

ADDITIONS, INTEGRATIONS, CORRECTIONS AND SUPPLEMENTS TO THE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ARNOLD JOSEPH TOYNBEE*

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Integrations and Corrections to Part I,
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321) No. 318 – *U.S. Politics Called Fulcrum of Western Civilization* (q.v.) – was subsequently published, *with revisions by Toynbee*, as Item 1567 in S.F. Morton's *Bibliography*. A.J. Toynbee, *The Fulcrum of the Western Civilization*, in *The Age of Danger. Major Speeches on American Problems*, edited by Harold F. Harding, New York, Random House, 1952, pp. 77-80.

NOTE

According to Harold Harding (ivi, p. 77), «In the fall of 1950 Dr. Arnold Toynbee delivered three lectures at Stanford University and at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco. The text below is based upon the stenographic transcription made *at the first lecture* and later published in the "Christian Science Monitor" for 22 December 1950. Dr. Toynbee has gone over the newspaper version and has made certain revisions. In a letter to the editor dated 5 March 1951 he explains: "I always speak only from notes; I have no scripts". [...]. The title of this text was suggested by the "[Christian Science] Monitor" article. Dr. Toynbee's *other two lectures* in California dealt with "*True Religion in Contrast to Communism*" and "*The Need of Becoming Supranationally Minded*"» (my italics). As a matter of fact, a) the text of the first «C.S Monitor» article was based on Toynbee's *second* Stanford lecture (see nos. 307-308, 318, Note), b) both *True Religion in Contrast to Communism* and *The Need of Becoming Supranationally Minded* were the specific topics of Toynbee's San Francisco lecture (see nos. 311-316). On her part, S.F. Morton not quite correctly described the lecture summarized in no. 318 as «delivered at Stanford University *and* the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco» (*Bibliography*, p. 103, my italics), overemphasizing the overlaps between the Stanford and the San Francisco lectures, which addressed different audiences.

To sum up for the convenience of the reader, during his 1950 visit to California Toynbee gave a press conference and *four lectures*. These were:

1) Press conference, Stanford, Thursday morning, October 19 (no. 305);

* *A Bibliography of Arnold J. Toynbee*, compiled by S. Fiona Morton, with a Foreword by Veronica M. Toynbee, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980.

- 2) *Does History Make Sense?*, Stanford, Thursday morning, October 19 (nos. 302, 303, 319);
- 3) *Is Our Civilization on the Way Out?*, San Francisco, Friday morning, October 20 (nos. 311-316, 319-320);
- 4) *The Political Future of the Western Community*, Stanford, Friday night, October 20 (nos. 307-308, 318, 319, 321).
- 5) *The Unification of the World by the West as the Key to Modern History*, Stanford, Saturday afternoon, October 21, 1950 (no. 309).

THE FULCRUM OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION¹

By Arnold J. Toynbee

It seems to me that the domestic politics of the United States have now become the government of the Western world as a whole. This has happened since World War II, though there were symptoms of it even in World War I. I do not know how far people in this country realize this. No doubt it is an extra complication for you and an extra annoyance to you.

It is very awkward for you; you did not wish that, you did not ask for that, when you created your Constitution and worked out your party system and your way of governing yourselves; you did all this for yourselves and for your own national purposes. You never asked or wished that your domestic politics should become of vital importance to the Western world as a whole.

And yet, owing to the central and preponderant position of the United States in our common Western community, we in my country, Great Britain, and the rest of us in all the other countries of the Western world or countries that are even remotely associated with the Western world, follow your politics, I think, with greater interest and with greater anxiety nowadays than we follow our own local politics.

Why this interest in American politics outside the United States? It is because we have all come to realize that American politics have become a matter of life and death for us. We have not votes, but, though we cannot vote for the President of the United States, he is the most important executive official that we possess. We have no voice in who is to be Secretary of State, but he is the most important diplomatic officer that we possess. You did not ask for it; we did not ask for it; but that is the situation, and I do not quite see how that can last as between peoples who are all accustomed to democratic processes of self-government, and who prize this heritage of self-government almost as highly as they prize life itself.

¹ 1952 text revised by Toynbee.

A union of the democratic Western nations around the United States is, I believe, now a paramount necessity for all of us. But this union cannot, I also believe, really be placed on a sound, healthy, satisfactory, and lasting basis unless we face a problem from which we all shrink. We shrink from it because it clashes so much with our traditional national feelings. It is the problem of creating some kind of common government for our Western community on a democratic basis – a democratic government for the Western community as a whole.

During the last four or five hundred years, we Westerners have been insisting on these national differences of ours. We have been digging the dividing lines between one Western nation and another deeper and deeper, and we have been trying to make each of these national fractions of our Western Christendom into a separate and self-contained universe. Our respective nations have in a sense become idols. They have become perhaps the real gods that we Westerners worship under the nominal surface forms of our traditional Christianity. It seems to me that we now have to undo and reverse the whole of what you might call this secessionist movement from our common Western Christendom. We have all been guilty of this during these last four or five centuries. We must all cooperate now to rebuild the common house that we have all had a hand in breaking up.

That is very difficult because it brings us into conflict with national group emotions that have become consecrated by time and that are particularly difficult to cope with because they are not based on reason. It might well take four hundred years for so deep-rooted an institution as national sovereignty to be uprooted from peoples' hearts. If it takes three generations to change your nationality (in the sense that immigrant families are assimilated into the American scene), it might take ten generations or fifteen generations to give up some very cherished idea like national sovereignty or local independence and to accommodate ourselves to the idea of world government. Yet current history is forcing the pace and speeding up the rate of change in our feelings. If you or I today are thinking of what is happening in Korea, and if, in connection with that, we say the word "we", I think we would find ourselves meaning a much bigger "we" than we used to mean when we said "we" about war or politics. We used to mean just "we Americans", "we French", "we British"; now we mean "we Westerners".

Of course, we mean more than that. We mean not only us peoples of the Western world; we mean all freedom-loving people in the world, Western or non-Western, whatever the color of our skins, whether we are inhabitants of the New World or of the Old World, whether we are Christians or Jews, or Mohammedans or Hindus or Buddhists. We mean all of us who share the same ideas and ideals about freedom and justice and the supreme value of the individual soul.

But within that happily wide group of peoples there is a smaller group with a closer and longer past in common – the Western group – and I think we feel and know today that the Western community is a reality. Outsiders still recognize that we are in some sense a single society, a common family. But we ourselves, when we grew strong at the beginning of the modern age, found it easy to ignore the rest of the world and to indulge in the luxury of emphasizing our domestic national differences from each other. Now that we Westerners no longer have an unchallenged and unquestioned monopoly of power in the world, our consciousness of our unity is, I believe, happily, and just in time, beginning to come back to us, and we are groping about for common institutions to express this unity once more – to give it a practical expression to meet our common need for standing together in a world that has become once again a dangerous place for the West and for its ideals.

Perhaps it is legitimate – I am sure it is both legitimate and wise to look at what one's adversary is doing when he has perhaps done, rather well and successfully, something that is also important for us. Well, we might learn something from what the Soviet Union has done about this problem of nationalities.

Let us give to nationality in our Western world a wide scope in all linguistic, cultural, and educational lines and in the field of sports, but do not let us – because we cannot afford this in face of our present Russian adversary – do not let us leave any edged tools in the hands of these local fractions of our Western world; let us place the edged tools under the control of a central Western authority. If our Western community can crystallize around North America on a footing of democratic self-government for central as well as for local purposes, we shall be so irresistibly strong that neither Russia nor anybody else outside will be able to challenge us.

Let us begin by building up the necessary common institutions behind our new common Western army as far as efficiency demands, and that will carry us very far towards a common self-government. But when we have got that far, we cannot just rest there. On the one hand, I feel it would be a mistake to think that we can shirk the question of a common political constitution. On the other hand, it would be equally a mistake if we were to develop our common institutions on lines that would be unnecessarily provocative to the national sentiments that are so deeply planted in the hearts of all Western peoples.

Let us take the moderate, statesmanlike way but, in taking it, let us not shirk the problem of providing, not merely a common Western army, but a common democratic form of self-government for our threatened and precious common Western world.