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Dynamics of Identity and Remembrance in Trieste

Esodo, Foibe and the Complex Memory of Italy's Oriental Border

This chapter discusses the displacements and the violence against civilians during and after the Second World War in the Upper Adriatic area and their consequences in the political and cultural dynamics of Trieste from the Cold War to the process of European integration. The author analyzes how these topics interacted with personal and collective memory, with historiography and with debates shaped by the political competitions, by the ideological divisions of the Cold War and by the expectations and preoccupations connected to the process of European integration. Transnational cooperation and conflict among the population of the Northern Adriatic were, and still are, influenced by how the public opinions of each nation have perceived and presented the events and memory of interethnic and ideological violence. This article will analyze, in particular, the new interest of Trieste and Italy public opinion for the commemoration of Italians as victims of mass killings (the *foibe*) and population transfer (the *esodo*), and will try to contextualize it in the framework

of the politicization of historical discourses and public memories.

Key words: Trieste, Upper Adriatic, memory, commemoration, *esodo*, *foibe*, *Giorno del ricordo*, reconciliation

Introduction

Individual, collective, and public memories and their links with historical, often conflicting, narratives taking place in the arena of public discourse and interaction are strongly debated topics in human and social sciences (Nora, 1989; Vidal, 1996; Todorov, 1996; Winter, 2000; Vösu, 2008). In the last twenty years of the twentieth century a new political and intellectual framework has contributed to a shift in historical studies about the nature and relevance of memory, and on its social and political implications (Winter, 2000; Nora, 2002; Kuljić, 2006). The politicization of historical discourse and of public memory is an aspect of the re-evaluation of the past in various European regions after the Cold War, especially in those places where the demographic changes and the legacy of the twentieth century's tragic events hinder the creation of shared historical views.

Strong population movements are a characteristic of many Central and Eastern European lands in the central part of the twentieth century. These lands share other common traits in modern history: a multilingual and a continental imperial legacy until the beginning of the twentieth century; political tensions in the creation of the post-First World War national states; interwar nationalistic regimes and the recrudescence of nationalistic rhetoric; the brutal occupations by Nazi, fascist, and Soviet or pro-Soviet armies during and immediately after the Second World War; and the consequences of the Cold War ideological and national divisions. The reoccurring violence around the border areas in the twentieth century, in addition to the cultural and demographic changes during and after the First World War and especially the Sec-

ond World War, created contested views and unclear segments in the historical narratives of these European “Lands Between,” including the whole Upper Adriatic region.

2. The role of Trieste

Trieste was the biggest port of the Habsburg Empire and during the nineteenth century the city grew demographically and economically, becoming a site of intense political confrontations along social and national differentiations. In the period after the two World Wars the main city of the Upper Adriatic became a site of ethnic and political violence. The ethnic clashes started to prevail already after the First World War, under the military and civil Italian administration. Trieste and Istria, as in many parts of the Italian peninsula, became a site of conflict between fascist and socialist-communist oriented activists, but even this confrontation was “ethnicized” by nationalist intellectuals as well as by the military and civil authorities. The epithet “Slavic-communist” (*slavo-comunista*) began to spread in the local public opinion (Sluga, 2003). The violence after the Second World War and the ethnic and political confrontations, along with the divisions over the “Question of Trieste” and with the role of Trieste in the ideological, more than strategic, frame of the Cold War, resulted in the creation of fractured memories and contested historical narratives which still today impede the achievement of plans and efforts of reconciliation and of interethnic and trans-border cooperation.

The Second World War and postwar European misfortunes and their legacy in present day political developments have particularly triggered the attention of historians, historic anthropologists, and social analysts dealing with the shift and changes of public and private memories (Young, 1993; Suleiman, 2006). The Upper Adriatic area is among those places where the movement of borders, the population displacements, the concentration camps, and the mass killings during the Second World War intensely influenced Cold War and post-

Cold War local political and ideological confrontations (Pupo, 1999 and 2006; Sluga, 2001; Ballinger, 2003; Volk, 2003; Kerševan, 2003 and 2008; Wörsdörfer, 2004; Cattaruzza, 2007; Conti, 2008). The uncertain border settlement in the Julian March (Venezia Giulia/Julijska Krajina) was a matter of strong diplomatic dispute at the end of the Second World War, and already in 1945 Western military circles presented the Question of Trieste as a potential detonator for the beginning of a Third World War (Judt, 2007: 179; Ballinger, 1999: 64; Bowman, 1982: 7). Until the 1954 London Memorandum, which assigned the so-called Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste (the town itself and a strip of villages of the karstic surrounding territory, the Kras plateau) to Italy and the Northwestern part of Istria (Zone B) to Yugoslavia, the local and national Italian and Yugoslav public opinions had been actively mobilized. After the Memorandum, the national media and politicians of both countries lost interest for the Question of Trieste. The Italian-Yugoslav 1975 treaty of Osimo, which settled the diplomatic dispute, was not perceived with much concern by the respective national public opinions. However, the attention had not decreased in the Upper Adriatic, especially in Trieste.

In postwar Rijeka (Fiume) and Istria, the memories of twenty years of anti-Slavic fascist dictatorship and the brutal wartime occupation, including the ruthless repression by fascist and Nazi squads, were canalized in discourses and rituals of commemorations and celebrations that substantially pacified the (Yugoslav) public opinion. Occasionally the public opinion was mobilized, as was the case in 1974, before Italy and Yugoslavia signed the Osimo treaty (Dota, 2003). The wounds of family losses had kept the tension alive on both sides of the border, but in Trieste it was embittered by the resentment of the post 1945 refugees (named *optants* in Yugoslavian discourse and historiography, and in the last twenty years predominantly *exiles* in Italy).¹⁶⁷ **The aban-**

¹⁶⁷ The expressions *esuli* (exiles) and *esodo* (exodus), with their religious-national implications, were largely used in Trieste, but commonly the Italian public opinion used the word *profughi* (refugees), which fell into disuse as the housing problems of the refugees began to be resolved, the provisional camps were closed, and the arrivals came to an end. The “Istrian refugees” arrived in Italy in the 1960s. The words *esodo* and *esuli* became widespread in

donment of their homelands in Istria, Rijeka, and Dalmatia, and their requests for moral and economic compensations, played a key role in maintaining the issue at the center of the public discourse all along the Cold War period. After Osimo, the Italian government was fiercely criticized by the Italian right-wing political party MSI (*Movimento sociale italiano*, heir to Mussolini's 1943-45 Quisling northern Italian fascist state, *Repubblica sociale italiana*) and by the associations of the refugees from the parts of the Julian March eventually handed to Yugoslavia. Wounds, traces, and corollaries of the Question of Trieste are still present in the local everyday political interaction. The border issue and its implications, including the problem of both the Istrian refugees and of the status and rights of the local Slovenian minority, have never ceased to be the top issue in Trieste's public debate.

From the early 1960s until the end of the 1990s, Trieste was a preferred shopping destination for Yugoslavs, but this did not ease political and inter-ethnic relations, and actually fostered prejudices and stereotypes from both sides of the border. In Trieste, Italian nationalists and exiles organizations were constantly involved in disputes with the local section of the Italian communist party, the Slovene minority organizations, and the radical left-wing activists, all of which were enforcing the memory and the values of the antifascist struggle and supporting a bilingual policy in the whole area. The Italian context of right-wing/left-wing ideological and political confrontation, which was exacerbated with the 1970s student movements and the dramatic, and often violent, conflict between polarized organizations and activists, in Trieste was spiraling around local issues related to the different memories of the Second World War.

The local sections of Italian socialist and communist parties and the local socialist organizations openly promoted bilingualism and

Italy after the end of the Cold War, when the Italian Eastern border again became a debated issue. *Optanti* ("optants") was the term adopted and used in Yugoslavia following the norms and choices which regulated the migrations in the postwar period. This term is still normally in use in Croatia and Slovenia. The term *esodo* and *esodi* has been used sporadically in some recent debates in these two countries, as an answer to the Italian rhetoric displayed in the public opinion or in historiography.

their posters usually appeared in both Italian and Slovenian languages. Other associations promoted bilingualism and interethnic cooperation, but negative reactions to the application and use of bilingualism were constant. The combination of traditional Triestine ethnocentrism and anti-Slavic feelings with Italian patriotic and anticommunist ideological orientations, in the framework of the Cold War ideological antagonism, has fostered disinterest and even hostility for the promotion of Slovenian language and of Italian-Slovenian bilingualism in the urban area of Trieste. **The Italian Triestine anti-Slavic stance was not a twentieth century novelty.** It was a surviving component of the old nationalist irredentism. Like in other parts of Central and Eastern Europe, it was also a legacy of the social interactions between dominant and non-dominant linguistic groups in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which have long influenced representations, values, interactions, and ethno-national orientations. Nevertheless, nationalism and the prejudices against the Slavs have always coexisted with a challenging cosmopolitan attitude, which is also an important and traditional factor of Triestine culture from the days of the establishment of the Free Port of Trieste in the eighteenth century (Waley, 2009: 248; Ballinger, 2003b: 93; Ballinger, 2003; Ara and Magris, 1982). The Italian Trieste had replaced the Habsburg “city of groups,” but the variety of Triestine political, ideological, and cultural positions and orientations lived on, as did its contradictions, and the peculiar Triestine ambivalence between openness and aloofness towards Slavic culture.

The reality and the myth of the cosmopolitan and multicultural Trieste have been challenged by its twentieth century role of Italian border sentinel. During the Cold War, the legitimization and institutionalization of the memory of Yugoslav and communist violence towards Italians, and the stereotypes of the ethnic war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s, have reinforced the distance and detachment between Italian and Slavic cultures in the city. Despite the many Slovenian and Croatian students and Serbian workers, the established presence of the Serbian Orthodox Church and of other Slavic cultural institutions, and the good tradition of Slavic studies at the University

of Trieste, the knowledge of Slovenian, Serbian, or Croatian languages and cultures among Italians has always been poor in Trieste, even among scholars and experts of the Upper Adriatic. There are many schools for the Slovenian minority in the city, but for generations the native Italian speakers in Trieste did not consider the knowledge of Slovenian as a gain. In the middle of the 1980s, the left-oriented grammar school “Petrarca”, when deciding to adopt a fourth foreign language for its linguistic curriculum (along with English, German, and French), after a long debate among its teachers chose Spanish instead of Slovenian. In the same period the students of the right-wing oriented gymnasium “Dante” blockaded the school, protesting against any possible adoption of Italian-Slovenian bilingualism in the city, which in those days was not on the agenda. Trieste was an integral Italian city and it had to remain as such. In fact, long before the 1980s, many local nationalist activists have interpreted the fight against bilingualism as a way to defend the Italian identity of Trieste. In the 2000, geographers Milan Bufon and Julian Minghi wrote that “considering that contemporary processes of integration follow the principle of ‘unity in diversity’, it is likely that Trieste can assume again its regional function in this area, on the condition that at the same time its multicultural tradition is revived” (Bufon and Minghi, 2000: 124). Nevertheless, in the same article, they stated that “particularly the knowledge of both languages and national or ethnic intertwining of the border population provide for more sophisticated and intense forms of social and cultural cooperation and integration” (Bufon and Minghi, 2000: 126). Whereas border intertwining might have improved in the recent years, the reality is that the knowledge of both languages has remained a feature of Slovenes in Italy and in Slovenia, but not of Triestine Italians.

However, there are some signs of the modification of the long lived sense of superiority and aloofness towards Slovene culture and language among Triestine Italians. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, along with the process of European enlargement and the hopes of revitalizing the economic and cultural role of the nineteenth century Trieste in Central and East Europe, the issue of bilingualism still

causes friction but is no longer a taboo. Bilingualism has been implemented in Trieste, but only to a limited extent and in certain areas, while is more widely applied in the suburbs and in the mixed villages of the Kras plateau.¹⁶⁸ In the meantime, schooling in Slovenian has become something more fashionable, and the number of Italian parents sending their kids to the schools of the Slovenian minority has increased over the years. This is a new trend in the central urban area, while in the mixed or predominantly Slovenian villages of the surroundings it is not as easy for Italian children to integrate into Slovenian schools. In these places the linguistic barriers seem to be stronger and less mediated by the extensive usage of the Triestine dialect.

The political efforts displayed by the center-left administration of Riccardo Illy, the former mayor of Trieste (1993-2001) and the former President of Friuli-Venezia Giulia (2003-2008), to renew the cultural and economic role of Trieste in the transborder Adriatic area have not been followed by many initiatives from below or by concrete signs of new attitudes towards Slovenian culture. Compared to the other border towns such as Gorizia, which hosts a much larger number of projects and moments of Italian-Slovenian interaction, Trieste is still trapped in its role of Italian outpost.¹⁶⁹ On 1 May 2004, when Slovenia joined the European Union, a huge concert of the “Yugoslav” celebrity Goran Bregović celebrated the event symbolically and physically unifying the two sides of the Transalpina square, around the old central station between Gorizia and Nova Gorica and the old site of the Iron Curtain border.¹⁷⁰ On the same day Italian flags were covering all of

¹⁶⁸ *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, 8 March 2001, 27 November 2007.

¹⁶⁹ Besides the greater engagement of local authorities, Gorizia hosts initiatives such as the civic movement “Pax et Concordia” aimed at trans-border and trans-ethnic cooperation, or the scientific institution Istituto culturale Mitteleuropeo, which promotes the role of this area for scientific and cultural Central European integration and collaboration. Trieste hosts the club “Istria” which aims at building bridges between cultures, but the number of its members and its capacity to attract people and to occupy spaces in the public opinion are very limited if confronted with the other clubs and associations promoted by refugees or their descendants in Trieste.

¹⁷⁰ The concert was organized by the three main Italian trade unions, who symbolically decided to celebrate the annual national May Day festival in Gorizia/Nova Gorica on the day Slovenia entered the EU, <http://archivio.rassegna.it/2004/speciali/primomagGIO/1maggio.htm>, last visited 2009-08-20.

the main streets in Trieste, as a sign of welcome for the annual meeting of the *Alpini*, a traditional patriotic Italian military corps, which was to be held two weeks later in the city.

On the day of the Slovenian entrance into the EU, the President of the European Commission Romano Prodi visited both Trieste and Gorizia. In Trieste, Prodi held a memorable speech at the prestigious Verdi theatre, saying that “everything conspires for Trieste to become the center of gravity... Here you have a great opportunity to move out of the margins and become the center” (Waley, 2009: 251). The speech was addressed to local dignitaries, but outside the theatre people were not cheering like in many small locations of the border area. No special outdoor and open event was organized in Trieste to welcome Slovenia in the European Union or to celebrate the end of the old stiff Italian-Yugoslav border, even by the local Slovenes. Hopes were confronted by cynicism, disbelief and, mostly, by the peculiar local skepticism also among local Slovenes, whose complaining and recriminating attitudes have often had the effect to legitimize more than to abrade the **Italian image of the city.**

During the 1990s many wished that the city would benefit from the conjuncture of European enlargement and economic expansionism towards the east. However, the weight of the past political legacies has been an obstacle to the desired role of Trieste as a key center and open city oriented towards the new Eastern markets and possibilities. The very poor investments for the improvement of the rail and road **communications east of Venice are one of the signs of the minimal engagement by the Italian state.** Still, the problems lay also in Triestines’ (real or supposed) attitudes. Local politicians have been very cautious in encouraging open cooperation with Slovenian and Croatian counterparts. The openings by the former mayor Illy were not always welcome by the politicians from his side, and fiercely criticized by skeptical political opponents. More limited efforts by the new center-right mayor Roberto Dipiazza to promote economic and cultural trans-border cooperation have not been encouraged by his allies, whose stances and attitudes usually reveal a coldness rather than openness.

The idea of Trieste as Italian outpost has a long tradition that goes back to the nineteenth century (and before, according to the nationalist narrative)^[7], but it had thrived with the ethno-national and ideological drives during and after the two world wars, and it had been implemented by the population exchanges and its inclusion in the Italian state. If we look at the demographic composition of Trieste in 1910 and in 1991, we see that “the percentage of people that immigrated to Trieste from Italy increased remarkably (from 11% to 17%)” while “the number of immigrants from western Slovenia decreased (from 12% to only 1%), as did the number of the immigrants from the rest of Yugoslavia (from 10% to less than 1%), and also from Austria (from 5% to 0%)” (Bufon and Minghi, 2000:122-123). Bufon and Minghi see the increase of the number of immigrants from Istria (from 8% to 14%) as a tool for better trans-border communication. In contrast, **the role of the Istrians in Trieste was to augment the sense of Italian-ness of Trieste.** The high number of abandonments from the Yugoslav controlled area after the Second World War had a strong impact on the demographic and political equilibrium in Trieste and in the surrounding karstic area, inhabited traditionally by strong and compact Slovene populations (Volk, 2003). The cultural and psychological consequences were possibly stronger, as Trieste acquired from Rijeka the role of the Italian sentinel towards the “Slav-communist East.”

After the Second World War, the refugees had already their natural passage in Trieste, which in the first postwar years was in many ways a “displaced persons camp” (Ballinger, 2008). Many Triestines and Istrians left the European continent but many others came back to Trieste from their provisional destination in the Italian peninsula. Trieste became a privileged destination for many refugees who were unsatisfied with their accommodation in other Italian places and felt **Trieste much closer to their places of origins.** In sum, about 60,000 residents emigrated from Trieste, being replaced by about the same number of refugees from former Italian lands ceded to Yugoslavia

[7] On this issue, a still very useful publication is the 1912 book by Angelo Vivante, republished various times in Italy and recently in Croatia in 2002.

(Ballinger 2006: 155). In 1948, there were 279,000 residents in Trieste, out of which 12,800 came from Istria. The following year the Istrians' number rose up to 15,000-20,000 and in 1950 to about 30,000 (Purini, 2005: 258). According to the 1961 census the whole province of Trieste had around 300,000 inhabitants, of which 71,000 were born in the old parts of the Julian March then belonging to Yugoslavia (Purini, 2005: 267).

The overall number of *esuli* is a matter of dispute. Estimates by scholars vary from 220,000 to 270,000 people (Columni, 1980; Žerjavić, 1997; Cattaruzza, Dogo and Pupo, 2000; Wörsdörfer, 2004; Mileta Mattiuz, 2005; Pupo, 2006). National public opinion has somehow accepted the more striking and powerful number of “350,000 Italians,” which has been long promoted by unreliable nationalist studies (above all by Luigi Papo and Flaminio Rocchi) and superficial journalist narrations (above all by Arrigo Petacco), and has been legitimized by monuments, celebrations, newspapers, and many politicians.

The big number of Triestine inhabitants born in Istria has been seen as a resource for the strengthening of Triestine-Istrian communication and common regional identification (Bufon and Minghi, 2000: 124). However, besides the problem of the old and persisting strong stereotypes against Istrians, it must be emphasized that the Istrians who arrived in Trieste as refugees have strongly contributed to the broadening of the barrier between Italy and Yugoslavia. They have often rejected their eventual links with the Slavic culture and have generally identified with a nationalist version of Italian identity. Large numbers of Istrians have therefore deeply affected the political and electoral confrontation in Trieste and also influenced the way the “Istrian exodus” (the *esodo*) was portrayed by the media and generally perceived by the local public opinion. According to this rhetoric, the *esodo* reflected a choice for freedom and for preserving Italian national identity, albeit the complaints about Yugoslav communist brutality against Italians and for the violent measures taken to ensure their flight

[72] Papo de Montona, 1997; Rocchi, 1984; Petacco, 2003.

have been always included in the justification of this forced exodus. The idea of the *esodo* as an “Italian plebiscite” circulated from the very beginning and presently prevails in the Italian public opinion.¹⁷³ Due to the publications and social activities of the exiles’ associations, individual memories slowly adapted to a canon and to a rhetoric that basically excluded any other non-political choice of the migration (Nemec, 1998; Smith, 2008; Dota, 2009).

It is problematic to consider all the exiled individuals as “ethnic Italians.” Ethnic and national identities and belongings, ethnic origins, languages of use, and mother tongue languages often did not necessarily correspond in Istria. Istrian refugees opted for Italian citizenship and identified with Italian identity. Their identity choice was not always a product of old family traditions, but was often historically and socially determined by their individual or contemporary family option, or by relatively recent processes of Italianization, in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. Some of the refugees were Croats and Slovenes who knew little Italian, but in general most of the refugees from Istria and Rijeka could easily interact in a romance vernacular and present themselves as Italians, regardless of their origins, mother tongue, and family linguistic patterns. Twenty years of imposed, though not always completely enforced, Italian mono-linguistic public interaction had strengthened the Italian character of the whole area, although in many parts Slovenian and Croatian identities persisted.¹⁷⁴ The Italian identification of many inhabitants of Istria and Rijeka did grow, especially among the young people who had moved to the towns in the interwar years, weakening their bonds with the villages and families of origins. Still, these freshly urbanized families, as many inhabitants of Istrian rural mixed areas, were living on the edge of multilingual-

¹⁷³ The words of most of the Italian newspapers and politicians during the 2009 commemorations of the victims of the *foibe* and of the *esodo* offer a striking example of this. The author thanks Franko Dota for the ANSA (Italian press agency) reports of the 2009 Italian commemoration of the *Giorno del ricordo* (Day of Remembrance). Other sources used by the author were the articles on this topic by the Trieste newspaper *Il Piccolo* in 2009.

¹⁷⁴ On this topic see the results of the secret census conducted by Italian administration in 1939 in: Mattossi and Krasna, 1998.

ism and stabilized into Italian, Croatian, or Slovenian identity after the Second World War, due to family circumstances, political-ideological preferences, job opportunities, social constraints, or personal choices. Many Croatian and Slovenian Istrians, including (and maybe especially) those leaving Yugoslavia from the countryside, integrated into a stable Italian national pattern only after immigrating to Italy. Some others went through a process of Italianization as members of the Italian minority in postwar Yugoslavia. Many other people did not “stabilize” into any identity, and their capacity to use both Romance and Slavic dialects as a mother tongue (mostly Istro-Venetian and Chakavian) allowed them to adapt to different social circumstances and to maintain a distanced attitude towards strong national or ethnic identifications. Istrian regionalism became an identity answer to this attitude but only from the 1990s, and in some moments Yugoslavism was also perceived as a bigger umbrella for Istrian-Italian communists. Illusion and disillusion with the Yugoslav regime were a factor for choices regarding where to live and which identity to lean towards, especially when individuals and families went through difficult life experiences. Violence and threats had a big influence on life choices when war came to the region. As was the case during fascism, postwar detention in camps or prisons and persecutions by police, by individuals, groups, or the entire neighborhood/community, but also relationships with the party organizations (as affiliated, constrained collaborator, or maltreated) and the 1948 Tito-Stalin break, influenced both ideological and also national orientations. Therefore, it is not rare to find families whose members were partly living in Trieste before the war and with the years acquired a stronger and conscious or even radical Italian identity, while their siblings remaining in Istria and Rijeka had different choices: fervid or moderate Croatian or Italian identity, or fervid Istrian support closer to Croatian, Italian, or Yugoslav identity.

It is an illusion to screen the ethnic identities of those who left Istria and Rijeka, and to consider them first and foremost Italians, even if many of them became the most radical Italians. Likewise, it is hard to find a single explanation for their abandonment. A mixture of political,

ideological, and national reasons played a significant role in the decisions to leave. Many left for fear of reprisals, for their political views, or because they held a social-economic position or a state job (especially in some sectors like local administration, police, or tax collection) which exposed them to the label of “enemy of the people.” Some were deprived of their homes. Many factors should be recognized, starting from the linguistic, psychological, and economic insecurities of the radically modified social and political environment. High social status and economic position became a disadvantage on the new upside-down reality, but the community component was also particularly relevant: even the people that at first did not intend to leave their homes, shops, fields, their beloved places of birth and everyday existence, were somehow forced to move when the towns and villages literally emptied. This is true even for the last waves of migration in the 1960s. At this point, it was easier to obtain a passport and the choice to flee was less a matter of constraint, so many migrated because of a desire for social and economic improvement. This is not to say that political, cultural, and linguistic factors did not matter anymore. Political justifications were crucial for the integration in many communities in exile, but even migrants who did not strongly socialize with the exiles’ associations gradually developed a political consciousness of their migration.

Some of the new exiles did not completely leave Istria and maintained strong social relationships with the places of origins. Some of them even resettled back, or built houses for holidays and for their retirement. Since the middle of the 1960s, all exiles enjoyed the softening of the border, and some of the people who had cut their ties with the members of those who “remained” (*rimasti*) visited their old birthplaces. For many others the trauma of the exile proved to be too strong for a return. In many cases the memory of violence, suffered personally or by family members, was crucial in the refusal to visit their birthplaces. In general, it seems that the changes brought by the political and economic liberalization in Yugoslavia from the 1960s to the 1980s did not have a great effect in the way the *other*

was perceived across the borders. Indeed, since the border logic was reproduced also inside the families, a soft curtain of prejudices and silences was running across families dividing brothers and sisters who had chosen different states to live in (even if the choice to stay or to flee had been a matter of pressure). The wars in the 1990 would have a much greater emotional effect in revitalizing old stereotypes of violent and uncivilized Slavic attitudes.

The 1990s Yugoslav wars caused the wide circulation of words and categories like genocide and ethnic cleansing, which started to be used for the Upper Adriatic case. The exile organizations used their impressive publishing capacities, in terms of periodicals and monographs, and their influence on the local Triestine and Italian public opinion, to bring this issue to the local and national agenda. Politicization of the refugee communities has been crucial in the development of the intermixture of individual, collective, and public memory and discourses of the *esodo*. **An important factor of the politicization of the migration to Italy was the socialization into the exiles organization, where many people found their new community, while a factor of de-politicization was the close contact with the people and places of origin.** In Italy, but also in Australia and in the Americas, the refugees tried to reinforce kinship and community ties: they established new Istrian communities in exile and strengthened their networks and associations. **The politicization of these communities in exile was a peculiar element of the refugees in Italy, who had been scattered all along the Italian peninsula, often suffering the same or similar derogatory labels they had faced in Yugoslavia, above all their presumed association to fascism.** This label pushed the exiles towards a right-wing and patriotic orientation in the years of the cultural and intellectual hegemony of the left in Italy. Italian identity became a shelter for the refugees and also their main explanation for the flight. The strong Italian left-right political confrontation also favored the right-wing positioning of the refugees, who found political support in the Catholic Church, in Trieste's Christian Democratic Party, and in right-wing parties and organizations. Right-wing parties and organizations have been constantly close to the

refugees at both the local and the national level, and right-wing orientation has been connoting to the present time most of the organized associations of the exiles.

As mentioned above, fear was also an important reason to leave, albeit not the main one. In the development of the collective memory of the exiles, fear became a recurring motive (along with the wish to preserve Italian identity) in the explanation of the abandonment. As shown by the recent research of Alessandro Cattunar, the memories of the elders developed and consolidated in a framework of public management of history relying upon strong national divisions and personal traumatic experiences (Cattunar, 2008: 28). The past provides a symbolic framework for the individuals and groups by which they conceptualize their existence and, in the case of the exiles, reaffirm the reasons for their choices in the public arena of socialization interaction. Many memories and events of the exiles' past acquired with years a canonic configuration, especially when dealing with memories of violence.

3. *The foibe narrative*

The violence, and in particular the mass killings, during and immediately after the Second World War, are commonly called "*foibe*." This is the Italian word for karstic pits common in the Upper Adriatic littoral. During the war, these pits were used not only as occasional disposals, places where to bury carcasses of animals or hide things, but also as the nameless tombs of many human beings. Soldiers, irregular combatants, and civilian suspects and enemies of different nationalities found their tombs in the *foibe*. In September 1943, after Italy surrendered, about three hundred civilians, mainly Italians or Croatian collaborators, were thrown in the *foibe* by the Yugoslav partisans and pro-Yugoslav local inhabitants. The exact number of people killed in that period is not certain. It has estimated to be from three to five hundred people, even if this number is based primarily on the

amount of disappeared people, regardless the circumstances of their death (Dukovski, 2001; Pupo and Spazzali, 2003; Scotti 2008). In the following period the German and Italian armies killed about thirteen thousand partisans and civilian suspects of collaborating with the partisans. These people were usually buried by their relatives and as a rule did not end in the *foibe*. Still, the plaques in every single village of the Istrian peninsula testify the extensiveness of the repression between 1943 and 1945. At the end of the war, in the last military operations during the German retreat, local inhabitants threw the corpses of dead German soldiers along with military material into the karstic pits. About ten thousand civilians were arrested by the Yugoslav authorities or kidnapped by pro-Yugoslav civilians in Trieste, Gorizia, Rijeka, and Istria. Some returned, but many were sentenced to death far from Trieste and Gorizia. Many civilians disappeared and were killed, but they were usually not thrown into the *foibe*. The uncertainty of the destiny of these people and of their corpses fostered the myth of the *foibe*, which materially and symbolically are obscure and impervious places where to throw or hide things. The act of hiding corpses has been considered as a specificity of the *foibe* (Pupo, 2007). The word *foiba* as such became a metaphor for the violence against, and the killings of, Italians, perpetrated in particular by Yugoslavs and pro-Yugoslav forces against ethnic Italians. As a result, the assassination of Italians and Croats or Slovenes carried out by German and Italian military forces in 1941-45 and the assassination of Italian citizens of Slovenian and Croatian ethnic background by Yugoslav oriented communist partisans in 1943-45 are both excluded from the definition of *foibe*, even if and when they took place in karstic pits (Franzineti, 2006). The wide use of the term *foibe* in the public discourse contributed to its acceptance among Italian publicists and historians. At first the term was a feature of Italian right-wing rhetoric, but it slowly penetrated the Italian public discourse. Italian historians openly adopted this term also because of its widespread usage in the local public opinion (Pupo and Spazzali, 2003).¹⁷⁵ Historians and journalists such as Sandi Volk,

¹⁷⁵ In a more recent work, Raul Pupo has partly modified the position expressed in the book

Alessandra Kerševan, Claudia Cernigoi, and Giacomo Scotti (often labeled as “negationists”) confute the use of this term, particularly in historiography. One reason is that there is uncertainty over the number and nationality of the people who were actually thrown into the *foibe*. Moreover, they fear that obsessing over the memory of the *foibe* and the partisan crimes will cause the de-criminalization of fascist crimes and suggest the equivalence between fascists and the fighters against German and Italian occupation.

It is still a matter of dispute to what extent the victims were part of a plan to kill Italians and to push them to leave the area, or if they were more victims of rough justice and non-planned reprisals, whether they were chosen because of their political responsibilities or because of their administrative function or political roles, or because of their possessions. The reasons for the killings include all these and other variables as well, including personal reprisals and private reasons. In any case, although the use of the term *foibe* is ambiguous, it is true that many people disappeared and were killed, even if they were not thrown into the *foibe*. The number of civilian casualties in the northern Adriatic was lower than in other areas where the Yugoslav partisans fought, but even if it is not proven that there ever existed a plan against them, in practice Italians were targeted by Tito’s forces. Some of the problems lay in the difficulties to establish who was an Italian, as the word “ethnic Italian” is of little use in an area of social, spontaneous, and forced Italianization. Because of their actions and choices, people could be easily fit into different categories or fields (ethnic, social, political, or military), according to different contingencies and moments in time. The different readings and interpretations of the *foibe* are often based on assumptions of the presumed identity of the disappeared people. It is not so relevant, therefore, to establish the reasons and motives of the actions, but the historic responsibilities in order to prove accountability that can be used in the present day political arena.

with Roberto Spazzali, criticizing the uncritical adoption of the word *foibe* as a historiographic category to express all the killings and violence by Croatian and Slovenian communist partisans against Italians in Trieste and Istria (Pupo, 2007).

This happens normally with the political use of the commemorations of the victims. Because of the difficult and unsuccessful exhumations after 1945, any *foiba* of the Kras plateau (as a real or presumed site of violence or mass grave), can become a place for contemporary mourning, for the commemoration of the Unknown Soldier, and as a means for calling the attention of the public opinion on this issue.

The commemorations of the victims of the *foibe* and of the *esodo* currently catalyze the attention of public opinion (not only in Trieste), historians and survivors, as well as politicians. In the last twenty years, intellectuals and politicians from the moderate left or with communist backgrounds have raised this issue, blaming their own side for the “silence.” This “silence” did not take place in Trieste, but among the national public memory and historical discourse. Until twenty years ago, the Italian historical narrative did not mention the *foibe*, but occasionally debated the issue of the partisan reprisals on the fascist combatants. Fascist veterans were free to narrate their war experiences in the postwar Italian democratic republic, but they were marginalized by the prevailing anti-fascist rhetoric of public discourse on the Second World War. Similarly, the *esodo* and the *foibe* were omitted from the prevailing national narrative.

The narratives and testimonies of the RSI veterans had not been silenced or censored but had been extremely marginalized by the prevailing antifascist rhetoric of the Italian Republic, founded in 1946 and legitimized by a political settlement among the Italian antifascist bloc of Catholic, Liberal, Socialist and Communist parties. A similar mechanism had kept the memory and the experiences of the Istrian refugees at the margin of national public opinion. Raising such issues would probably have had the effect to reconsider the Italian responsibilities in the Second World War, the question of Italian aggression on Yugoslavia, and the case of unprosecuted Italian war criminals. It has been observed, also, that the ruling Christian Democrats did not raise the issues of the mistreatments and violence on the Italian ethnic population of the Julian March in order to not jeopardize the friendship with (the anti/non-Soviet) Yugoslavia, while the main opposition

party (the Communist Party) did not intend to open a discussion on the Italian partisans' rough justice nor cast blame on the Italian and European communist partisan movements.

Antifascism was a founding element of the 1948 Republican constitution and during the Cold War period, an antifascist historical narrative prevailed in Italian historiography. Fascism was openly condemned, but some of its implications were not widely discussed or recognized in the public arena. The mistreatment of national minorities was never strongly debated outside the areas of their settlement. The scarce attention paid to the memory of the Istrian exiles and of the "Yugoslav massacres" avoided uneasy confrontations with the consequences of twenty years of the anti-Slavic fascist regime in the Julian March, or with the legacy of colonialism. Fascism was recognized as responsible for the alliance with Nazism and for the war, but Italy had also paid the consequences of involvement in the war. The idea of the war as a logical outcome of the fascist policy was widespread, but the condemnation and criminalization of the overall fascist experience left out of the debate some particularly sensitive issues. For instance, Italian colonization in Africa was condemned but the myth of the "good Italian soldier" persisted.¹⁷⁶ The activity of the fascist tribunals and the fascist repression acts were part of the collective memory in many areas of northern Italy, but Italian public opinion was scarcely aware of the existence of the concentration camps against Slavs in Italy and of the implications and nature of the brutal Italian occupation of Yugoslavia from 1941 to 1943 (Gobetti, 2007; Conti, 2008).

In the transition of the Italian political parties from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, *foibe* and *esodo* have been freely discussed without a strong confrontation with Italian responsibilities, invoked only by the left-wing and Slovenian intellectuals, and used as an instrument of political legitimization. For the right-wing party MSI, insisting on these Second World War issues has helped to keep it in touch with its old anti-communist electorate during its transformation

¹⁷⁶ Angelo Del Boca wrote many books concerning this subject. See, for instance, Del Boca, 2005.

into a non-fascist party representing both patriotic and victims' issues (Franzineti, 2006: 88). For the former Italian Communist Party (transformed into the Left Democrats and eventually into the Democratic Party with the left-wing faction of the Christian Democrats), promoting the idea of moral justice for the victims of the *esodo* and the *foibe* has helped legitimize its new non-communist stance. The party transition was accompanied by the evolution of many former communist-oriented historians, who became much more sensitive to these issues, after having marginalized them for years. This produced the strengthening of a local binary historiographic confrontation along national-ideological lines, with recurring debates in the press, journals, books, and public events around the issues of the *foibe* and the *esodo*: an Italian-oriented narrative portrayed by academic and non-academic historians, intellectuals, and common readers, and countered by a radical left and Slovenian group of readers, intellectuals, and historians.

The contextualization invoked by left-wing and Slovenian intellectuals has found space in historical publications and the press. Continuous commemorations of fascist and of partisan victims or personalities constantly reopen public debates in Trieste, reinserting the memory of the Second World War into everyday discourse. Every year at the beginning of May, celebrations of the "Liberation from Fascism and Nazism" are organized in many villages of the Kras plateau around Trieste. In the same month, the refugees and their organizations commemorate all the victims of the *foibe* at the National Monument of Basovizza, at the margins of a mine pit where in May 1945 an unknown number of people were killed and supposedly thrown in. In the same village, Slovenian and partisan organizations commemorate every year the "Four Martyrs of Basovizza," executed in 1930 because of their antifascist terrorist activity. Inaugurations commemorating streets, plaques, and monuments take place also in the city: on 21 February 2010, the President of the Italian Deputy chamber Gianfranco Fini inaugurated a monument to the martyr of the Istrian *foibe* Norma Cossetto in the already inaugurated Via Cossetto; on 13 May a street (*scalinata* Granbassi) was inaugurated to remember a local radio an-

chorman and editor in chief of *Il Piccolo* during fascism, **Mario Granbassi**, who died as a fascist volunteer in the Spanish Civil War. Many intellectuals, as well as communist and Slovene political activists opposed the naming of a street after Granbassi, denouncing the lack of public memory of the fascist dictatorship in the area and of the repression against the antifascist activists or “alien enemies” (local Croats-Slovenes) during the Second World War, which caused the death of thousands. These events were part of the local public memories and debates throughout the Cold War in Trieste, especially regarding the fascist dictatorship, but are left out of the post-Cold War commemorative trend. In the last twenty years, both the local and the national Italian media and the public opinion have predominantly focused their attention on the Partisans’ “guilt,” related to the expulsions and assassinations during the 1943 Istrian Partisan uprising and during the forty days of the Yugoslav “occupation” of Trieste in May 1945.

The only “place” of antifascist memory actively promoted by Triestine authorities is the Nazi concentration and extermination camp of Risiera di San Sabba (in Trieste). After the end of the Second World War, Italian institutions incorporated the memory of the antifascist struggle and officially held manifestations at monuments such as the Risiera di San Sabba, but were reluctant to revive the memory of the fascist and Italian responsibilities in Yugoslavia and of the mistreatment and detainment of civilians from the Upper Adriatic in Italian concentration camps (such as Porzus and Arbe/Rab). The occupation/liberation of Trieste, the Italo-Yugoslav diplomatic confrontation, and the issues of the *foibe* and *esodo* are all elements of a divided memory which has animated the ideological and political confrontation in a frame of contested views and memories, that in the last six years was strongly reinforced by the state-promoted celebration of the “Day of Remembrance” (*Giorno del ricordo*).

At the national level, the role of the long-marginalized fighters of Mussolini’s Italian Social Republic has been reconsidered in the reinterpretation of the last two years of war in Italy as a civil war between antifascist communist and pro-Allied partisans, on one side, and fas-

cist pro-Nazi armies on the other (Pavone, 1991). The post-Cold War reconfiguration of the Italian political balance and discourses opened the possibilities for a reconsideration of the divisions of the Second World War and also for a renewed presence in the national agenda and public opinion for Trieste, Istria, and their past.

The new interest in the Italian “Eastern border” has developed at a historical and political level. Books on regional history have always sold well in Trieste, but not so in the rest of Italy. In recent years Istria and its dramatic Second World War legacy have enjoyed a renewed interest among Italian professional and non-professional historians and readers. Political leaders have also been pushing the agenda. Leaders of the former Communist parties, in Trieste and in Rome, started to confront the issues of the exodus and of the *foibe*, which had been always neglected by the local and national left and provoked debates and confrontations with post-fascist leaders. In 1998, the President of the Italian Deputy Chamber and prominent figure of the former PCI, Luciano Violante, met in Trieste with the Italian post-fascist leader Gianfranco Fini, who is currently holding this position. The meeting was instrumental for the legitimization of both former communists and former fascists in the new post-Cold War political order, in a strategy of reconciliation at the national and local level.

4. Conclusion

The Istrian Exile, the *foibe*, and the Risiera di San Sabba are the main “places of memory” through which individual memories have been channeled into collective and political narratives of the Second World War. In some official commemorations and appraisals of local tragedies of the Second World War, the fascist legacy and the policy against Slovenian minorities between the two World Wars have been mentioned, but Italian responsibilities have hardly been brought to the public’s attention. As the Triestine journalist Paolo Rumiz has recently observed, by focusing the memory debates on the Nazi-led Risiera

concentration and extermination camp on one side, and the Exile and partisan massacres on the other, the result has had the indirect effect of containing Italian responsibilities in the Julian March (*Il Piccolo*, 10 February 2009).

In 2004, the Italian Parliament established the *Giorno del Ricordo* (The Day of Remembrance) with a sponsorship of all right, center and moderate left deputies. The *Giorno del ricordo* is organized by Italian authorities on 10 February of every year “to preserve and to renew the memory” of the people that lost their lives in the Northern Adriatic with the seizure of power by Yugoslav partisans and Yugoslav authorities, and of those who fled from Istria, Rijeka, and Dalmatia during or after the Second World War. The law officially commemorates “Italians and all the victims of the *foibe*” and also “the sensitive, complex matter of Italy’s eastern border,” but as of this writing the celebrations have not remembered other victims and dramatic events in the area such as the post-First and Second World War violence against Croats and Slovenes, and the annihilation of their languages and cultural identities during the fascist dictatorship. The law does not refer to any historical processes and events when it mentions the “sensitive, complex matter of Italy’s eastern border.” Is the issue of *fascismo di confine* (the interwar fascist movement at the Eastern Italian borders) a part of it? Is the Italian occupation of Yugoslavia? Are the concentration camps for communists, Croats, and Slovenes? Or is it only the Risiera that should be commemorated? An analysis of the events taking place on the occasion of the 2009 commemorations of the *Giorno del Ricordo* shows that among these “places of memory” only the Risiera is commemorated by Triestine and National authorities. Hundreds of events take place in Italy in the week between 7 February and 14 February, but the official speeches only rarely mention the Risiera and never mention fascism. Only a few intellectuals and historians try to place *foibe* and *esodo* in a historical framework. All sides speak of reconciliation, but official speeches mostly indulge on placing Italy and the Italians exclusively on the victim’s side.

The Day of Remembrance has become a day when people related

personally to the Italian refugees, and ideologically linked to their organizations or to those nationalist parties and associations who have always pushed this issue into the Triestine and Italian public opinion, meet. Nevertheless, leaders of these parties and of the refugee organizations in Italy, as well as the Italian minority leaders in Croatia and Slovenia, publicly promote this day as an occasion to remember not only the tragedies but all the Italians originally from Istria, Rijeka and Dalmatia, including those still living there (those who “remained,” often publicly accused by some “exiles” of being “traitors”). Unfortunately, the Italian exclusive identity of the celebration limits any concrete possibility of common interaction in the celebration with Croatian and Slovene authorities and population.

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