survival. Germans in Prague 1861-1914*, Princeton 1981; on Budweis/Budějovice see Jeremy KING, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans. A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948*, Princeton 2005. See also Id., *The Municipal and the National in the Bohemian Lands 1848-1914*, in: William WHYTE / Oliver ZIMMER (eds.), *Nationalism and the Reshaping of Urban Communities in Europe, 1848-1914*, Basingstoke 2011, 17-46; Pieter M. JUDSON, *Nationalizing Rural Landscapes in Cisleithania, 1880-1914*, in: Nancy M. WINGFIELD (ed.), *Creating the Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe*, New York 2004, 127-148.

between neighbors, in trading circumstances, and in some political frames. These interactions occurred despite the low degree of secularization and the language barrier. In Mostar and in the other towns of Bosnia-Herzegovina, cross-religious interactions had long been regular occurrences, regardless of the traditional segmentation of society. Both the general process of secularization and the first and second Yugoslav state ideologies fostered cross-cultural communications and relations in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, despite moments of crisis. After the new shock of the nineties war, physical contacts and interactions began to grow once again. Both cooperative and hostile forms of interaction occur in the *virtual world* (internet sites, blogs, social networks... even between radio audiences), but also *on the ground*. In the physical world, these interactions take place within occasional or recurring circumstances, especially in leisure and music related situations. During the research for our ethnographic film, we encountered many examples of transnational communication and interaction taking place in blogs, internet sites and social networks, but also in cafés, shops and markets, and in theatres and concert venues. Physical interactions are more likely to subsist when intercommunal violence does not prevail and freedom of movement is realized. The spatial organization of the *divided Mostar*, however, with its very limited *interface area*, prevents both conflict and cooperation.

In 2005, a local association erected a monument to Bruce Lee as a provocative protest against the pervasive logic of segregation and the appropriation of urban public space. Some young Mostarians welcomed the statue as a positive step beyond the prevailing politics and constant attitude of ethnonational demarcation of urban space. Hundreds of them gathered in the rain to see the unveiling of the first non-ethnic monument in post-Yugoslav Mostar. The mentioned poet and writer Veselin Gatalo<sup>69</sup> was one of the main promoters of the monument. In our film he says:

“We were looking for a hero that can be ours.  
 A hero from our childhood,  
 from the time when we believed that justice and respect  
 could fight against the violence of money and power.  
 And here Bruce Lee remains one of our biggest models.  
 We all loved him: Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks ...  
 He was “ours”!  
 We practiced karate which he performed.  
 Besides that, Bruce Lee is a hero who is far enough from us  
 Nobody will ask him what his parents did in the Second World War ...  
 Where was he ...  
 ... or about his roots.”

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<sup>69</sup> Veselin Gatalo wrote several novels and collections of poems, often directly or indirectly related to Mostar and/or to the war. Among them *SFOR - Siesta, Fiesta, Orgasmo, Riposo* (2004), *Ja sam pas... i zovem se Salvatore* (2005), *Geto* (2006).

Some people attacked the statue the very night it was inaugurated, and further attacks (likely some kung-fu move) pushed the Chinese-American global film star off his bronze pedestal. The “dragon”, who was venerated by many Yugoslav kids in Mostar during the 1970s and 1980s, was forced to seek a safer shelter, from which he is still awaiting to be reinstalled.

I was in Mostar for the inauguration of the Bruce Lee monument and had the impression that more of the young people who came to this event were from west Mostar than from the east. Talking with people those days, I also had the impression that Croat kids and even older people from the *Croatian side* were more enthusiastic about the statue than those from east Mostar. At the time I interpreted this as a stronger desire for change on the part of *west Mostarians*, and the difficulty of *east Mostarians* to escape from a sort of *victim's box*. The destroyed Old Bridge is also a metaphor of something broken, and the east Mostarians are still awaiting compensation for and recognition of what the Croats did. Young *west Mostarians*, however, do not feel that they are personally guilty even when they recognize the Croatian HVO's responsibility for destroying the bridge. Above all, they want to move on.

But this is only one side of the story. When I asked some young Mostarians in the east about the Bruce Lee statue in 2009, they told me: “They should have put the Bruce Lee monument under the bridge! *There*, it would have been safe!” They probably felt that the statue would have been protected in the same way as the *New Old Bridge*, which is now guarded by the *Ikari* (or *Mostari*), the “jumpers from the bridge”. The jumpers' association has its headquarters right on the place where the Ottoman soldiers who guarded and protected the bridge were once stationed. It also happens to be the spot where the Bosnian-Herzegovinian army fought during the 1990s. Throughout history the Old Bridge has experienced various shifts in meaning. Recently, it has been re-islamized.<sup>70</sup> Bruce Lee, a Chinese Californian actor and martial arts master, became a global star and a hero fighting for justice in the 1970s Yugoslav kids' imaginary. At the same time, he was a symbol of a wishfully *de-ethnicized* Mostar, whose monument was conceived in a west Mostar café but might eventually end up in the east, under the bridge! The bridge itself is a symbolic battlefield. In July 2004, on the night of its inauguration, one could hear these words: “The bridge had its spiritual meaning in connecting two shores, including everything that this has always meant. And this is binding people and their cultures and differences [...]”

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70 The link to the Muslim heritage of the town had always been present, and although Muslim intellectuals started to emphasize it during the 1970s, the Old Bridge was not perceived as merely Muslim, and its identity was not generally politicized by Mostarians, who all felt a strong attachment to it. On this see Sylvie RAMEL, *Reconstruire pour promouvoir la paix? Le cas du “Vieux Pont” de Mostar*, Genève 2005.



These words were solemnly pronounced by the speaker during the internationally broadcast opening of the *New Old Bridge*, which fit perfectly well with the intermingling of international symbolic expectations and the local attempts to fulfil them. The bridge does not fill the gap, of course, since it does not symbolically or materially bond Croats and Bosniaks, or the two sides of the disconnected city. The bridge is inside east Mostar, as it was east of the front line. In the future it might once again become a shared symbol of the town. For the time being, tourism works. The bridge, after all, is beautiful like the new old town. Says Gatalo, on the Bridge:

“When I think of Mostar, and I am away,  
 the Bridge is the first thing that comes to my mind.  
 But it is a constant; there is nothing there that divides us,  
 Nothing that binds us. And that’s it.  
 Something that we love.  
 And now, all these silly things  
 Of which some people abroad live when they say:  
 “Some people love the Bridge, some people don’t.”  
 This is absurd.  
 We all love it,  
 Whether we accept it or not  
 And precisely this “those who love it – those who love it not”  
 Causes the fight.  
 The Bridge is here and, we love it and that’s it.  
 Because the Bridge was destroyed by four, maybe five people,  
 But “some people love the Bridge, some people don’t” -  
 Ridiculous.”

The bridge was severely damaged by constant shelling from HVO tanks, which probably caused its eventual collapse. HVO General Slobodan Praljak has denied allegations that he ordered the bridge’s final destruction. Recently, Croat allegations that Muslims caused the final fall of the bridge for political purposes, have appeared in the press and in blogs. These allegations have caused endless quarrels.<sup>71</sup> Such quarrels also reflect the prevailing antagonism, as it is often expressed violently between young Mostarians during internationally broadcast soccer matches or on occasions of local derby matches between Bosniak and Croat teams. The latter have primarily concerned matches between the former common city club *Velež* and the Croat team *Zrinjski*, which was banned

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<sup>71</sup> Eksperti tvrde: Most nije srušio HVO, *Nacional*, 20 December, 2006, available at <<http://www.nacional.hr/clanak/23276/eksperti-tvrde-most-nije-srusio-hvo>>. See also the forum on the Croatian portal *Index*, available at <<http://www.index.hr/indexforum/postovi/55739/ko-je-srusio-turski-most-u-mostaru-11>>; and, from another perspective, the Facebook page on the topic, available at <<http://www.facebook.com/pages/Doka%20BEimo-svima-da-je-HVO-sru%20io-STARI-MOST-u-Mostaru-115096775183745>>.

in 1945 but reestablished in 1992.<sup>72</sup> Sometimes these football supporters engage in violent confrontations along the war's front line. However, we should not mix the responsibility for war with the fights and screams occurring around the soccer stadium between the supporters of *Zrinjski* and *Velež*. These are, one could say, *normal* aspects of a modern European town. Indeed, we should not mix the memory of a war fought by soldiers twenty years ago with the street fights of their sons or younger brothers. These youth tend to identify with the older soldiers whose political importance in perpetuating Mostar's division is very often overestimated by the press. In our film, Veselin Gatalo, utters a warning:

“Nothing comes spontaneously.  
 All these things came from above.  
 It means that to someone it suits.  
 Try to buy “mortadella” in Sarajevo.  
 That would be a difficult endeavor.  
 Although people ate it before the war in Sarajevo,  
 And if they get the chance they eat it now.  
 But you cannot buy it. Maybe in some places [...].  
 In east Mostar I don't think you can buy it.  
 But this thing is originated from [...] above.  
 Some people keep this situation,  
 They have helpers abroad who sell certain theories  
 And live of it.  
 Because a lot of people would lose their job,  
 A lot of people would lose their positions  
 If the town started to live normally.  
 Because in two post offices work 150 people,  
 And in one would work 75.  
 The Mayor controls one side,  
 The Vice mayor the other.”

Since the new city law was passed in 2004, the posts of mayor and vice-mayor (reserved for a Croat and a Bosniak or vice versa) have been unified. Public services and job resources, however, have continued to operate on two tracks. The border is still there, even though it has been erased from maps. Its existence is determined by new daily habits, and it is deployed for political-economic purposes. Some families live *on the other side of the tracks*, but very few people live in the border area. For some time after the war, the immediate vicinity of the old front line was organized as a *Central District* with central buildings and public offices that could easily be reached from both sides of the city. Here,

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<sup>72</sup> Stephanie ROLLAND, Le football dans la Bosnie-Herzégovine d'après-guerre: exhibition symbolique et exaltation identitaire, in: *Migracijske i etničke teme* 23 (2007), no. 3, 185-208.

along the old front line, there is also a bottom-up reaction to segregationism. It is expressed in a desire to expand a sort of shared space used by everyone. Right after the *Bulevar*, one of the most damaged front line roads is Šantićeva street. It was named long ago after the poet Aleksa Šantić, a local Serb. This street is part of the former *Central District*. Nearby are the offices of the Norwegian NGO Nansen Dialogue Center. The youth cultural association *Abrašević* has been active all these years promoting a local *third space* and an alternative to the segregation of socialization. On the same street there is a local radio that refuses to be nationally identified (*Radio Studio 88*). Some small enterprises (like the *Entrepreneurship* and *Business Association Link* as well as other micro-finance institutions) have chosen to settle in proximity of the *Bulevar*. The nearby *Spanish Square* (*Španjski trg* in Bosnian language and *Španjolski trg* in Croatian language), is at the centre of the old front line. It was originally meant to be the site of the Bruce Lee monument. The statue eventually ended up in the city park, very close to the old front line, but on the Croatian side of the city. A few months before the statue was unveiled, Nino Raspudić, the monument's other main promoter, said (in our film):

“The statue will be placed in the city park, in the *central city park*.  
 And will be in a place from which he will see, in fact, the whole park.  
 He will look after the park  
 And the kids playing there  
 And the elders walking around,  
 Couples who kiss each other on the benches  
 [...].  
 The statue will be oriented towards the north  
 Because in Mostar the public space is hyper-politicized  
 And everything is divided and treated in a political manner.  
 We could not orient him towards the east, or towards the west  
 Because if I had turned him towards the west people would say that I made a  
 Muslim Bruce Lee against Croats.  
 Had I had turned him towards the east people would say that he is a Croat  
 Bruce Lee attacking Muslims.  
 We decided to turn him towards the north: towards Sarajevo, Zagreb, Bel-  
 grade, Bruxelles, Washington ... .”

Both Raspudić and Gatalo reserve an attitude of particular irony and detachment for the international observers. As mentioned, Gatalo has even written a book called SFOR (*Siesta, Fiesta, Orgasmo, Riposo*, otherwise the acronym for the International Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina). Sarajevo, Zagreb and Belgrade are all perceived as outside players, intruding into the local game. There is not much respect for local politicians either. Raspudić accuses them of having transformed the city into a *urinal*, a *public* toilet to mark their highly symbolic, segregationist policies. It is not a surprise that right on the *Spanish*

*square*, at the centre of the old front line, both Croat and Bosniak nationalists wished to build “their” objects, a *national* theatre and a religious/cultural centre.

Nothing has been built on the *Spanish square*. Instead, two old Austrian buildings have been beautifully restored. One is the old city *Gymnasium* with separate Croatian and Bosnian curricula and now also hosting the United World College. Adjacent to it, on the *Bulevar*, is the new town hall. The latter was inaugurated in 2012 but has never been used. A monument to HVO soldiers placed in front of the town hall provoked a boycott from the Bosniak parties. After some months, a monument to the opponent *Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine* appeared overnight and provoked strong reactions from local Croat parties. The former monument, Croat politicians said, had been placed instead of a cross long contested by Bosniak politicians. This conciliatory gesture did not calm the Bosniaks down, *au contraire*. The monument to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian army was placed by unknowns, and other unknown people later blew it up. Presently the broken monument is still there. It has not been restored, and it has not been removed.

Even if no physical barrier divides east Mostar from west Mostar, it is hard to find a coffee bar offering both local newspapers (the Sarajevo *Dnevni Avaz* and the west Mostar *Dnevni List*). The former front line lives on in people’s minds and influences political interactions and socialization. It belongs to neither of the contending sides, and contrary to Belfast’s *interface areas*, it is not densely populated. Nevertheless, as in Belfast, this is the area where violence is most likely to erupt.

Without the war Mostar would not have become so radically divided. At the same time, plurality and segmentation, and the propensities towards both cooperation and conflict, are all elements of the city’s multicultural historical character. According to old inhabitants of Mostar, the difference between prewar and postwar Mostar is so strong that it sometimes seems as if they are telling two different stories about two different towns. This is not particularly surprising for anybody with even limited knowledge of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Historical circumstances and conjunctures have produced different developments in the delicate equilibrium between coexistence and conflict. The crisis of late 20<sup>th</sup> century Mostar is rooted in the Bosnian and Yugoslav crises, but it can also be observed through the lens of the history of multiethnic towns in modern Europe.

The national homogenization processes in the transition to late 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century national states have weakened the heterogeneous character of many central and eastern European towns. Yet, there is a strong difference between formerly divided and contested towns like L’vov, Wroclaw, and Thessaloniki – to name just a few – and Mostar, Banja Luka or Sarajevo. Unlike the former Yugoslav towns the first group of towns were radically changed by the 20<sup>th</sup> century *unmixing of peoples*, which largely erased the peculiar plurilingual and plurireligious central and eastern European urban kaleidoscopes. Ethnic “cleansing” policies were pursued in Bosnia-Herzegovina during two different European moments of crisis; first during World War Two and then at the end of the

Cold War. A Croat and a Serb homogeneous nation state was the idealized model of political and cultural stability in both situations. The Muslims, however, were not perceived as a distinct nation in the 1940s as they were in the 1990s. After World War Two, the socialist internationalist South Slav model offered a possibility for interethnic recomposition. Yet, it did so on the basis of a social and political revolution established with extreme violence, in the context of an extremely violent civil war and an internationally tense postwar situation. The result was a new prospect for integration in a repressive and authoritarian framework of limited freedom. Nonetheless this new project enjoyed a great deal of support from the population, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina where a new *mixing of peoples* was under way. Towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, during the crisis of Yugoslav succession, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat military and political elites followed the nation state model. They fought against each other but also against multicultural Bosnia-Herzegovina, the only ideological resource at stake for the Bosniak political elites.

The latter, however, also supported a system that legitimized and deployed ethnic cleavages in the production of political discourses enhancing segmentation and cultural segregation. Moreover, these elites had a centralist stance towards the overall state, the Federation and Sarajevo. At the same time, where Muslims were not a clear majority, as they were in the state as a whole and also in places like Mostar, they welcomed the consociational forms of democracy introduced by the international community. As Azra Hromadžić has pointed out, consociational democracy strengthened ethnic boundaries and favored the ethnicization of citizenship, because it offered political groups opportunities to organize their power in their specific part of the city through institutions and local governmental bodies.<sup>73</sup>

Hromadžić also stressed the importance of territory in the process of the creation and development of ethnic citizenship in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The wartime and postwar political competition gave new meanings and new strength to the old and legitimized ethnonational differences. Division need not be understood in merely physical terms. Nicosia after the Turkish invasion of 1974 is the most notable example of such division. Nicosia first became physically divided soon after the independence of Cyprus in 1960. Then, a process of segregation developed alongside the enhancement of a line of division conceived as a means of limiting violence between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The origin of the violence was the mix of contestation and competition in the political and public sphere. The border that divides Nicosia into two clearly separate and segregated areas, like the one that divided Mostar during the war and in the immediate postwar period, is not the only element of division experienced by these and other divided urban populations. Segregation is frequently expressed in residential patterns, but also in various forms of social, political and cultural differen-

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73 HROMADŽIĆ, "Once We Had a House".

tiation. These are crucial elements that characterize the division and contestation of Nicosia, Mostar, Belfast, and Jerusalem. Physical division, therefore, may not always be evident or visible. Contention in and for the public and political space originates division. In crises of statehood, violence makes temporary divisions more permanent. Partition may halt violence, but it also cements the violence-evoked status quo and thus impedes reconciliation and the recomposition of a common political framework and a shared public space.