We introduce a relaxed Nash equilibrium concept for strategic form games, called emph{quasi-Nash equilibrium}, which exists in every diagonally transfer quasi-concave games. The quasi-Nash equilibrium has the property to be stable with respect to perturbations on both payoff functions and mistakes in playing pure strategy profiles. We compare our relaxed equilibrium with the emph{Reny equilibrium} (introduced in a recent paper) and give stability properties for the Reny equilibrium.

Remarks on the existence and stability of some relaxed Nash equilibrium in strategic form games / Scalzo, Vincenzo. - In: ECONOMIC THEORY. - ISSN 0938-2259. - 61:3(2016), pp. 571-586. [10.1007/s00199-015-0917-4]

Remarks on the existence and stability of some relaxed Nash equilibrium in strategic form games

SCALZO, VINCENZO
2016

Abstract

We introduce a relaxed Nash equilibrium concept for strategic form games, called emph{quasi-Nash equilibrium}, which exists in every diagonally transfer quasi-concave games. The quasi-Nash equilibrium has the property to be stable with respect to perturbations on both payoff functions and mistakes in playing pure strategy profiles. We compare our relaxed equilibrium with the emph{Reny equilibrium} (introduced in a recent paper) and give stability properties for the Reny equilibrium.
2016
Remarks on the existence and stability of some relaxed Nash equilibrium in strategic form games / Scalzo, Vincenzo. - In: ECONOMIC THEORY. - ISSN 0938-2259. - 61:3(2016), pp. 571-586. [10.1007/s00199-015-0917-4]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11588/631307
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